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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JULY-OCTOBER, 1936.

PINDAR, *PYTHIAN XI*.

THE story of Orestes in Pindar's *Pythian XI* presents two problems. First, there is the manner of its introduction; as Wilamowitz says, 'ganz äusserlich ist die Verbindung mit dem Mythos¹.' After praising the victory of the Theban Thrasydaeus in the Pythian Games Pindar moves with astonishing abruptness to the story of Agamemnon's death and the vengeance of Orestes. At first sight nothing could be more superficial than the way in which Pindar passes to the myth. Thrasydaeus has glorified his home

ἐν ἀφνειαῖς ἀρούραισι Πυλάδα
νικῶν ξένου Λάκωνος Ὀρέστα,
τὸν δὲ φονευμένου πατρός κτλ.

—'winning in the rich ploughlands of Pylades, the friend of Spartan Orestes, whom when his father was murdered, etc.' The transition to the myth seems to be effected by a mere association of ideas. Delphi suggests Pylades, who suggests Orestes, whose story is told. But this difficulty is small compared with the second. The scholiast's comment on the whole myth, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς σφόδρα ἀκαίρῳ παρεκβάσει ἐχρήσατο², has been endorsed by most scholars, and the relevance of the story of Orestes to Pindar's main theme is an unsolved problem³. What has the tragic story of Agamemnon's murder to do in a hymn sung at Thebes for a Theban athlete, and what can be Pindar's motive for introducing it?

I.

Pindar's choice of a myth is not always explained by the words with which he introduces it. On the contrary, he often employs an apparently superficial motive to introduce a myth whose real meaning is of great weight and importance. But both the superficial means of introduction and the real lesson contained in the myth may usually be explained by reference to the poem which contains them. For instance, in *Olympian I* the real importance of the myth of Pelops is that it is a lesson on the bad and the good king, on Tantalus who abused the gods' kindness and was punished and on Pelops who trusted in them and was rewarded. As such the myth is relevant to Hieron, who has it in his power to become either a bad king like Tantalus or a good king like Pelops. But this profound lesson is not adumbrated in the words which introduce the myth. For this Pindar simply makes use of the connection between Pelops and Olympia which he founded as a Lydian colony. Hieron has won at Olympia, and this, it seems, is a good enough reason to tell the story of Pelops. The real meaning of the myth is kept till the end of the poem with its solemn words on the high duties of kingship. So in considering *Pythian XI* we need not expect the way in which the myth is introduced to throw any light on its essential relevance, nor need we assume that the lighthearted association of names which starts it necessarily shows that Pindar had not something very serious on his mind. We should rather try to see what connection, if any, Orestes has with the festival at which the ode was sung, and what lesson Pindar intends by telling this story of murder and revenge.

The first question then is—why does Pindar mention Orestes at all in a Theban

¹ Pindaros p. 260.

² Schol. *Pyth. XI* 23 a.

NO. III., VOL. XXX.

³ Cf. L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar I* p. 146.

poem? Has his presence here some justification in Theban rites or tradition? Hitherto there has been little known connection between Orestes and Thebes, but a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus, published by Italian scholars¹, throws a new light on the problem. The papyrus is short and fragmentary, but its language leaves no doubt that it contains the beginning of a poem by the Boeotian poetess Corinna. It consists of a title and the middle part of five lines:

ΟΡΕΣΤΑΣ

ῥο]ας μὲν Ὠκινῶ λιπῶσα τ[
]ιαρὸν φάος σελάνα σπασα[
]ψ· Ὠρῆ δ' ἐς Διὸς ἀμβρότι[
]· Φέαρὸς ἐν ἄνθεσι γεγα[
]συν χορὸς ἀν' ἐπτάπουλον[Θεΐβαν

The metre of the fragment is not obvious and therefore all supplements are extremely hazardous, but Coppola's ῥο[ας in 1 seems probable and Diehl's [Θεΐβαν in 5 gives a more than probable sense, even if it is not verbally right. In 3 it looks as if σελάνα were the subject, and in that case we must divide not σελάνας πασα[but σελάνα σπασα[and assume that Corinna wrote some word like σπασα[μένα. In most places we must leave the fragment unsupplemented, but even so its relevance to *Pythian II* will soon be clear.

First, there is the title Ὀρέστας, which can only mean that the poem was connected with Orestes and told his story. Corinna, as we know from the Berlin papyrus, wrote narrative stories, and not only are *Helicon and Cithaeron* and *The Daughters of Asopus* traditional Boeotian legends, but the other names of poems which survive are equally Boeotian. Titles like Βοιωτός, Ἑπτ' ἐπὶ Θήβας, Εὐωνομή, Φιόλαος, speak for themselves; her Κατάπλους dealt with the return of Orion to Boeotia and her Μινονάδες with the daughters of Orchomenus. She seems to have confined herself to Boeotian stories, as was right in one who said of her own work:

καλὰ γεροῖ' αἰσομένα
 Ταναγρίδεσσι λευκοπέπλυν·
 μέγα δ' ἐμῆς γέγαθε πόλις
 λιγουροκωτίλης ἐνοπή².

There is, then, a strong presumption that her Ὀρέστας also told a 'fine old' Boeotian story, and if so Pindar had at least some reason for his choice of the story of Orestes in a poem for a Theban victor sung at Thebes.

Corinna's contribution does not end with this important fact. The occasion of her own song throws light on that of Pindar's. The word ἐπτάπουλον in 5 must refer to Thebes and so far as the sense is concerned it does not matter whether we supplement with Θεΐβαν or ἄστυ or πόλιν or πούργον. Like Pindar, Corinna composed her song to be sung at Thebes. Moreover, we know at what time of the day and night it was sung. The moon is mentioned in 2, and this surely indicates the hour of the performance. Coppola thinks that the subject of the sentence is the Dawn, and that Corinna follows the familiar Homeric phrases which tell of the Dawn rising from the streams of Ocean. The difficulty about this view is that in it the Dawn does something to the light of the moon, and Coppola assumes that the Dawn makes the moon turn pale. But such an idea seems too rhetorical for Corinna. The earliest parallel in Greek poetry is in Nonnus XLVII^e 279, and the passages which Coppola quotes from Lucan³ and Statius⁴ are concerned not with the moon but the

¹ P.S.I. X (1934). No. 1174. The fragment was first published with a full discussion by G. Coppola, *Introduzioni a Pindaro* pp. 231-242.

² Fr. 2 Diehl.

³ VIII 778-9.

⁴ *Theb.* II 134-140.

stars—a simpler and older idea. If we make *σελάνα* the subject, the sense is more natural. The moon rises from the streams of Ocean, as she does in *Homeric Hymn XXXII* 7-8:

εὖτ' ἂν ἀπ' Ὀκεανοῖο λοεσσαμένη χροά καλὸν
εἶματα ἐσσαμένη τηλαυγέα διὰ Σελήνη . . .

In that case it is possible that the missing word at the end of 1 is something that means 'spreads' or 'raises.' In any case we are concerned with the rising of the moon.

Such nocturnal song-singing was not uncommon in Thebes. The Chorus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1089-1903 refers to dancing all night long at the time of the full moon, and in general Theban *παννυχίδες* were familiar to Attic poets. Euripides knows that the Theban Dionysus holds his rites *νύκτωρ τὰ πολλά* (*Bacch.* 486), and his Bacchants sing of their *παννυχίοι χοροί* (*ibid.* 863). Moreover Pindar himself wrote hymns for such occasions, as he says explicitly in *Pythian III* 77-9:

ἀλλ' ἐπέξασθαι μὲν ἐγὼν ἐθέλω
Ματρί, τὰν κοῦραι παρ' ἐμὸν πρόθυρον σὺν
Πανὶ μέλπονται θαμὰ
σεμνὰν θεὸν ἐννύχαι.

When we turn to *Pythian XI*, we find that it too was not sung by day. The time of singing is given in 10 as *ἄκρα σὺν ἑσπέρῃ*. That this does not mean at the middle of the dusk but at the end of the dusk, when it is already night, is shown by a passage of Aristotle quoted by Athenaeus VIII 353 b.¹ He says that owls and ravens, who cannot see by day, *νύκτωρ τὴν τροφὴν ἑαυτοῖς θηρεύουσι καὶ οὐ πάσαν νύκτα ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀκρέσπερον*. It is clear that he regarded *ἡ ἀκρέσπερος* as being part of night; it is the time when dusk has already passed into dark. Pindar's poem was then sung at the first hour of night, and its hour is not far removed from that of Corinna's sung with the rising of the moon.

Next, Corinna's song was sung in the spring. This is proved by the words *Φέρος ἐν ἄνθεσι*. Moreover, she indicates that this is the beginning of a new year, for she mentions the undying Seasons coming from Zeus. Homer makes the return of the seasons mark a new year in similar languages:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ρ' ἐνιαυτὸς ἔην περὶ δ' ἔτραπον ὄραι (κ 469)

but he does not indicate at what time of our year this is. Nor indeed did the Greeks have any uniform notion when the New Year was. In Rhodes it was certainly spring, as the Swallow Song shows. In Samos the *εἰρεσιώνη* sung by the children shows that there too it was the spring and that the coming of the New Year was regarded as coincident with the return of Apollo to his Samian shrine after his winter holiday among the Hyperboreans.² The same idea existed at Thebes. Corinna's mention of the *ᾠρῃ* shows that she is concerned with an annual spring festival, and Pindar's *Paeon I* (fr. 35) shows that the return of the *ᾠραι* was connected with Apollo:

ἰὴ ἰή, νῦν ὁ παντελὴς Ἐνιαυτὸς
ᾠραι τε θεμύγονοι
πλάξιππον ἄστν Θήβας ἐπήλθον
'Απόλλωνι δαῖτα φιλησιστέφανον ἄγοντες.

At Thebes, as in Samos, the return of the Seasons was connected with a festival of Apollo. For such a festival Corinna may well have written her *Ὀρίστας*. For the story of Orestes was not unprecedented in a hymn composed for such an occasion. Two fragments of Stesichorus' *Ὀρέστεια* show that it was sung in the

¹ Cf. O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* p. 103.

² Cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* pp. 186-7.

spring,¹ and since Apollo played an important part in the story, it was probably sung at his festival. In *Pythian XI* Apollo certainly is important. Pindar summons the Theban heroines, Semela, Ino Leucothea, and Alcmena to come

παρ Μελίαν χρυσέων ἐς ἄδων τριπόδων
θησαυρόν, ὃν περὶ ἀλλ' ἐτίμασε Δοξίας,
Ἰσμήνιον δ' ὀνύμαξεν, ἀλαθέα μαντίων θῶκον. (4-6)

The song seems to be sung in the Ismenion, Apollo's shrine in Thebes, which held the tripods of the *Θηβαγενεῖς* and was a seat of divination by the inspection of burnt offerings.

Pindar's poem, then, was closely connected with the festival of Apollo, and since in this, as in its time of performance and its mention of Orestes, it agrees with Corinna's *'Ορέστας*, it seems likely that it was written for a festival of the same character as hers. Moreover, it is remarkable that in this Epinician heroines play an important part. Not only are three summoned to Apollo's shrine, but Melia, the mother of Ismenus, is regarded as already established in the shrine. This predominance of heroines would explain why Pindar and Corinna, a man and a woman, could both write for similar occasions. Corinna wrote naturally for an occasion which honoured the heroines of her own sex; Pindar, the author of Maiden-Songs, could with equal propriety write for the same occasion. It must, however, be noted that Pindar does not mention the time of year. The parallel with Corinna points to the spring, and if the festival is in the spring after Thrasydaeus' victory, it must be in the following calendar year, since the Pythian Games were held in August. Since Pindar seldom mentions the time of year, there is little difficulty in this. Nor did he mind leaving a considerable interval between an athletic victory and its celebration in song. *Olympian IX*, for instance, was composed at least two years after Epharmostus' victory in the Olympic Games of 466 B.C., and in *Olympian X* Pindar apologizes for his delay in delivering the ode. Nor are the reasons for such a delay hard to find in the case of *Pythian XI*. The victor's return was a great event, and his countrymen would be willing to wait for a grand festival, like that of Apollo, for its celebration. Apollo was the national god of Boeotia, and the payment of the victor's thanks to him was inevitably right. Moreover, this national character of the festival justified Pindar in introducing political themes into his poem. In the same way after the eclipse of April 30, 462 B.C., he voiced his fears and doubts in a Theban Paean written for Apollo.

II.

The fragment of Corinna shows among other things that the choice of the myth of Orestes in a Theban poem is not necessarily out of place. It has at least a superficial relevance in that Orestes was known in Thebes and connected with Apollo at whose shrine the poem was sung. But the deeper significance of the myth is of more importance and deserves close consideration. It is at least unlikely that Pindar would have no serious motive in telling a tragic story with an obvious moral which he certainly underlines. The natural supposition is that his powerful treatment of the story implies some definite reason for his choice of it, and the unravelling of his motives for this must now be attempted.

Pythian XI is a national Theban poem. It is therefore remarkable that Pindar goes out of his way to call Orestes *Λάκων* and closes the poem with praise of the Spartan heroes, Castor and Polydeuces. More than this, his whole treatment of the story of Orestes has a strong Spartan colouring. The murder of Agamemnon is placed at Amyclae, and in this Pindar follows the version of Stesichorus. The role

¹ Frs. 13-14 Diehl.

of the Nurse also comes from Stesichorus, though Pindar changes her name. Homer, who makes Orestes an Argive, says nothing of the Nurse and sets the murder at Mycenae. The Spartan version, which Pindar follows, took shape in the sixth century, but it did not have a wide circulation in Greece, and it is remarkable that Pindar should assume that it was both intelligible and appropriate to a Theban audience. A natural explanation for this may be found in the traditional ties which existed between Boeotia and Sparta, ties which went back to the Heroic Age and still meant much to Pindar. Heracles, the son of the Theban Alcmena, was the ancestor of the Spartan kings, but a closer connection existed in the famous clan of the Αἰγίδαι.¹ This clan had helped the Spartans to conquer Laconia and taken Amyclae for them when they failed. Their first home was Thebes, but it had sent a branch to Sparta which settled and survived there in honour and security. In the fifth century the clan was still important. Herodotus (*IV* 149) says that at Sparta there was a μεγάλη φυλή Αἰγιδῶν, and at Thebes there was a πατρία Αἰγιδῶν (Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* V 101). Moreover, the connection between the two branches of the clan was a source of pride to Pindar. In *Isthmian VII* 14 ff., in an enumeration of great events in Theban heroic history, he asks:

ἦ Δωρίδ' ἀποικίαν οὐνεκεν ὀρθῶ
ἔστασας ἐπὶ σφυρῶ
Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔλον δ' Ἀμύκλας
Αἰγίδαι σέθεν ἔκγονοι, μαντεύμασι Πυθίοις;

'Or because you set up on its feet the Dorian colony of Lacedaemonians, and your descendants, the Aegids, took Amyclae at the bidding of the Pythian Oracle?' A tie, formed in the past like this, was still a reality for Pindar.

Pindar, moreover, had special reasons for basing a connection between Thebes and Sparta on the Aegids. For he himself was an Aegid. In *Pythian V*, written for the Dorian King of Cyrene, he makes this clear. After praising Apollo's care for the Spartans he goes on to say:

τὸ δ' ἐμὸν γάρνυ
ἀπὸ Σπάρτας ἐπήρατον κλέος,
ὄθεν γεγενναμένοι
ἴκοντο Θήρανδε φῶτες Αἰγίδαι,
ἐμοὶ πατέρες, οὐ θεῶν ἄτερ. (72-6)

'And he proclaims my well-prized glory which I have from Sparta. From thence were sprung the men who came to Thera, the Aegids, kinsmen to me, not without the Gods.' Here Pindar claims a connection with Cyrene because the Cyreneans also are members of the Aegid clan. It had branches in Thebes, Sparta, Thera and Cyrene. Pindar was proud of this connection between himself and prominent members of Dorian society, and it disposed him to be friendly towards Sparta.

This affection for Sparta is prominent in *Pythian XI*. The hero of the myth is called a Laconian, although he was usually considered an Argive, and may even have had some standing in Thebes. Again, Pindar ends by praising Iolaus, Castor and Polydeuces. Iolaus was a Theban hero, but the Dioscuri were the characteristic divinities of Sparta. The conjunction of the three names means that in Thebes and in Sparta there was a tradition of heroic achievement which was a bond between the two cities. A somewhat similar point is made by Pindar in *Isthmian V* 32, where the Dioscuri in Sparta are paralleled by Iolaus in Thebes and Perseus in Argos:

ἐν δὲ Θήβαις ἱπποσώας Ἴολαος
γέρας ἔχει. Περσεὺς δ' ἐν Ἀργεῖ, Καστοπὸς δ' αἰχ—
μὰ Πολυδεύκεός τ' ἐπ' Εὐρώτᾳ ρέεθροισ.

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* pp. 477-480.

'In Thebes the horseman Iolaus is honoured, in Argos Perseus, and strong Castor and Polydeuces on the stream of Eurotas.' Nor does Pindar leave any doubt at the end of *Pythian XI*. Not only does he mention the Spartan heroes by name, but he underlines the place of their dwelling and the manner of it as it was accepted in Sparta:

καὶ Κάστωρος βίαν
σέ τε, ἀναΐ Πολύδευκες, υἱοὶ θεῶν,
τὸ μὲν παρ' ἅμαρ ἔδραυσι θεράπνας,
τὸ δ' οἰκέοντας ἐνδον Ὀλύμπου.

'Strong Castor, and you prince Polydeuces, you sons of gods, who dwell one day in graves below Therapne, and Olympus holds you on the morrow.' The emphatic close makes it clear that Pindar was seriously concerned with the Spartan twin-brethren and regarded them as types of manly virtue such as any Theban would wish his sons to be.

There is then in *Pythian XI* a strong Spartan colouring. Pindar, himself a Theban writing for a Theban festival, goes out of his way to tell a Spartan story and praise Spartan virtues. His immediate justification and superficial reason for telling the story of Orestes must of course be that somehow Orestes was connected with the festival. How this came to be we have no evidence, but it is possible that his presence was due to Delphi. Wilamowitz showed that when Pindar made Strophius dwell at the foot of Parnassus he followed a tradition not used by Aeschylus or any other known poet.¹ The same point is made earlier in the poem at 15, when Delphi is said to be in the ploughlands of Pylades. For Pindar Strophius and Pylades came from Delphi, and this may indicate that there was a Delphian version of the story. Moreover, the poem is in honour of Apollo, the Delphian God, and Apollo was essential to the story of Orestes. Orestes' presence at Thebes may naturally be connected with Apollo, under whose guidance he killed Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra. Pindar's sources lay in Sparta and Delphi, and when he used them, he must have had good reasons for preferring them to Homer.

Pindar tells the story of Orestes in an undeniably tragic spirit. His is much more than a story of revenge as it is in Homer, and it has no resemblance to the high tale of

θεῶν τε γάμους ἀνδρῶν τε δαίτας καὶ θαλίας μακάρων²

such as Stesichorus seems to have told. In a short compass Pindar finds time to discuss the motives of the tragic murderess Clytaemnestra, to speak of Cassandra, to stress the helplessness of Orestes, *νέα κεφαλά*, when he was sent off by night to Strophius, and to tell as well the main events of the story. The effect of this insistence on grim or pathetic details shows that Pindar treated the story with great seriousness and expected his hearers to treat it in the same spirit. This has, of course, been noted and reasons for it have been advanced. Wilamowitz³ argued powerfully that the poem is really a record of Pindar's own feelings when he returned to Thebes from his visit to Syracuse in 476, only to find himself attacked by his countrymen for consorting with tyrants. By this hypothesis Wilamowitz explains various points. First, he takes *αἶνὰν ὕβριν* in 55 of Pindar enemies; secondly, he thinks that *κακολόγοι πολῖται* of Clytaemnestra's enemies in 28 was suggested to Pindar by the evil speech of his own citizens against himself; thirdly, he takes the reference to tyranny in 53 to be Pindar's abjuration of any affection for the tyrannies of Theron and Hieron. On this basis he constructs a picture of Pindar returning home in 474 to find himself slandered and defending himself against his enemies.

¹ *Aischylos: Orestie II* p. 251.

² Fr. 12 Diehl

³ *Pindaros* p. 263.

Wilamowitz's interpretation is undoubtedly powerful and attractive. It faces the difficulties and finds answers to them. But these answers are not entirely satisfactory. Each of his points is open to criticism. First, the reference to αἰνὰν ὕβριν in 55 occurs in a context which has no connection with Pindar and his enemies but is concerned with the victor who, if he leads a modest life, will leave a good name to his children. This is the doctrine of *Pythian I*, where the reputations of the good Croesus and the evil Phalaris are contrasted, and it is more than once put forward by Pindar in his advice to victors. Secondly, it is hard to believe that when Pindar speaks of κακολόγοι πολῖται, he can really be thinking of the evil speech from which he has himself suffered. For this means that Pindar implicitly compares himself with the murderess Clytaemnestra. The mere hint of such a comparison would surely be an admission of guilt. Thirdly, if in his denial of tyrannies Pindar refers to his late host in Sicily, it is curious that a man so serious as he was should after this write three odes for Hieron, *Pythian III* probably in this same year of 474, *Pythian I* in 470, and *Pythian II* probably in 468. Moreover, if Pindar is defending himself, the myth has little or no relevance, and Wilamowitz is right when he says 'it is one of his darkest songs.' But though Pindar has different reasons for introducing myths, he usually has a reason, even if it is pure decoration, and here the tragic temper shows that he has something on his mind. This can hardly be a conscious sense of injustice at the way he has been treated in Thebes, since the point of Orestes' story is the triumph of justice over wickedness in the end. On Wilamowitz's view Pindar would, unconsciously perhaps, symbolize himself as Clytaemnestra, and since the myth tells of her rightful punishment, this would mean that Pindar regards himself as in the wrong and deserving an awful fate. With this conclusion the whole temper of the poem is at variance.

Wilamowitz bases his view on the assumption that the poem was written in 474. The scholiasts say that Thrasydaeus won twice, as a boy in 474 and as a man in 454. The lists on which such information was based were good but meagre, and no doubt the name Thrasydaeus appeared under the two dates. Both dates have an equally good claim to be right, except that for the later there is some discrepancy about what event Thrasydaeus won. From the poem it looks as if he won the foot-race, since this is the natural interpretation of γυμνὸν ἐπὶ στάδιον in 49. But the scholiasts differ on what the event of 454 was.¹ Inscr. a says δίαυλον ἢ στάδιον, while Inscr. b says διαύλῳ. It may be doubted whether δίαυλος should be called στάδιος, and Thrasydaeus seems to have won the single foot-race. But the scholiasts at least record a doubt, and one of their traditions said that it was the στάδιος. The objection then does not seem seriously to impair the view otherwise tenable that the poem was written for the victory of 454. The later date suits the internal evidence as well as the earlier, and if we wish to decide between them we must look for a deciding factor elsewhere. This may perhaps be found in the political circumstances of the two dates. Pindar's poetry often takes its colour from the problems and events which were uppermost in his mind when he wrote, and the remarkable peculiarities of *Pythian XI* may perhaps be illuminated by reference to the two years 474 and 454 and what they meant for Thebes.

We have seen that the poem is noticeably pro-Spartan and has a marked Spartan colouring. Now in 474 most Thebans of Pindar's class must have felt that Sparta was a potential enemy and Athens a potential friend. Soon after the Persian defeat Sparta had tried to oust Thebes from the Amphictyonic Council (Plut. *Them.* 20), but the attempt had been frustrated by Themistocles, who for good Athenian reasons did not want Sparta's power strengthened to the north of Cithaeron. 474

¹ The problem is discussed with great care and fairness by Farnell, *The Works of Pindar II* pp. 221-5. It is of course possible that the

Thrasydaeus of 454 is different from the Thrasydaeus of 474.

was hardly the time for an aristocratic Theban poet to emphasize his own relations with Sparta or to praise Spartan heroes. In 454 the situation was reversed. Athens was a proved enemy and Sparta a possible friend. In 457 the Athenian army of Myronides had defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta and conquered their country. The Boeotian League had been dissolved, and the political system in which Pindar had been brought up was annihilated. On the other hand, earlier in the same year Sparta had defeated the Athenians at Tanagra and was still at war with them. In 454 the Athenians were deeply and desperately engaged in Egypt, and it looked as if at any moment Sparta might take the offensive against her and liberate Boeotia. Aristocratic Boeotians might well look to Sparta for help, and no feelings would be hurt when Pindar touched with affection on Spartan stories and Spartan virtues. So far as the Spartan colouring of the poem is concerned, 454 is a much more likely date than 474.

We know something of Pindar's attitude towards these events. In his early and middle manhood, so long as Athens did not menace Aegina or Boeotia, he had had been well disposed towards her. In Athens as a boy he had been trained in music and poetry. In 486 he had written *Pythian VII* for Megacles the Alcmaeonid: later he had written his famous Dithyramb on 'shining, violet-crowned Athens, told in song' and praised the valour of the Athenians at Artemisium: in 470 his *Pythian I* referred honourably to the Athenian part at Salamis. Nor is it probable that his attitude changed much before 460. In that year he wrote *Olympian VIII* for an Aeginetan, and it shows that in his view the political scene had changed definitely for the worse.¹ Cimon, indeed, had been ostracized, Ephialtes murdered: Pericles was in power: Athens had quarrelled with Sparta and was on the verge of war with Aegina. Pindar's first fears were for Aegina, and he reveals them in the prayer that time to come will not undo her present prosperity. It is, however, characteristic of Pindar that this fear for Aegina did not prejudice him against individual Athenians of his own class and opinions. In this poem he praises the trainer Melesias and asks that he may not for this be smitten with dislike. Megacles, as an Athenian, was perhaps becoming unpopular in Aegina, and Pindar, true sportsman that he was, spoke up for him.

The danger soon came nearer home, and in 457 Athens won Oenophyta. In 456 Pindar wrote *Isthmian VII* for the Theban Strepsiades, whose uncle of the same name had been killed in the battle. Pindar's feelings are mixed. He has splendid words for the dead man who fell

λοιγὸν ἅντα φέρων ἐναντίῳ στρατῷ
ἀστῶν γενεᾷ μέγιστον κλέος αὔξων
ζῶων τ' ἀπὸ καὶ θανάων.

But this burst of praise is tempered by something different. Pindar was far from being a bellicose patriot, and it is characteristic of him that he goes on to say:

ἔτλαν δὲ πένθος οὐ φάτόν, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι
Γαῖόχορος εὐδίαν ὅπασσεν
ἐκ χειμῶνος.

'I suffered a grief unspeakable, but now the Earth-holder has given me calm weather after the storm.' The Earth-holder, Poseidon, is the God of the Isthmus, and the calm weather is the content which Pindar feels in the Isthmian victory of Strepsiades. He can turn from the agonies of defeat to the present pleasure. Moreover, the opening lines of the poem show where his real thoughts and consolations

¹ The whole situation is discussed by H. T. Wade-Gery in *J.H.S.* LII (1932) pp. 211-213.

lay. It is a list of great events in the ancient, heroic past of Thebes, and in these Pindar finds comfort for the present. But if these were his feelings, his moral judgment was clear. He does not condone or defend Athens. Though he does not mention her by name, in the last triad he mentions Bellerophon who was thrown by Pegasus when he tried to climb to heaven. In this lesson against presumption his hearers would surely apply the moral to Athens. Bellerophon is an example of that ὕβρις which is inevitably punished. On such a point Pindar's opinion was unshakeable.

To his more militant countrymen *Isthmian VII* may well have seemed defeatist. Pindar may praise the glorious Theban dead and by implication foretell the humiliation of Athens, but there is no word of confident hope or patriotic hate. On the contrary Pindar seems content to admit that he is getting old and that we all must die:

ὁ τε τερπνὸν ἐπάμερον διώκων
ἑκαλὸς ἔπειμι γῆρας ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον
αἰῶνα· θνήσκειμεν γὰρ ὅμως ἅπαντες· (40-42)

'Seeking the day's delight I shall pass in quiet to old age and my allotted span; for all alike we die.' This is a mood of pious resignation and acceptance of what the Gods send. Pindar feels himself growing old, and for the present his joy in Strep-siades' victory is enough. His temper is similar to that which he shows in *Pythian VIII* written for a young Aeginetan in 446. Then the political prospects for Aegina were far brighter than they were for Thebes in 456. But Pindar's mood is the same. To his young Aeginetan friend Pindar preaches the beauties of peace and quiet and leaves the responsibility for Aegina's future to her traditional heroes.

These two poems show what Pindar felt and thought about politics in 456 and 446. His unbending moral judgment on the insolence of Athens was combined with a kind of quietism which led him to accept the present and to be a little sceptical of sanguine hopes for the immediate future. A position of this kind would easily be misunderstood, and we can see that it might easily bring Pindar into unpopularity in Thebes. In *Pythian XI* 50-53 he indicates that some such fate has been his and that he is defending himself against critics. After praising the victories of Thrasydaeus and his father, Pindar changes his theme abruptly and says:

θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν,
δυνατὰ μαιόμενος ἐν ἀλικίᾳ·
τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ
ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα μέμφομαι αἶσαν τυραννίδων.

'God help me to love beauty, yet desire what I may have among men of my age. Having seen that the middle fortune in a city abounds longer in bliss I have no use for the state of tyrannies.' His general meaning is clear. He prays that he may desire what he has always desired—τὰ καλά—and the words include things moral and political, but especially Pindar's poetry and the subjects which prompted it. He wishes to continue in his own special work. But to this he gives a supplement. The words ἐν ἀλικίᾳ¹ show that he feels he is getting old; he wishes to continue with that work for which his age best fits him. His position is in fact very similar to that in *Isthmian II*, where joy in Strep-siades' victory is combined with a sense of the advance of years. He does not feel that he can share all the enthusiasms of younger men. In 454 he was over sixty, and he was beginning to feel old.

For this prayer Pindar gives a reason so remarkable that it demands close analysis. He says that the Middle State lasts longer in a city and that he disapproves

¹ For ἀλικία meaning 'time of life' as here Aesch. Pers. 914, Plat. Gorg. 484c. compare *Pyth. IV* 157, γηραιὸν μέρος ἀλικίας. Also

of the lot of tyrannies. The words look like an answer to critics and are a statement of political principles. The words ἀνὰ πόλιν are general, but Pindar must have Thebes in his mind. They indicate that there has been, or is, a menace of tyranny in Thebes and that the Middle State has more lasting power than any other form of government. What Pindar means by τὰ μέσα is made clear by two couplets of Theognis, whose political leanings were like Pindar's own. In the first, 219-220, he sets it as an element of quiet against the excited crowd:

μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλλε ταρασσόμενον πολιητέων,
Κύρνε, μέσσην δ' ἔρχεο τὴν ὁδόν, ὥσπερ ἐγώ.

In the second, 331-2, he tells Cyrnus not to give away the property of one class of men to another:

ἥσυχος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, μέσσην ὁδὸν ἔρχεο ποσσίν
μηδ' ἐτέροισι δίδους, Κύρνε, τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων.

For Theognis the Middle State was that of quiet conservatism, which is not disturbed by popular agitations and does not give away the lands of the rich to the poor. For Pindar too it is the state of established aristocracy, which lies between democracy and tyranny. For democracy Pindar seems to have had little sympathy, and in *Pythian II* 87 he refers to it as government by ὁ λαβρὸς στρατός. The Mean in politics was for him just that aristocratic government which had existed long in Thebes and produced the society in which Pindar moved. Here, then, he proclaims his attachment to it, and it looks as if he had been suspected of disloyalty.

What this accusation of disloyalty was may be seen from Pindar's statement about tyrannies. He disclaims approval for them, and it looks as if he had been accused of supporting them. In 454-3 there could be no question for Pindar of his earlier praise of the Sicilian tyrants, Hieron and Theron. Both had long disappeared from the scene, and there would be no point in Pindar disclaiming his old admiration for them. Nor could his *Pythians IV* and *V*, written for Arcesilas of Cyrene, be counted as written for a tyrant. It is therefore hard to believe that Pindar is referring to his own relations with tyrants in the strict sense. The tyranny of which he disapproves must surely be nearer home, since he says ἀνὰ πόλιν and refers to Thebes. But unfortunately the political state of Thebes before and after Oenophyta is a matter of great difficulty. That there were divisions which helped the Athenian victory is proved by the statement which Thucydides (III 62) gives to the Thebans, 'Ἀθηναίων κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, 'when owing to our divisions the Athenians held the greater part of Boeotia.' But the precise nature of the divisions is difficult to assess. On the one hand there is the statement of Aristotle (*Pol. VIII* 1302 b 25), ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἢ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, which must mean 'in Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta owing to bad government the democracy was destroyed,' and implies that in Thebes about the time of Oenophyta there was a democracy in power. On the other hand the Old Oligarch (*Resp. Ath.* 3. 10), when describing the failure of Athens on the few occasions when she tried to get support from the aristocrats in a city, says ὁποσάκις δ' ἐπεχείρησαν αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς βελτίστους, οὐ συνήνεγκεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ὁ δῆμος ἐδοῦλευσεν ὁ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς. On one point both accounts agree. Both indicate that the pro-Athenian governments soon ceased to do what was required of them. The democracy in Thebes disappeared; the alleged pro-Athenian oligarchies soon enslaved the δῆμος. A possible solution is that the democracy was established in Thebes before Oenophyta, and that is why, as Diodorus says, Thebes was not taken by Myronides (XI 83. 1), while in the rest of Boeotia Athens tried the unsuccessful experiment of friendly oligarchies.

Whatever the exact details of the situation were, it seems fairly clear that

Athens interfered with the government of Boeotia, and that this interference was not for long successful. Against such a background of political dispute and change we may see why Pindar defends himself and explains his feelings. His assertion of belief in τὰ μέσα is a denial of affection for any system imposed by Athens, whether democracy or pro-Athenian oligarchy, and a proclamation of his own attachment to the traditional aristocratic government of Thebes. When *Pythian XI* was written, the Athenian system had probably disappeared and something like the old Theban government been restored. Anyone who had accepted or seemed to tolerate the Athenian rule in Thebes would be under suspicion of disloyalty. We can see how Pindar with his tendency to acquiesce in unpleasant facts might come under such suspicion, but when he answered his critics, he said no more than the truth. The fact that he does not mention democracy does not necessarily mean that there was no democracy in Thebes after Oenophyta. Such a democracy would be too patently dependent on Athenian support for Pindar to regard it as anything else than an instrument for foreign oppression. What he does mention is *ἄλλα τυραννίδων*. The words are general and refer to the state of tyrannies of all kinds. There is something in the nature of a tyranny which he deplores. But the general statement is based on a particular fact and has almost a particular reference. Pindar is surely thinking of some *τυραννίς* near home, and this seems not to be the *τυραννίς* of a man but of a city—Athens. Pindar applies to her the same word which Thucydides (III 37, 2) makes Cleon use when he says *τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν*. It is Athens who dominates Boeotia like a *τύραννος* and of whom Pindar disapproves. Against the abstract idea of *τυραννίς* he sets up another abstract idea τὰ μέσα. Both are ways of life but have their special importance in politics. Pindar's disapproval of the lot of tyrannies is consistent with his whole ethical outlook. A tyranny, whether of a city or of a single man, is in danger of *ὑβρις*, and in the case of Athens he saw the danger translated into fact. It was not unusual for him to apply the principles of individual conduct to a city. He could call Aegina *δικαιόπολις* (*Pyth. VIII 22*) and say that in Corinth Justice and Peace ward off pride from her (*Ol. XIII 7-10*). And conversely when he wished to hint at the dangers of Athenian ambitions he used as moral symbols the figures of Bellerophon or the presumptuous Giants. For him on this point political morality was the same as personal.

The date of 454-3 seems then to suit *Pythian XI* better than 474. The tyranny of Athens hangs over Thebes, and Pindar declares himself against it. And it is this feeling that Athens is a dangerous tyrant which gives its real significance to the myth. Pindar's myths are not allegories, and their details must not be pressed. For him a myth illustrates an eternal law by an example poetically presented in an individual case. He decorates the story, and much of his poetical success lies in this, but the relevance of the myth to his main theme lies in the important truth which it enshrines. For instance, *Pythian II* presents the story of Ixion as an example of the dangers of ingratitude, and the rest of the poem shows that Pindar is afraid of being ungrateful to Hieron. In *Olympian VII* three stories are told, in each of which a careless or mistaken action leads to good results, and the moral must be that some mistake has been made but all may yet be well. So in *Pythian XI* the myth of Orestes exemplifies in a particular form a general point of morality, and what this is can be seen from Pindar's own words. At 9-10 he announces that the gathering of the Goddesses at the Ismenion takes place that they may sing of *θέμιν ἱερὰν . . . καὶ ὀρθοδίκαν γὰρ ὀμφαλον*. This refers to the justice of Apollo, the Delphian God, and since it was Apollo who instigated the deaths of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra, it is to this that Pindar points. The moral of the myth is that Apollo punishes the presumptuous doer of violence, and Pindar drives this home by closing his story with their deaths. The theme is a special variety of a common lesson in Pindar, that pride is punished by the Gods. Here it is not stated simply as a general truth. It

is a general truth which has relevance to the present occasion, and therefore the Goddesses are summoned to sing of it. By Pindar's audience, full of hope and anxiety for their country, the lesson would easily be applied to one thing—Athenian domination in Boeotia. Pindar seldom refers directly to contemporary politics, but sometimes he refers indirectly. *Pythian VIII* has little meaning unless we see it against its background in Aegina at a time when Athenian failures had given new life to hopes of Aeginetan independence. So *Pythian XI* is first seen as a whole, coherent and deeply serious, when we realize that Pindar is writing for a Theban public whose minds were occupied with the political problems of their day. Pindar seems to have been accused of half-heartedness in the Boeotian cause, but he states again what he had stated in *Isthmian VII*. His own work is still his chief interest, and in politics he takes the long view which considers the past as well as the present. But so far as the present is concerned, his judgment is clear. Murderous violence, no matter how highly placed, is punished by the Gods. That is the lesson of the myth, and Pindar left it to his hearers to interpret it as they pleased. In the rest of the poem he referred more directly to contemporary events, and when he combined this moral story with praise of Spartan virtues, his meaning would surely be plain. Nor in fact were such expectations as Pindar may have raised entirely falsified by events. In 446 Boeotian independence was restored at the battle of Coronea, when Thebans, exiled from their own cities, defeated the Athenian army of Tolmides. This victory seems to have been part of a concerted scheme in which Sparta took a part. Earlier, Spartans had been in West Boeotia, and in 446 a Spartan army invaded Attica. Boeotian liberty was indeed won without their direct intervention, but they were allies who created an important diversion on another front.

III.

If *Pythian XI* was written in 454-3, it is later than Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, written in 458 two years before its creator's death. Pindar certainly felt the power of the Trilogy and was indebted to it for some striking ideas. Most noteworthy perhaps are the motives he attributes to Clytaemnestra for murdering her husband:

πότερόν νιν ἄρ' Ἰφιδένην ἐπ' Εὐρύπῳ
σφαχθεῖσα τῇλε πάτρας
ἔκνιξεν βαρυνάλαμον ὄρσαι χόλον;
ἢ ἑτέρῳ λέχεϊ δαμαζομένην
ἔννυχον παράγον κοῖται; (22-25)

That resentment at the sacrifice of Iphigeneia was a motive for the murder is twice mentioned by Aeschylus at *Agamemnon* 1418-9 and 1525 ff. The excuse is given only by Clytaemnestra, and therefore Pindar follows Aeschylus in leaving it open to doubt. The second motive of unlawful love for Aegisthus could also be deduced from Aeschylus, who makes Clytaemnestra hint at it in *Agamemnon* 1372 ff. and Orestes advance it as a reason for killing his mother at *Choephori* 906-7. In giving the two motives as alternatives Pindar shows that he has read Aeschylus and appreciated his dramatization of the story. After the second motive he adds the curious lines about the evil speaking of the citizens:

τὸ δὲ νέαις ἀλόχοις
ἔχθιστον ἀμπλάκιον καλύψαι τ' ἀμάχανον
ἀλλοτρίαισι γλώσσαις·
κακολόγοι δὲ πολῖται.
ἴσχει τε γὰρ ὄλβος οὐ μείονα φθόνον·
ὁ δὲ χαμηλὰ πνέων ἀφαντον βρέμει. (25-30)

This notion of hostile speech persecuting Clytaemnestra is certainly surprising. In it Pindar seems to show at least some admiration for her, even if he disapproves, and surely there is more respect in his view for bliss which gets 'envy as big as itself' than for the contrasted man who 'breathing the dust whispers and is not known.' The criticized is more sympathetic to him than the critics, and this surely was helped by the words which Aeschylus gives to Clytaemnestra when she says how awful it is to sit at home

πολλὰς κλύουσεν κληδόνας παλιγκότους (Ag. 863),

and, though it does not refer to Clytaemnestra, by the passage where the Chorus sings:

βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις σὺν κότῳ
δημοκράντου δ' ἄρ' αὖς τίνει χρέος. (Ag. 456-7)

'People's talk when in wrath is dangerous; it performs the office of a curse publicly decreed.'¹ The doctrine of what *κακολογία* may do against the presumptuous ruler is the same in both poets, and since it is after all a small and rather special point, it looks as if Pindar took it from Aeschylus rather than as if both poets took it from some common source such as Stesichorus. Indeed in Pindar it is not strictly relevant to his main theme and looks as if he were persuaded into using it because of the effect which Aeschylus' poem produced on him.

One or two other smaller echoes may be detected. The striking reference to Cassandra being sent to Acheron in 21-22 recalls her prophecy in *Agamemnon* 1160-1:

νῦν δ' ἀμφὶ Κωκυτόν τε κάχερουσιους
ὄχθας ἔοικα θεσπιυδέσσειν τάχα.

So too the words *χρονίῳ σὺν Ἄρει* at 36, which sound a little strange in a context more concerned with Apollo than with Ares, suggest that Pindar owed something to the cry of Orestes:

"Ἄρης" Ἄρει ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίκη Δίκα (Cho. 461).

Both these ideas are fully assimilated by Pindar and are vital to his design, but he may well have had the first inspiration for them from Aeschylus.

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¹ Trs. W. Headlam.

PLATO, SOCRATES AND THE MYTHS.

I BEGIN with a paraphrase of Plato *Laws* X 887de, which has suggested the arguments to be developed in this brief article. 'The Athenian' speaks to the following effect:

'How can one admonish in all patience those who deny the existence of gods? For no sufficient reason they disbelieve the myths which, in infancy, they heard from nurses and mothers in sportive or in serious vein. They disbelieve also those myths which, at sacrifices, from boyhood onwards, they heard recounted in prayers and saw represented in spectacles. They reject the testimony of their own parents, nay, of all Greeks and barbarians, who by continual prayer and worship show clearly their unanimous belief in the existence of gods. Despising all these things, they lay on us the burden of refuting by reasoned argument their perverse opinions.'¹

It is noteworthy that the Athenian (i.e. Plato) reproaches the atheists for not believing the myths told to them by their mothers. Yet we know from *Rep.* II 381e that mothers are among the worst offenders who pervert the young by telling false tales about the gods. He reproaches them also for disbelieving the myths which they see represented in religious ceremonies. Yet, without raising the question of the connection between myth and ritual, or enquiring what Plato may have thought of their interdependence, it should be pointed out that there is one representation at least, of which the Platonic Socrates in two places (*Enthyphro* 6b, *Rep.* 378c) expresses disapproval, namely, the 'peplos', i.e. the robe embroidered with scenes from the battle of the gods and the giants (and from other mythical wars of the gods), which was borne in procession at the greater Panathenaea and presented to the statue of Athena Polias. Such disedifying slanders on the gods teach the young hearer unworthy notions of deity, and are a direct incentive to quarrelsomeness.

In the ideal state such myths will not be allowed. But it is easy to show that the atheists addressed in *Laws* X have by no means been brought up under ideal conditions. For example, they have learned of the venality of the gods from those who are reputed to be the best poets, orators, seers and priests (885d). They have heard the myths, both injurious and untrue, concerning the mutilation of Uranus by Cronus and of Cronus by Zeus (886c). Most of them adhere to the latest Athenian version of the materialistic doctrines of Anaxagoras, now incorporating the sophistic distinction between 'nature' and 'law', together with the shallow deductions (the unreality of the gods and of justice) drawn from it (886, 889; see also *C.Q.* for April, 1936, p. 48.). And they live in a society where poets and composers of all kinds falsely apply the adjective 'happy' to wicked men who chance to enjoy material prosperity (899e). But in the city which is to be governed by the principles laid down in this dialogue, poets must compose, and teachers must teach, only what accords with the laws (719b sqq., 810b sqq., 817c); and at sacrifices and prayers Platonically pious language is to be the rule (800-1, 821cd). Clearly the atheists of the tenth book belong to the unregenerate Greek world of the fourth century B.C.; and the myths which they have heard or seen depicted in various ways from childhood onwards include many which Plato himself—chiefly in *Rep.* II and III—has censured for inculcating unsound ethics and theology. Few indeed if any among

¹ The paraphrase is correct even if we began a new sentence in d 2, reading, with the mss., οὐδ' (οὐδ' rightly, Stephanus and subsequent edd.): in

which case Plato says that the atheists used to believe the myths in childhood and youth, but now perversely despise all such testimony.

the myths currently told could have been permitted to enter the Platonic state, if Plato's principles had been rigorously applied.

It might perhaps be suggested that we should make a distinction between the Platonic Socrates of, say, the *Republic* and the Athenian of the *Laws*, as though the latter were less severe on mythology than the former. But, as we have seen, the poets and their myths are treated in exactly the same way in both dialogues. And here in *Laws* X on just the preceding page (886c) the Uranus-Cronus-Zeus myths have been condemned by the Athenian for the same reasons as by the Platonic Socrates in *Rep.* II 377-8 (cf. *Euthyphro* 6a).

Our text, then, makes it plain that Plato, the severe and scornful censor of the current myths, assigns to them here this much of value that at least they teach the existence of the gods whose conduct they so often and so sadly libel. Though this interesting implication seems to have eluded the commentators, it would appear that I am by no means the first to have noticed it. The emperor Julian was following Plato to the best of his dry and pedantic ability, when he held that many of the myths (e.g. those which assert that the gods do harm to mankind or to one another), however 'sportive', were offensive and immoral; that Hesiod's *Theogony* in particular should be withheld from children; but that at the same time it is right that even the common people should learn from the ancient poets of the existence of the gods. It is true that in the ideal state Plato would deny the *Theogony* and myths of the like character to adults as well as children. But in censuring Julian for inconsistency (*C.Q.* XXVIII, 1934, p. 111), I should have added that he has Platonic authority for his views to this extent at least, that in the non-ideal conditions prevailing in the world at large Plato regards the myths as performing a useful function in testifying to the existence of the gods; provided that they instil this necessary truth, it is apparently better (so far as this passage goes) to believe in degrading myths than in none at all. There is, however, no Platonic warrant for Julian's desire to perpetuate this ambiguous condition of affairs; for Plato would wish to abolish the old mythology in favour of new and morally inoffensive tales to be devised by his new race of poets. Nor does Plato authorise Julian's superstition that divine truths can be learned from the old myths by the intelligent reader who is able to interpret them allegorically.

This testimony of Plato's to the usefulness of the current myths arouses, in a more intense degree, the same kind of surprise as the curious deference to the Delphic oracle in *Laws* VIII 828a. In spite of the frequent condemnation of every form of the mantic art which is divorced from the ideal enlightenment of the right Platonic philosopher—see, for example, what is said of seers and priests in this very dialogue 885d, 908d—we learn that the purely empirical religious knowledge amassed at Delphi is to be of use to the governors of the ideal state. Clearly one has to be extremely careful in attempting to read the mind of Plato or of his contemporaries in religious matters. In modern times there has been put forward the generalisation that in or about 400 B.C. the Athenians in general set no store by mythology; that they found 'repulsive' the stories of wars and mutilations in heaven. I have elsewhere criticised this view unfavourably (*C.Q.*, 1933, pp. 74, 159). Here I need only state and illustrate briefly the moral which our passage from the *Laws* appears to suggest. Before committing oneself to such generalisations all relevant facts should be soberly examined. Disrespectful use of the name 'Cronus' (as equivalent to 'old Methusalem')¹ is, for example, a fact, though it is scarcely significant enough to suggest an inference. But there are the additional facts that even Cronus had his festival at Athens (at which he was worshipped as 'a scarcely remembered harvest-god'—Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* I p. 25); that Plato numbers him with Uranus and Zeus among 'the first and greatest of the gods'; and that Plato deploras

¹ Taylor *Plato*, p. 147.

the anti-ethical influence of the stories concerning him in a way which implies that these stories are currently believed. In sum, the point which I wish to emphasise regarding our passage from the *Laws* is that when we find the arch-critic of Greek mythology himself showing (even for a brief moment) so much regard for the current myths as not to deny to them a certain usefulness in the contemporary conditions of thought and life, we may well hesitate to believe that these myths, even the most repulsive, were utterly discounted by the 'ordinary Athenians,' his contemporaries.¹

Some points which have arisen in this discussion invite a speculation regarding the indictment of Socrates. It appears (e.g. from Plato *Euthyphro* 6a) that Socrates was an adverse critic of the current mythology. Indeed he could scarcely help being so in a city where an exaggerated respect was paid to the ancient poets as authorities in religion, morals and much else; for he made it his business to examine all assumptions. Further, it is seriously suggested (*ibid.*) that his disbelief in myths such as those concerning Uranus, Cronus and Zeus is one reason why he was accused of impiety. Evidently Burnet is right in holding that *Rep.* II is in character with the historic Socrates, since there, as in the *Euthyphro*, these (and the like) tales are condemned by 'Socrates.' There too, as we have seen, 'Socrates' expressly alludes, as in the *Euthyphro*, to the disedifying nature of the myths portrayed on the robe offered to Athena Polias. The fact that both these dialogues ascribe to Socrates a condemnation of the same two things or sets of things (the *Theogony* and the 'peplos') appears to me significant. I have made it clear that I differ from Burnet in regarding the Platonic Socrates as an amalgam of Socrates and Plato; but I should agree with him so far as to hold that Plato, particularly in the earliest dialogues, based himself on what the historic Socrates actually taught and said, although I should give Plato all credit for developing the Socratic germ into a tree of many branches. I suggest, then, that in this passage of the *Euthyphro* we have little more than the Socratic germ; while in *Rep.* II we have Plato's development of the same theme. The *Euthyphro* is admittedly early enough. Ritter holds that it was actually composed before the trial of Socrates took place. But although I am disposed to agree with Ritter, and although the earlier the date of the *Euthyphro*, the stronger my case, it is not necessary to put the dialogue so early in order to accept the suggestion which I am about to make.

Socrates was charged with impiety on three counts: (1) disbelief in the existence of the gods in whose existence the state believes,² (2) introduction of novel

¹ That there is a real inconsistency in Plato's attitude will appear from a comparison of our passage with 906e, 907b, etc. If the young *do* believe the myths, they will grow up believing, on the authority of Homer, etc., not only that the gods exist but that the gods are unjust. This belief constitutes the third form of impiety, which is the worst of all (excepting that of the human beast of prey 909a). Thus in escaping atheism they will fall into a far more grievous error. Plutarch (*de superstitione*, 169r) agrees, as Professor H. J. Rose reminds me, with the more characteristically Platonic view (907b) that 'superstition' (which is roughly Plato's third form of impiety) is worse than atheism; whereas Julian takes over the inconsistency from Plato and exaggerates it by his own additions.

A less serious but not uninteresting oversight occurs in 901a where the argument hinges on Hesiod *W. and D.* 303-4. The Athenian, though clearly alluding to these lines, does not quote the really important words; these, apparently,

Cleinius and Megillus are expected to know. Yet they have already been congratulated (866b) on their ignorance of Hesiod's *Theogony*; it seems improbable that they will know the *W. and D.* by heart. Further, they are expected to accept this Hesiodic statement on one characteristic of the gods (that they hate the idle man), though it is based on no proof other than the authority of the discredited author of the *Theogony*.

² On the meaning of the first count see my articles in *C.R.* 'Greek for "Atheism"' (Feb. 1936) and 'More Greek for "Atheism."' It should be unnecessary for me to add that in contending for what I believe to be the truth on these matters (against e.g. Taylor's statement in *Plato* p. 163 n. 1 that a different interpretation of the indictment is 'quite certain on linguistic grounds') I intend no unkindness towards Professor A. E. Taylor or the memory of Professor J. Burnet.

divinities (i.e. his Divine Sign and the strange 'gods'—material elements like the aither—of the Ionian scientists with whom Socrates was popularly, though wrongly, associated), (3) corruption of the young. What I am about to say refers only to the first count, which would, however, form one item in support of the third; for I do not suppose that the accusers troubled to keep the three accounts quite separate in their arguments.

I suggest, then, that the first count would be supported chiefly by proving that Socrates had (a) adversely criticised myths of the Uranus-Cronus-Zeus type, and (b) had used critical language regarding the 'peplos.' He may very probably have said something to the effect that if the gods or their children do the kind of thing related by Hesiod or depicted on Athena's robe, then they are not gods or children of gods (cf. *Rep.* III 391d). If he did say so, he would of course mean to invite the hearer to infer that the gods and their children do not make war on one another. But his enemies, themselves believing the myths thus officially sanctioned (in addition to the *Theogony* which lacks such sanction), would say that the gods do act in this manner and that the 'peplos' itself is proof positive to that effect! And thence they would infer that in Socrates' view the gods are not gods.

Can it be, then, that when the indictment complains of Socrates' disbelief in the existence of the gods of Athens, the reference is above all to one important goddess: the pugnacious Athena Polias herself? I am inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. That such critical language on Socrates' part would come under the Attic law of impiety seems clear from the case of Diagoras of Melos who was charged with impiety, not for committing any impious act, but merely for adversely criticising the gods and ceremonies of the Athenians ([*Lysias*] VI 17).

If we look again at the passage of Plato with which we began, it will be clear how unjust such an exploitation of Socrates' remarks would have been. For criticism of the conduct of the gods as mythically portrayed need not in the least imply disbelief in their existence.


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THE ALDINE SCHOLIA TO THUCYDIDES.

(See C.Q. April 1936 pp. 80-93.)

PARISINUS suppl. gr. 256 was written, to judge from the hand, not long after 1300. As far as the end of book VI the writer copied both text and scholia from a descendant of M. At that point another MS. came into his hands. This was no other than that ancestor of J which, as we saw on p. 87, had received valuable readings from the source ω . From this MS. the scribe now corrected what he had already written,¹ copied the two remaining books, and added the two Lives before the text and the *Epistula Dionysii ad Ammaeum* after it. (That he went on to copy Demosthenes' *Philippics* and other works, and bound them up with the Thucydides, is not our concern.) From l—for so, after Dain (see p. 86 n.), I shall style our MS.—was copied the MS. from which, after it had been perfunctorily corrected from another source, was copied X (p. 91). Thus the stemma given on p. 87 now assumes the following form:



In substantiation of this stemma (where the situation of K is not absolutely certain because of its lateness), I need only refer to the readings from J K given on pp. 88-90 and point out (1) that l gives us the explanation why J, K and X agree far more often in books VII and VIII than I-VI; and (2) that K and X never agree with J except in readings already found in l. To reconstruct ω , therefore, we now require only J and l. Our conjecture (p. 92) as to the source of the Lives and Dionysius in X is also confirmed.

In the 15th century, after the parent of X had been copied from it, l was corrected throughout (l₂) from a CG-source which also contained many B-readings in the last two books. This corrector introduced a large quantity of scholia and glosses, which, so far as they are not coincident with those found on the margins of C, are obviously modern and worthless.

A 15th century owner is recorded in the inscription on the guard-leaf: Θεοδώρου

¹ The process is particularly clear in places where the scribe, by a not uncommon inadvertency, has recopied half a page or so of his

own copy under the impression that it was his exemplar. In these cases the cancelled repetition still shows the uncorrected text.

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τοῦ Σοφιανοῦ πέλει βιβλίον τόδε. I find no trace of this man elsewhere; but were he the same as ὁ εὐτελής καὶ ἀμαρτωλὸς τάχα καὶ θύτης Θεόδωρος ὁ Σοφὸς ὁ καὶ αἰχμαλώτης πόλεως Κωνσταντίνου, who wrote Trinity Coll. MS. O-1-66 in 1460 A.D.—the hands are much alike—then we should have a trace of the arrival of the book in Western Europe. About the beginning of the 16th century I, along with X and perhaps K, passed into the hands of Aldus, who based on them his *editio princeps* of 1502, and—chiefly on I—his *editio princeps* of the scholia in 1503 (see p. 80).¹ Strangely enough all three books subsequently found their way to the Netherlands. The known history of K and X has already been given (pp. 88, 91).² Nothing seems to be known about the ultimate fate of Aldus' private library: all that I can find is that according to his will³ his property of every kind was divided equally between his three sons; the family became extinct in 1601. At all events, in 1605, according to an entry on one of the guard-leaves, I came into the possession of Πέτρος Πάντινος Τολεταῖος, i.e. Pierre Pantin, formerly professor of Greek at Toledo and at that time dean of St. Gudule's at Brussels.⁴ Pantin's teacher Schott stated in a letter to Meursius, dated May 27th 1613,⁵ that he believed Pantin's Greek MSS. to be part of the collection acquired in Italy by the Cardinal Anton Perrenot de Granvelle (1517-1586). Pantin died in 1611, and the MS. eventually passed like all his other Greek MSS. to André Schott, the theologian.⁶ In the meantime, however, with at least one other MS. of Pantin's (Brussels 11,383-4 = Omont no. 94), it had been in the possession of one Carl Verbeg, Κάρολος Βερβέκιος Κορτακῖνος, of whom I can find no other trace. With all Schott's MSS., the book became the property of the Jesuits of Antwerp on his death in 1629. In 1794 the revolutionaries carried most of the MSS. of the monastery, including this one, to the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Fifty-eight were restored under the Peace of Vienna in November 1815, but I and at least twelve others (suppl. gr. 201-5; 213-7; 244; 310) were—overlooked. The MS. was collated for the first time in the present year by me.

On pp. 80 ff. it was shown that at the present day our *corpus* of Thucydidean scholia (Hude, Leipzig 1927) falls into two classes: (1) scholia found on the margins of the seven oldest MSS., collected by Hude, and designated with the *sigla* of the MSS. in which they occur; and (2) scholia taken over by Hude from previous editions (so far as not coincident with scholia already obtained from the seven oldest MSS.) and printed by him *nullis codicum siglis ornata*. It was further shown that these latter are virtually: (a) the scholia first published by Aldus in 1503 + (b) the Bâle scholia (J) + (c) the Leyden scholia (X). With (b) and (c) I have dealt already; but (a) still forms about one-third of the whole *corpus*, and the rediscovery of the actual MS. from which the Aldine scholia were published not only makes it possible to correct misreadings of Aldus which have persisted in print for over four centuries, but also reveals the misjudgments into which textual criticism has fallen through ignorance of the provenance, and consequently of the age and nature, of these scholia. This can best be made clear from the passages where 'Schol.'

¹ From a noteworthy sentence in the dedicatory epistle of Aldus' Thucydides we learn that at that period he insisted on having at least three MSS. of an author before printing: 'eram daturus . . . τὰ τε Ξενοφώντος, καὶ Πλάτωνος, . . . sed quia non habebam minimum tria exemplaria, distulimus in aliud tempus.'

² Some time in the last century X was taken to pieces and rebound in three volumes with a blank sheet of paper between every two leaves. The original binding and guard-leaves were discarded. Such a procedure cannot be condemned too strongly. Binding and guard-

leaves are often the only source for information about a manuscript's past.

³ See Baschet: *Aldo Manuzio*, Venice 1867 no. XIX.

⁴ It is no. 40 in the list of his MSS. which Pantin sent to Meursius in a letter of March 1st 1611 (reprinted in H. Omont: *Cat. des MSS. de la Bibl. roy. de Bruxelles*, Ghent 1885 p. 46.)

⁵ Meursii opera XI, ep. 312, p. 223.

⁶ In Schott's classified catalogue (Omont l.c. pp. 47-50) I appears three times under different contents: nos. 1, 22 and 50.

adduced in the Oxford apparatus is an Aldine scholium, or in other words an l-scholium.

At δώσοντας 3, 14¹, we read in the apparatus 'διδόντας Schol.' The 'scholium,' which goes back to Aldus, runs: διδόντας] δώσοντας. But this is absurd. Neither Aldus nor any subsequent editor ever read anything but δώσοντας; and we have seen (p. 90) that the lemmata of Aldus are his own, not the scholiasts'. A glance at

l shows what has happened. There, *manu prima*, stands διδόντας; which means that the scribe, probably by error due to the foregoing present παραβαλλομένους, first wrote διδόντας and then corrected it. Aldus mistook the correction for a scholium, wrote διδόντας] δώσοντας, and never troubled to look up his text. A similar thing has occurred at ἐπειρών 4, 25¹⁰, where the apparatus says 'ἐπειρώντο Schol.' and the

'scholium' reads: ἐπειρώντο] γράφεται ἐπειρών. Here l reads ἐπειρών, the suprascript being a gloss by the second hand. Aldus puts ἐπειρώντο in his text, supposing it a preferable variant, and noted the other reading as a variant amongst the scholia

for one of which later editors have mistaken it (see p. 90). Again, at οὐδετέρων ὄντες 5, 84¹, the suprascript of the second hand, probably meant as a gloss, was taken for a variant by Aldus, who recorded γράφεται μεθ' ἐτέρων, which Hude 'emended' to γράφεται < οὐδὲ > μεθ' ἐτέρων, and which appears in our apparatus as 'οὐδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων γρ. Schol.' When we read in our scholia at 8, 64¹ αἷς ἀν ἰσχωσι] ἀντὶ τοῦ προσορμίσωνται, this only means that when Aldus copied the scholium from l he gave it l's text for lemma, although his own had προσίσχουσιν; 'Schol.' supports neither reading.

Now that we possess l, we see ourselves obliged to remove 'Schol.' from the apparatus in yet another 26 places. In 7 'Schol.' is the reading of l₁ cited as a variant: 5, 55¹; 6, 64³; 7, 12³; 39²; 44⁴; 50⁴; 86⁵; in 7 more it is the reading of l₂ similarly cited: 6, 2²; 7, 12²; 27¹; 30²; 44⁵; 8, 86⁹; 92⁹. Again, 12 times 'Schol.' is a gloss of l₂, often misleadingly inaccurate, based on the text it accompanies and destitute of independent authority: 1, 38⁴; 74⁴; 93⁶; 131²; 2, 3⁴; 21¹; 35²; 96¹; 3, 42²; 5, 79⁴; 83¹; 7, 38². On the other hand, 'Schol.' at 1, 3³, 54¹ twice, 90², and 4, 60¹ (accidentally omitted by Hude) refers to l's first hand, and since the scholia or readings in question are neither in M nor in C, there is always a possibility that they derive from ω. It is of interest to know that the well-known Byzantine senarii on the Sicilian disaster found at the end of book VII derive from l₁, though the heading ἀδέσποτον is an addition of Aldus.

In this and my previous article I have already removed 'Schol.' from 39 places in the Oxford apparatus. I may as well make a clean sweep. At 7, 42⁵ and 48² 'Schol.' refers to the late Leyden scholia, whose worthlessness we have seen (p. 92); 'γρ. Schol.' at 7, 30² is merely a K-variant (see p. 90). οἱ ἀρτῦναι 5, 47⁹ for αἱ ἀρτῦναι is ascribed to 'Schol.'; but the scholia have αἱ. It was only 'corrected' by Haase to οἱ, which Göller, on a suggestion of Duker, had already restored conjecturally in the text. The scholium at 5, 90 does not imply ἦ, nor, still less, that at 6, 9² πρόηται; nor can it be inferred from the explanation μετὰ βοῆς ἐξεληθόντες that the scholiast at 1, 105⁸ read ἐκβοήσαντες for ἐκβοηθήσαντες; for βοηθῶ (i.e. βοηθίω) is often so explained where there is no variant. It is inadmissible to adduce recent scholia in C as additional authority for C-readings, as happens at 1, 41² and 90¹. 'Schol.' at 1, 68³ is merely a variant noted by Aldus. The adduction of 'Schol.' for νόμῳ 5, 70 is a pure oversight.

Aldus, or his employee, was a better workman than the scholars who copied, and corrupted, the Bâle and Leyden scholia. But he, too, occasionally destroyed the sense of a scholium by attaching it to the wrong lemma, or by misunderstanding contractions or illegible words. It is as well that his grosser mistakes, which are

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here.

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themselves additional proof that I itself was in Aldus' hands, should be put right here.

Hude p. 7 l. 13 ποιήσας / κατὰ κτλ.

13, 17 εἴρηκεν.

21, 21 f. ὁμοιωθῆναι αὐτοῖς, τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις δηλονότι, τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ κτλ.

34, 2 μετὰ τῆς αἰτήσεως τῆς ξυμμαχίας τὸ ἐξῆς.

35, 1 f. ἀντὶ πολλῶν, ὧς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑμᾶς χρημάτων ἐλίσθαι νομίζω.

36, 21 τοῦτο γὰρ τὸν φόβον ἐμποιοῦν.

71, 1 pro αὐτοὺς conicio οὕτως, quomodo pro οὕτω 72, 2 οὐ τοὺς habet l.

85, 1 f. τουτέστι τρισὶ τάγμασι l_1 ; τευχίσμασι l_2 .

87, 13 καὶ pro μετὰ.

24 lemma est non ἱκανὰ . . . ἐγκλήματα sed τὰ παραγγελλόμενα.

88, 26 λογισμῷ pro λόγῳ.

93, 15 γένος pro ἄγος.

25 Περικλέους ξυμφορὰς τὰς.

98, 3 ἄλλον δὲ ἐφόρου pro δηλονότι.

126, 11 ἀποκεκομμένα pro ἀποκεκριμένα.

134, 1 ἐκστρατεῖαν pro εἰς στρατεῖαν.

142, 15 lemma est non οἱ διαπεφευγότες sed τὸν θνήσκοντα.

151, 1 post χωμάτιον adde τείχος.

16 συνῆξαν pro συνῆρξαν.

156, 26 lemma est ἐξένευσαν non ἐξέωσαν.

165, 17 πλέον pro πολύ.

28 dele ἐς Πελοπ. . . . περί; nam varia est lectio, haud scholium.

177, 4 πολιτείας pro πόλεως.

178, 18 περισσότερος pro πλείστος.

181, 18 δὲ et εἰ non habet codex, sed valde corruptum est scholium.

198, 21 ὡς habet cod. (suppleverat Hude); τοῦτου.

208, 19 pro κρατοῦντες . . . Πελοποννήσιοι lege κρατοῦντες] οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι.¹

210, 21 ἰδίᾳ ζῶντες pro ἰδιάζοντες.

216, 30 τῆς συγγενείας pro διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

220, 4 ἐγγειτονῶσι pro ἐν γειτόνων ὧσι.

226, 23 προσέπλευσαν pro προσέπασσαν (conjecerat Haase).

231, 14 δυσανάβατα.

234, 16 προσσχεῖν habet cod. (conjecerat Hude).

250, 20 ἄλλοις. ξυνέβαλε] Ἀθηναίοις.

258, 21 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς Ἴωνας,

266, 1 ἱαντοὺς εἰς ἀπάντησιν.

7 ἐν τῇ τύχῃ pro εἰς τὴν τύχην.

282, 4 ἐπιτεθῆσθαι pro ἐπιθήσειν.

292, 27 dele κατὰ . . . θέαν (28). διὰ varia lectio est pro κατὰ.

319, 8 ὀλίγους pro Ἑλληνας (conjecerat Duker).

328, 11 ἐπιρρίψαντες.

351, 24 lege ἐπὶ κέρως] συντεταγμένως.

375, 28 f. dele τῷ . . . μεγάλῳ; varia lectio est ex l_2 .

378, 25 adde ἀντὶ ante παθητικοῦ.

381, 24 ff. habet cod. ἔχοντες, ἡλεκάτην et ὅταν καὶ. πρὸ (sic, spatio relicto); correxuit et supplevit Bekker.

385, 2 ἀπῆγει pro ἀποτείνει.

386, 14 καθίσταται.

¹ The progress of the error is as follows. τῇ ναυμ. οἱ II. Stephanus;¹ κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέ-
κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ] οἱ II. Aldine; κρατοῦντες] μοι] τῇ ναυμ. οἱ II. Poppo.

386, 15 πρόθεσις αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

388, 15 εὐρήσειν pro ἀθρήσειν.

409, 10 dele ἐπηγγέλησαν . . . δηλονότι; varia lectio est ex *l*₂.

410, 13 dele ἦν . . . εὐρίσκεται; dicere vult Aldus haec verba in *l* in margine suppleta esse.

419, 16 lemma est ἐπρασσε, non κομίσαι.

425, 4 Τισσαφέρωνος ἐκινήθησαν, ἐν.

433, 21 κατέσφαξε.

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THE MEANING OF *ΑΠΤΕΡΟΣ.

TOWARDS the conclusion of his interesting remarks (*C.Q.* XXX, 1-3) on the meaning of the Homeric phrase, τῇ δ' ἀπτερος ἐπλετο μῦθος, Professor J. A. K. Thomson writes, 'When a classical author uses the word ἀπτερος it means "wingless" or "featherless" and nothing else,' and he accordingly rejects Headlam's interpretation of ἀπτερος φάτις at Aesch. *Ag.* 288 together with the same scholar's proposal to read at *P.V.* 707 ἀπτερος for the unmetrical αἰφνίδιος. (Headlam did actually propose either ἀπτερος or ἀπτέρως, but preferred the former.) It may be true that the phrase, ἀπτέρῳ τάχει, which Headlam adduced in his note on the *Agam.* passage in support of his rendering, is not by itself convincing, but there are other considerations which Professor Thomson has, I imagine, overlooked. What follows is not an attempt to demonstrate that ἀπτερος does mean 'wing-swift' in Aeschylus, but only to suggest that there is evidence to show that the word could bear that meaning in classical Greek authors, and that Headlam's interpretation and emendation should therefore not be rejected out of hand.

I start with the assumption that ἀπτέρως is an adverb formed from the adjective ἀπτερος, and that the quadrisyllabic form of the word is due to the exigencies of hexameter verse. (Headlam adduced ἀψοφίως as a parallel.) If this assumption is correct, it seems impossible on Professor Thomson's explanation of the meaning of ἀπτερος to make sense of the following passages (the second of which is cited by Headl. in *Journ. of Philol.* XX (1892)) :—

(a)

ὅς δέ κεν ἀνδρῶν
αὐτὸς ἔλοιτο βίῃ νέμεσιν τ' ἀποθείτο καὶ αἰδῶ,
τὸν μετὰ πάντας ἀνωγεν ἀολλέας ὀρμηθῆναι
ποινὴν τεισομένους. τοὶ δ' ἀπτέρως ἐπίθοντο
ἐλπόμενοι τελέειν γάμον.

(Hesiod frg. 96, 43 ff. Rzach (1913).)

(b)

τὴν δὲ παρφάμεναι κούραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισι
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὄχηα
ἀπτέρως ὥσπερ πυλέων ἄπο.

(Parmen. 15 ff. (Mullach).)

We might add *Ap. Rhod.* IV. 1765 (ἀπτέρως) and Lycophron, *Alex.* 627 (ἀπτέρως), both of which passages are referred to by Headlam (*Journ. of Philol.* XX.), but possibly Professor Thomson would rule them out on the ground that these poets belonged to an age when 'Greeks, or at least scholars, did not know why arrows have feathers,' and so used the word ignorantly. But if we confine ourselves to the two earlier writers, Hesiod and Parmenides, surely the meaning of ἀπτέρως in both these places must be 'straightway,' 'quickly' or the like? The difficulty is to discover how the word comes to bear this sense. The most obvious explanation would seem to be that it means, quite literally, 'wingedly' and so 'swiftly'; in other words, that the adjective ἀπτερος possessed two contradictory meanings, viz. 'winged' and 'unwinged.' No doubt this must sometimes have been highly inconvenient, but not more so, probably, than the use in contradictory senses of quite a number of other words, of which ἄβιος, ἄσκιος, ἀχανής are examples.

The rendering of ἀπτέρως which is given by L. and S. in the earlier editions,

viz. 'without wings, i.e. without wavering, steadily, resolutely,' is abandoned in the ninth ed., and, I think, rightly. The comment of the *Thesaurus* s.v. ἀπτερός, 'Dicuntur autem argute haec sine alis fieri quae quasi cum alis fieri videantur,' is altogether too mystical. Possibly Hesiod merely misunderstood Homer's ἄπτερος (as Professor Thomson says the later lexicographers did) and used the adverb ἀπτερός in an improper sense, though this explanation becomes even more unlikely if the reading ἀπτερόσσοι in Archilochus (*Diehl* fr. 49) is correct. But whatever the origin of the usage, the important thing for us is that the adverb ἀπτερός was used in the sense of 'swiftly' at an early date; not that this proves that the adjective ἄπτερος was in fact used in the sense of 'winged' or 'swift,' but it establishes a presumption that it was. Professor Thomson's statement that ἀπτερος never means anything in a classical author except 'wingless' or 'featherless' may, as it happens, be true, but the general assertion that 'an ἄπτερος ἵππος could only mean a horse without wings; it could not mean a wing-swift, let alone a winged horse,' goes much further than the evidence warrants. The existence (a) of the adverb ἀπτερός used in the sense of 'swiftly,' (b) of such adjectives as ἄβιος, ἄσκιος, ἀχανής, used in contradictory senses, indicates clearly enough the need to consider every instance of the use of ἄπτερος on its own merits, and not to presume that it must mean 'wingless' or 'featherless.'

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A note on this topic by Mr. George Thomson appeared in *C.Q.* XXX. 2, published a few weeks after my contribution had been accepted by the Edd.

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XX. 2,

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XX. 2,

ib. 131.

κλαγγαίνεις δ' ἄπερ
κύων μέριμναν οὐ ποτ' ἐκλείπων πόνου.

ib. 238.

ἀλλ' ἀμβλὺν ἤδη προστετριμμένον τε πρὸς
ἄλλοισιν οἴκοις κ.τ.λ.

Wilam. prints . . . προστετριμμένος τ' ἐγώ κ.τ.λ.

ib. 914.

οὐκ ἀνέξομαι τὸ μὴ οὐ
τήνδ' ἀστύνικον ἐν βροτοῖς τιμᾶν πόλιν

There are, then, in the *Oresteia* about seven examples of this Sophoclean usage, or one in every three hundred lines.¹

But when we come to the *Prometheus* an entirely different state of affairs presents itself. In this one play (containing 773 iambic trimeters) we find at least eighteen indubitable examples of the usage we are discussing, distributed evenly over the dialogue passages. They are as follows :

ἵνα (in order that) once (l. 61).

ἵνα (where) three times (ll. 725, 793, 830).

ὅτι (that) six times (ll. 104, 261, 325, 330, 379, 951).

ἐπεὶ (since) once (l. 386).

ὅπως (in order that) once (l. 463).

ὅτῳ twice (ll. 470, 989).

ὅ,τι once (l. 683).

ἀτὰρ once (l. 343).

τὸ μὴ once (l. 865).

τὸ μὴ οὐ once (l. 918).

I do not, of course, pretend to have enumerated all the places in Aeschylus where there is a 'run-on' of the sense from one trimeter to the next, but those which unquestionably show the particular Sophoclean trick of putting at the end of one line a word which looks forward to the next line.

The earlier of the extant plays of Aeschylus exhibit this particular Sophoclean technique, practically speaking, not at all; the trilogy (produced nine years later than the *Septem*) has a few but unmistakable examples (1 in every 300 trimeters); the *Prometheus* is overwhelmingly Sophoclean (1 example in every 43 trimeters). In fact, it is a good deal more Sophoclean in this respect than some of Sophocles' own plays, the *Ajax*, for example, or the *Electra*.

Unless, therefore, we think it likely that Aeschylus, after having composed his iambic trimeters in one style for, say, thirty-five years,² subsequently, i.e. after 467 B.C., developed a radically new conception and treatment of the metre, only to abandon it in or before 458 B.C. and revert in very large measure to his original, simple, 'stichic' manner of composition—unless we are disposed to believe this, the conclusion is inevitable that, if Aeschylus was its author, the *Prometheus Vinctus* is the latest of his extant plays, and was written between 458 and 456 B.C. We see the first premonitory symptoms of the coming change of style in the *Oresteia*, while the *Prometheus*, in which these Sophoclean rhythms are about seven times as frequent as they are in the trilogy, gives us the result of a rapid, but not impossibly rapid, development.

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¹ Perhaps we should include *Ag.* 297 and 1229.

² I do not consider the possibility of dating the *Prometheus* before the *Septem* since, among

other reasons, this would involve a quite incredible series of changes in Aeschylus' metrical style.

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A MANUSCRIPT OF OVID'S *HEROIDES*.

I.

THE MANUSCRIPT O DESCRIBED.

I PURCHASED in 1902 from the sale by Sotheby of 2347 manuscripts and rare books the property of Henry White, of 30, Queensgate, a manuscript of Ovid's *Heroides*, no. 1629 in the catalogue, the examination of which has led me to some conclusions. An account of it may be of interest. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. E. A. Lowe, our foremost palaeographer, who has most kindly examined my manuscript with great care and fixed its date and origin. This manuscript, which I call O, written on vellum in fine large characters somewhere in northern Italy, belongs to the middle of the fourteenth century. It contains 48 pages, measuring 10 inches by 7 inches, averaging 35 or 36 lines in the page. The initial illuminated letter of the first epistle shows a female figure dressed in a vermilion coloured robe with blue cuffs, representing apparently Penelope, on a blue ground with gold stars, and with borders illuminated with lake vermilion and burnished gold. The manuscript resembles in style two figured in the Palaeographical Society's facsimiles Vol. III., plate 221, Brit. Mus. Add. 31,032 early s. xiv, and plate 227 Brit. Mus. Add. 27,428 s. xiv. Dr. Lowe writes: 'There can be very little doubt as to the origin of the manuscript. It is north Italian. The curious errors of spelling make one think of the province of Venice. It is quite likely that it was written in the Veneto, and then migrated to the province of Lombardia. The fly-leaves contain the name of the proud owners of your manuscript in the fifteenth century. John and Peter and Anthony and Simon and Francis de Nailate owned the book. Some of them went to the school of Master Baltrami of Lucino. As the word Milan ('civitas Mediolani') occurs in the back fly-leaf, it seems highly probable that this Lucino is the place between Milan and Como.' Examples of the writings on the fly-leaves are:

Iste liber Ouidi est nostrorum uidelicet Petri < et > Antonii filiorum domini Johannis de Nailate pergentium ad scholas Bertrami de Lucino, qui est bonus doctor.

Iste Ouidius est mei Petri de Nailate qui pergo ad scholas domini magistri Baltrami de Lucino qui est bonus doctor in sua grammatica et . . . in aliis scientiis.

Ego Petrus de Nailate sum bonus puer quando dormio.

Iste Ouidius est mei Francisci Johannis et Donati filiorum Antonii (?) de Nailate qui pergunt ad scholas domini magistri Georgii de Erba qui est bonus doctor in sua grammatica et in aliis scientiis.

This handsome volume seems to have been used as a school book by these probably well-to-do boys, who, though they may have been mischievous, as Peter naïvely suggests he was, treated the volume well, for it is in excellent preservation and was bound by Mr. White's order by Zaehnsdorf.

The errors of spelling are numerous: the following are the chief:

(1) H. omitted: astā (hasta), ortari (hortari), yems (hiems), yberi (hiberi), traces (thraces), traicios (threicios).

H inserted: habeo (abeo), habundat (abundat), hostendo (ostendo), humet (umet), humeros (umeros), hora (ora), honus (onus), homen (omen), exhigit (exigit),

choit (coit), inertia (inertia), cathena (catena), horestes (orestes), lahertes (laertes), thesiphone (tisiphone), parcha (parca).

(2) O for A: socer (sacer), grossa (crassa), obstrusa (abstrusa), oetes (aeetes).

O for U: comulasse (cumulasse), incombo (incumbo), tronco (trunco).

(3) U for O: nundum (nondum).

(4) Y for I: yems (hiems), graya (graia), troya (troia).

(5) ES for AE: cessa (caesa), cesis (caesis).

(6) C for CC: oculit (occulit).

CC for C: ocellos (ocellos), paccatum (pacatum).

C for S: cinis (sinis).

C for T: cicius (citius).

C for SC: cisa (scissa).

CT for T: facta (fata).

(7) FF for F: defferat (deferat), refferam (referam), affrum (afrum).

(8) L for LL: molis (mollis), molior (mollior), malem (mallem), mile (mille), nolet (nollet), coligere (colligere), falor (fallor), policita (pollicita), soliciti (solliciti), puelares (puellares), ualibus (uallibus).

LL for L: allacer (alacer), cellauimus (celauimus), collos (colos), collar (color), dillaceranda (dilaceranda), ellene (helene), filla (fila), illicibus (ilicibus), illion (ilion) incolla (incola), mole (molle), pellas (pelias), pellago (pelago), tella (tela), tullit (tulit), uella (uela).

(9) R for RR: narabis (narrabis).

RR for R: borreas (boreas), dirriguere (diriguere).

(10) S for SS: abscisa (abscissa), nesus (nessus).

SS for S: admissit (admisit), missimus (misimus), promisserit (promiserit).

SS for CC: esse (ecce).

SS for SC: possunt (poscunt), possenti (poscenti).

SC for S: scilices (silices).

SC for SS: nosce (nosse).

SC for C: conscedet (concedet).

S for X: ceruis (ceruix), disti (dixti), es (ex), estat (extat), nos (nox), phenis (phoenix), senes (senex), testa (texta), uis (uix), uos (uox).

(11) X for S: fax (fas), lix (lis), luxae (lusae), luximus (lusimus).

X for SC: nexus (nessus).

RS for X: pars (pax).

(12) T for TT: atritus (attritus).

TT for T: litturas (lituras).

T for D: at (ad).

(13) Cum for con: cum discitur (condiscitur), cum sumpserit (consumpserit).

Con for cum: constringitur (cum stringitur), confulges (cum fulges), contacta (cum tacta).

Certain good spellings are presented: Argon (vi. 65, see my note on T. II. 439), conuitia, equus, pigneribus, querella, retullerat, secuntur, succenset (xvii. 35).

Like most manuscripts it omits xv. *Epistula Sapphus* and xvi. 39-144, and it ends after xx. 12.

II.

UNIQUE READINGS IN O.

The manuscript O has numerous unique readings, of which some are due to carelessness, some may be attempts at emendation. Instances are i. 20 notata (nouata), 77 narrans (narres), 79 uanescit (uanescat), 106 e (in), 107 ueniat (ueniet).

ii. 33 nisi (ubi), 45 lacrimas (laceras), 82 qui (quod), 114 socer (sacer), 119

afuit (ad fuit). iii. 14 si (ei), 40 ipsa (illa). iv. 35 sic (si), 53 redeamus (reddamus), 137 diu (licet). v. 9 nunquid (nondum), 13 requiemus ab (requieuiamus), 33 ducit (dixit). vi. 113 numina (nomina), 153 subcuba (subnuba). vii. 92 fuit (foret), 104 corda (tarda), 171, 2 tunc (cum), tunc (nunc). viii. 12 rapiet (raperet), 97 omnia (obuia). ix. 58 illi (illo), 124 inuictis (inuitis). x. 2 interdum (incertum), 32 feminibusque (semianimisque), 36 ipsa (illa), 61 tangit (cingit), 101 cuspidē (stipite). xi. 117 frigora (frigida). xiii. 44 hostis (hospes), 57 et (ut), 88 dabit (dedit), 93 designet (designat). xiv. 7 ipse (esse), 80 dinumeras (dinumerat), 115 restant (restat).

xvi. 14 hec (hoc): so also 211 hec (hoc), 162 poteram (poterat), 164 finiat (finiet), 238 dissimulandus (dissimulatus), 242 illa (ille), 258 nuptum (nutum), 277 distincta (districta), 282 mea (tua), 319 te tibi teque mihi (te mihi meque tibi), 358 haud (aut), 376 externa (aeterna).

xvii. 11 uidetur (uocetur), 29 nobis (non his), 61 noxe (terrae), 128 negat (neget), 159 comesque (domusque), 189 incepto potius (potius coepto), 243 uisa (uera).

xviii. 2 sexta (sesta), 24 sed tamen est (est tamen et), 28 fit (sit), 76 credentes (cedentes), 92 restant (restat), 98 dabis (dabas), 103 teque (eque), 108 que (quam), 147 modo fiat (fiat modo), 151 claramne (claramque), 154 modo (uia), 157 hec (hoc), 160 thorū (deum), 194 inuictas (inuitas), 204 mea (tua).

xix. 60 flere (ferre), 106 factaque (fataque), 112 negat (uetat), 168 osculaque—obuia (obuiaque—oscula), 185 metuit (metuunt).

xx. 18 triste (teste), 30 consultorque (consultoque), 33 tecum (iterum), 121 aut (et), 148 illud (istud), 150 et (si), 164 et aduentus (ad euentus).

xxi. 12 non (ne).

The following errors involving a false quantity show ignorance of metre:

v. 27 conscita in margine (consita margine), 113 germanaque (germana).

vi. 39 narrat ausu studioque (narrat studio cursuque).

vii. 106 more (noxae).

viii. 65 hoc grauis (generis) fatum, 71 amicleoque poluci.

ix. 35 apta (operata), 101 petes (potes).

xii. 75 satis est (sat est): so *Dresd.* and *Giess.*, 98 cumque uidi (cum uidi).

xiii. 21 atque (at), 51 subit (subiit), 137 hanc tamen expecto (hanc spectro).

xiv. 107 portus nullus emissus (Nilus portus emissus).

xvi. 198 trenario (Therapnaeo), 251 et lacte (uel lacte).

xvii. 39 crudelitas (credulitas), 52 domus est hec (domus haec).

xviii. 158 facit (fecit), 191 putet id (putes id).

xix. 51 uoceque (modo uoce), 90 ubi spretis est (ubi est spretis), 113 tamen (tam), 116 causa sit et certe femina more nulla (nulla morae), 137 canuut pluresque (pluresque canunt).

III.

THE RELATION OF O TO THE OTHER MANUSCRIPTS.

The text of the *Heroides*, the manuscripts of which descend from a common archetype, as is indicated by certain obvious errors present in them all,¹ is preserved in its purest form by the Paris manuscript, P, sec. xi., with which the Vienna fragments, V, sec. xii. largely agree. A recension is generally assumed to have been made some time about the eleventh century, which presents a text by which P was uninfluenced, but on which depend the Wolfenbüttel manuscript, G, sec. xii., the Eton manuscript, E, sec. xi., written in Beneventan script, and numerous largely corrupted manuscripts, which are chiefly of use in the parts where P is deficient. Moreover,

¹ Sedlmayer, *Proleg. ad Heroides*, p. 38, Palmer, *Heroides*, p. xxxvi.

among the numerous later 'Vulgate' manuscripts (though such authorities can be mainly neglected) not infrequently individual manuscripts, including my own, which for convenience I call O, preserve readings obviously genuine, not due to that eleventh-century recension.

I proceed to consider the value of O in relation to the other manuscripts. The references are to Palmer's text (Oxford, 1898). For the readings of the 'Vulgate' manuscripts, besides the apparatus of Sedlmayer's edition (Vindob., 1886), I have consulted the edition of Jahn (Lipsiae, 1828) and the useful collations printed in the edition of Loers (Coloniae, 1829), pp. 633-682. The symbol ω indicates the Vulgate manuscripts, ζ part of them.

O (whose reading stands first in these citations) frequently agrees with the Vulgate tradition against PG. In this case it generally gives a corrupt reading: ii. 20 ipse] ille PG, 47 quo abires] quod haberes PG, 82 feror] ferar PG, 89 tangit] tanget PG. iii. 35 septem] sex PG, 44 aura] hora PG, 139 at] aut PG, 142 animi] animae PG. v. 20 summa] longa PG. vi. 89 sparsis] passis G, passi P, 111 cur] uir PG. vii. 29 cogitet] cogitat PG, 71 quicquid id est] quid tanti est PG, 75 parcas] curae PG, 85 narrabas] narraras PG, 86 illa] ure P, inde G, 88 quod mihi uae] quodue mihi PG. ix. 56 lapsas] lassas PG, 105 facta] gesta PG, 144 labe] tate PG. xi. 106 admissi] amissae PG. xii. 96 habens] habet PG, 101 peruigil ecce draco] insopor ecce uigil PG, 140 funesta] funerea PG. xiv. 47 aut (at ω) rursus monitis iussuque coacta parentis] admoni iugulo, sine me tibi uera fateri PG. xvi. 196 quales] qualem PG, 203 erat] etiam PG, 323 nostri] nostra PG. xvii. 19 coepto] coepti PG, 126 insidiosa] inuidiosa PG. xviii. 59 mihi] fere PG, 79 nostras] nullum PG, 102 dis magnis] di magni PG, 203 desine] desino PG. xix. 12 fugacis] sequacis PG, 15 submotis] summotae PG, 18 credi] reddi PG, 100 sexta (sesta ω)] thressa P, cressa G, 163 hoc] hac P, huc G, 165 robora] tempora PG. xx. 41 modi-uno] doli-imo PG.

Yet in the following passages, agreeing with the Vulgate manuscripts, it preserves the correct text against PG.

ii. 122 quaque] quaeque PG.

vi. 51 mea fata] mala fata PG.

xii. 6 uitae] uitam PG.

xiv. 11 ense] ensem PG.

xvii. 164 ideo] adeo PG. Though adeo, adopted by Sedlmayer, is retained in Palmer's text, ideo, supported in Palmer's note and accepted by Ehwald and Bornecque, is simpler. Though rare ideo occurs in *Met.* I. 515, and is to be preferred.

xvii. 226 ista] ipsa PG. *Ista*, retained by Heinsius, 'this land,' my homeland, is more natural than *ipsa*, 'the very land,' which recent editors adopt, including Bornecque, in whose edition Marcel Prévost, perceiving this, rightly translates 'je ne sais pas quel charme cette terre-ci me retient.'

Sometimes, when some of the Vulgate manuscripts agree with PG. while others present a different reading, O agrees with those manuscripts which differ from PG. In such cases it generally, though not always, shows a corrupt text, as in the following passages:

iv. 17 fingat ζ],

vi. 28 trahunt E ζ],

vi. 100 uolet G³ *Goth. Dresd.*],

vi. 140 quaelibet ζ] quamlibet P,

vii. 152 scepra sacra P³ ζ],

regia scepra GE.

viii. 69 detinet],

figat PG ζ .

uocant G ζ (P wanting).

fauet PG, faut EP².

quodlibet GE ζ .

scepraque sacra P .

distinet γ .

destinat PG.

- ix. 160 thalamis ζ,
 xi. 92 genas P² ζ,
 xi. 104 ut ζ *Heinsius*,
 xi. 124 quaelibet ζ,
 xii. 81 priorum ζ,
 xii. 100 in se constrictas ζ,
 xiii. 29 utque redit animus ζ,
 xiv. 46 concidit ζ,
 xvi. 32 scindere *Dresd.*,
 xvi. 264 sinu ζ,
 xvi. 279 recolo G² ζ,
 cf. v. 113,
 xvi. 303 ipse abit ζ,
 xvi. 373 bellum G² ζ,
 xvii. 27 luctando ζ,
 xvii. 47 nescire P² ζ,
 xvii. 60 sanguine ζ,
 xvii. 113 natura P²G ζ,
 xvii. 137 recusio ζ,
 xviii. 3 uel sint ζ,
 xviii. 8 obeunda ζ *Heinsius*,
 xviii. 146 scindam ζ,
 xix. 155 eucta,
 xix. 191 obuorsor ζ,
 xix. 208 scinde ζ,
 xx. 58 quasque ζ,
 xx. 93 hoc quod iussit amor ζ,
 xx. 134 astringoque ζ,
 fatis ζ,
 titulis P² (eat P) G ζ,
 comas G^ω.
 (P erased).
 et G ζ *Palmer, Ehwald*.
 at P (ac *Merkel*).
 quamlibet PG^ω.
 meorum PG^ω.
 inter se strictas G ζ.
 inter constrictus P ζ.
 ut rediit animus P.
 utque animus rediit G ζ.
 recidit V, etendit P.
 redcidit G, decidit P²G².
 findere PG^ω.
 toro, PG^ω.
 repeto PG^ω.
cf. Trist. I. 3. 3.
 esset et PV ζ.
 esset ut G.
 ferrum PG ζ.
 luctanti PG ζ.
 necisse PG^ω.
 nomine PG ζ.
 fortuna PG (*v.l.*) ^ω.
 repugno PG^ω.
 et sunt P.
 tibi sint G ζ.
 adeunda PG^ω.
 findam PG^ω.
 euicta PG^ω.
 obuertor PG^ω.
 finde PG^ω.
 quaeque PG^ω.
 hoc quoque quod, || iussit P.
 hoc quod tu uis sit (sit G² *suprascr.*) G.
 effingoque PG ζ.

In the following passages O preserves the better reading; on iv. 126, xi. 59, see below.

- iv. 126 nixu ζ,
 vi. 107 udae ζ,
 xi. 21 clamanti litore ζ,
 xi. 59 disti ζ,
 dixti ζ,
 xiii. 39, 40 premetur—feret ζ,
 Loers, Ehwald,
 nisu PGE^ω.
 undae PGE^ω.
 clamanti in litore G.
 clamanti (n. *suprascr.*), || litore P.
 clamani litore V ζ
 aisti PG^ω.
 prematur G^ω—feret G ζ.
 ferat ζ.
 (P wanting).
 prematur—ferat *Sedlmayer, Palmer*.

xvi. 223 quidni V,

quid ne G ζ.
quidnam (nam *in ras.*) P.

Sometimes O agrees with P against G in giving a corrupt reading.

v. 16 depressa PE ζ,

depressa G ζ.
defensa *Parrhasius*.

vi. 62 sumus P,

simus GEω.

vii. 149 populos potius Pω,

potius populos G.

viii. 55 crimine P,

crimina Gω.

viii. 104 et minus a nobis P ζ,

hoc munus nobis G.

viii. 117 oro P ζ,

iuro G ζ.

xii. 7 apta P,

acta P²Gω.xii. 165 repuli P² ζ,

pepuli G ζ.

repudi P,

xiv. 42 saporis P,

saporis Gω.

xviii. 169 moraris P ζ,

morare P²G ζ.

xix. 112 iuuat P ζ,

iubet G ζ.

xix. 194 placata ζ,

piata Gω.

xx. 4 dolore P ζ,

dolere P²G ζ.

xx. 158 propior P,

propior Gω.

xx. 170 credere PV,

cedere ω (G *obliterated*).

Sometimes it agrees with P, against G, in the true reading.

ii. 84 armiferam P ζ,

armigeram G ζ.

ii. 95 confundere PEω,

effundere G ζ.

ii. 122 lata Pω,

nota G ζ.

iv. 111 negamus P ζ,

negemus G ζ.

vi. 144 nempe Pω,

nonne GE ζ.

vii. 48 careas Pω,

fugias G.

vii. 82 plector Pω,

plectar G ζ.

vii. 179 mitescunt P,

mitescant Gω.

vii. 180 edisco P ζ,

ediscam G ζ.

viii. 120 se Pω,

sic G ζ.

ix. 49 temeratam P ζ,

uiolatam G ζ.

xvi. 368 erit P ζ,

habet G ζ.

xvii. 10 hospes an hostis P ζ,

hostis an hospes G ζ.

Occasionally it agrees with P against G in a corruption which suggests the truth.

iv. 31 sic PE ,
si ζ (true reading),

et G.

vi. 140 quamlibet *suprsacr. m. 2.* irat-
tis P.

quamlibet iratis O ζ.

vii. 71 tutum P,
ut tum *Madvig*,quodlibet ad facinus GE ζ.
totum G²ω.

Sometimes it agrees with PG in a false reading against many other manuscripts.

ii. 69 chiron PE ζ,
cyron G,

sciron ζ.

vi. 93 mage PGE ζ,

male ζ

vi. 137 referam P²G ζ,
referat P (?),

vii. 21 si ueniant PGω,
vii. 113 in terras PGEω,

vii. 187 facto PG,
x. 139 horrent PGV,
xi. 53 continuo PG ζ,
xx. 37 placidos PGω,

refert E ζ.

ut eueniant E ζ.
internas *Naugerius, confirmed by Dresd.*
Goth. according to Jahn.

fato ω.
horret ω.
contineo ζ.
placitas V ζ.

Sometimes it agrees with PG, against other manuscripts, in the true reading.

ii. 98 fac PG ζ,
iii. 136 ad PG,
xx. 20 tulisse PG ζ,

face E ζ.
in Eω.
probasse ζ.
notasse ζ.

Often it agrees with G, against P, in the worse reading.

ii. 35 auris G ζ,
iii. 25 non Gω,
iii. 55 repellar Gω,
iii. 95 bello Gω,
iii. 149 at Gω,
iii. 154 more Gω,
iv. 108 carior Gω,
iv. 139 amplexus Gω,
iv. 165 feros Gω,
v. 8 indigne Gω,
v. 77 tecum ueniunt Gω,
vi. 77 perdam Gω,
vi. 78 concidet Gω,
vi. 81 argolicoas Gω,
vi. 82 expectato P²GEω,
vi. 146 perfide quo Gω,
vii. 68 tyria G ζ.

undis PEω.
nec P.
repellas P.
bellum P.
a P.
iure P.
gratior P.
amplexos P.
ferox P.
indigno P.
tibi conueniunt P.
perdo P.
concidat P.
argolidas P.
expectata P.
perfidiae PE.
frigia P.
phrygia ζ.
troica E.
amissi-mei P.
admissi-mei ζ.
suis P.
numeros P.
egerat P.
terna P.
aequaque P.
tegente P ζ, *cf. Class. Rev. iii. 212.*
acrios P.
Agrios *Micyllus.*
prensuras P.
uictor P.
tecto P ζ.

vii. 104 amisso-meo Gω,

vii. 124 meis Gω,
viii. 24 numerum P²Gω,
viii. 41 gesserat Gω,
ix. 38 cerno Gω,
ix. 78 tu quoque Gω,
ix. 126 tegendo G ζ,
ix. 153 acrior Gω,

x. 10 pressuras Gω,
x. 71 uictus P²Gω,
xi. 44 tectis G,
tectus ζ,
xi. 91 planxi P²Gω,
xi. 125 funere (fulnere G) Gω,
xii. 1 ut G ζ,

plangi P.
uulnera P.
at Pω.

- xii. 39 dixerat G ω ,
 xii. 65 petit altera et altera habebit
 (habebat G ζ), P²G ω ,
 xii. 89 possunt (poss || s G) G ω ,
 xii. 99 miserabile G ω ,
 xii. 199 numeramus in illo G ζ ,
 xii. 201 auro GP² ζ ,

aureo ζ ,

- xii. 205 potentem P²G ω ,
 xiii. 83 qui-amore GP² ω ,
 xiv. 43 uiolentia G ω ,
 xiv. 64 piam G ω ,
 xvi. 169 elegisse G ω ,
 xvii. 186 ut-foret G ω ,
 xvii. 192 fugit G ω ,
 xviii. 102 diis magnis G ω ,
 xviii. 115 contactus G ζ ,
 xviii. 135 iterare P²G ω ,

xviii. 156 erit in P²G ω ,xix. 138 conseruisse GV ζ ,xix. 151, 152 stertuit P²GV ω ,xix. 171 tam GV ω ,xx. 27 arte G ω ,xx. 135 remoui G ω ,

Sometimes it agrees with G against P in the true reading.

- vii. 8 uela G ω ,
 vii. 145 tibridis (Thybridis) P²GE ω ,
 vii. 177 ultra G ω ,
 ix. 20 cumulas—nota P²G ω ,

xi. 46 dena G ω ,xi. 67 frondibus G ω ,xii. 110 quod licet G ω ,xiii. 78 pios G ω ,xvii. 17 uixi G ω ,

In the parts where P is deficient, sometimes O agrees with G in the false reading.

- i. 33 hac est GE ζ ,
 i. 36 alacer missos GE ω ,
 v. 128 arte G ω ,
 v. 136 quaesierant, G ω ,
 xx. 189 cum casibus G ω ,
 xx. 215 nomina G ζ ,
 xx. 230 uigilans G ω ,

Sometimes it agrees with G in the true reading.

- i. 16 timoris G ω ,
 i. 50 abest G ω ,

dicitur P.

alter petit alter habebit P.

haec sunt P.

mirabile P.

numeranimus illo P ζ .alto P ζ .

potentis P.

quam-amare P.

uiolenti P.

piaae P.

legisse P.

ui-fuit P ζ .fuit P ζ .

di magni P.

cunctatus P ω .

itera P.

iter ante ζ .

erat P.

errat *codex Moreti*.composuisse P ζ , cf. *Prop.* II.

2. 12.

sternuit P.

clam P.

a me P.

remoto P.

uerba PE.

tibridas P.

ultro P.

cumulus—nota P.

cumulus—notat *codex Douzæ*.nona P ζ .

frugibus P.

quodlibet P.

pius P.

lusi uel uixi P.

lusi ζ .haec est ζ .lacer admissos ζ .ante G².quaesierunt ζ .modo casibus ζ .numina ω .uigilem ζ .doloris E ζ .abes ζ .

erit E.

Sometimes, where P is deficient, O agrees with the majority of manuscripts against G.

i. 28 facta G ² ω,	fata G.
i. 48 ante Eω,	esse G.
i. 75 meditor Eω,	metuo G.
i. 95 auctor Eω,	actor G
i. 105 annis Eω,	armis G <i>cf. Aen. II. 3. 7.</i>
i. 116 redeas Eω,	uenias G.
iv. 74 erit Eζ,	erat Gω.
v. 99 capias Eω,	sapias Gζ
v. 124 illa Eω,	graia G.
vi. 9 quam nuntia littera ω, quam littera nuntia Eζ,	de te quam littera G.
vi. 20 futura Eω,	recepta GE ² ζ.
vi. 43 furtim ω,	furto Gζ.

Sometimes it preserves the genuine reading against G.

i. 10 lassaret Eω,	lassasset G.
i. 31 atque ω, <i>cf. ii. 83,</i>	iamque Gζ.
i. 114 fati ω,	fatis Gζ.
ii. 7 bene quae Eω,	quae nos Gζ.
iv. 72 tinxerat ω,	cinxerat GE ² ζ.
iv. 84 iuuat—agis Eω,	iuuas—agas Gζ.
vi. 32 et eripedes Eζ,	aeripedes Gζ.

IV.

GLOSSSES.

The original, from which O descends, shows traces of glosses; as is often the case with Ovid manuscripts, e.g. vii. 68, E has the unmetrical troica (a gloss) for *Phrygia*.

Instances are

- ii. 72 dei] ^{ditis}ditis OE²ζ, i.e. dei.
v. 127 O has

Illam de patria theseus abstulit nisi nomine fallor
Nescio quis theseus abscidit arte sua

This shows a gloss: de patria ^{abstulit}theseus. The gloss abstulit having been incorporated unmetrically into 127, in 128 abstulit was altered to abscidit to avoid tautology.

vi. 9

cur mihi fama prior de te quam littera uenit:
isse sacros Martis sub iuga panda boues?

So G. For de te quam O with many manuscripts has quam nuntia: E and a few have quam littera nuntia. I suspect that nuntia was a gloss on littera to introduce the reported speech.

vi. 83 carmina nouit] carmine mouit OG²ω carmina nouit E. ^{e mouit te}The gloss carmine mouit was interpolated into the text in OG²ω.

xi. 103 erinyes] eumenides O²ζ, an unmetrical gloss.

xiii. 90 uiri] ^{mei}mei O, i.e. uiri.

- xix. 194 piata] placata OPA, i.e. ^{placata} piata.
 xx. 203 fac referas] fac ut referas O, i.e. fac ^{ut} referas.

V.

THE RELATION OF O TO INTERPOLATIONS IN THE *HEROIDES*.

The couplets introductory to *Ep.* v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xii, xvii, xx, xxi, preserved in E and some manuscripts and early editions, are not contained in O, nor the lines found in some manuscripts at ii. 18, vii. 24, 98, viii. 19, xx. 11. O does contain xviii. 1-2 omitted by the first hand of P.

Lines, not found in the best tradition, occur in many manuscripts, of which some are probably authentic. These are discussed by Sedlmayer, *Proleg. ad Heroid.*, p. 69 ff., Purser in Palmer's edition, p. xl ff., and Housman, who effectively defended the genuineness of those after ii. 17, vii. 23, 97, viii. 19, xiii. 73, *Classical Review*, XI. 200 ff.

The following interpolated lines are contained in O :

After iv. 132

Saturnus periit perierunt et sua iura
 Sub ioue nunc mundus est iussa sequere iouis

After v. 22

Populus est memini fluuiali concita riuo
 Est in qua nostri littera scripta memor

After xiii. 73

Ut rapiat paridi quam paris ante sibi
 Irruat et causa quem uincit uincat et armis

xiv. 47 instead of the hexameter Admoui—fateri O has

Aut rursus monitis iussuque coacta parentis

After xvi. 168

Cum uenus et iuno pallasque in ualibus yde
 Corpora iudicio supposuere meo

xvi. 265 foll. thus

Vt tulit ypomones ceneida praemia cursus
 Que proprio cursu uicerat ante procos
 Vt ferus alcides achiloia cornua fregit
 Dum petit amplexus deianira tuos
 Nostra per has leges audacia fortiter isset
 Sic et tu phrigios ypodomia sinus
 Nostra per has leges audacia fortiter isset
 Teque mei scires esse laboris opus.

Lines 268-9 are deleted by a stroke drawn through them. Here O partially preserves the two interpolated lines found in some manuscripts

Quae proprio cursu uicerat ante procos
 Sic et tu Phrygias uenies regina per urbes

After xviii. 4 in O follows the same line deleted by a stroke, then

Hostibus et causam nominis inde tuli (xvi. 360)

The scribe must have looked back negligently to the preceding page.

I add a few notes illustrating modes of interpolation.

1. Interpolation due to the scribe's eye wandering.
 - ii. 122 *aequora Aldus*] *litora O* with all manuscripts, from 121 *litora*.
 - iii. 34 *sex*] *septem OE ω* from *septem 32*.
2. To assimilation of termination.
 - i. 107 *ueniat O*] *ueniet G ω* , to conform to *uinat*.
 - vii. 145 *tybridas P*] *tibridis P²OG ω* , to conform to *undas*.
 - x. 78 *esses O*] *esset PG ω* , to conform to *mactasses 77*.
 - xix. 15 *summotis O ω*] *summotae PG*, to conform to *his*.
3. To remove an unusual word.
 - ix. 55 *terris totiens errator (erratur P, corr. Heinsius)*] *totiens qui terris errat OG*, to remove the rare word *errator*.
 - xii. 101 *insopor ecce uigil PG*] *peruigil ecce draco OP² ω* .

Here *peruigil* was interpolated from *Met.* vii. 149 to remove the unusual word *insopor*, which coinage of his own Ovid used to avoid tautology with l. 60 *peruigil anguis*. The words are a rendering of Ap. Rhod. IV. 128 *ὄξυς ἀπνοῖσεν προΐδων ὄφιν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν*: *uigil* is substantive as *Met.* xiii. 370. Palmer, wrongly I think, reads 'insopor ecce draco': for *draco* must be explained as a gloss on *uigil*, which was introduced into O and other manuscripts. The adjective 'insopor' is similar in formation to *insomnis* (*Met.* ix. 190 *pomaque ab insomni concustidita dracone*: Linse, *De Ouidio vocabulorum inventore*, p. 41), *infrons*, *dissors*. The history of this line is interesting as it shows the influence of two glosses

peruigil draco
insuper ecce uigil.

xiv. 36 *audibam P*] *audieram O ω* , to remove the rare archaic form, which is supported by *Fast.* iii. 507, where there is the same variation.

4. To remove an apparent false quantity.
 - xviii. 203 *desino PG*] *desine O ω* .
5. To make intelligible a reading already corrupted.
 - ix. 15 *se tibi pax terrae, tibi se tota acquora debent*.

So most manuscripts, which ineptitude was corrected by Heinsius, who replaced *tota* by *tuta*.

O and the Dresden manuscript have a remedy of their own to explain the erroneous *tota*.

se tibi pars terrae, tibi se tota acquora debent.

'A part of the earth, the whole of the seas owe their existence to you!'

6. To simplify a proper name unfamiliar to the scribe.
 - ix. 44 *nec pater Amphitryon nec puer Hyllus adest*.

O has, with delightful precision,

nec pater amphitrium nec puer ullus adest.

xviii. 1-2

*mittit Abydenus, quam mallet ferre, salutem
si cadat unda maris, sesta puella, tibi.*

The false form *Sesta* was satisfactorily corrected by Heinsius and Bentley independently into *Sesti*. O by reading *sexta* converts Leander into a Don Juan.

7. To correct to normal an unusual gender.

iii. 76 plenos—colos PE] plenas—colos OG ω . The rarer masculine gender occurs also *Am.* II. 6. 46, *A.A.* I. 702.

vi. 82 expectata—hoste P] expectato OP²G ω . Sedlmayer, Palmer, and Ehwald accept expectata, wrongly I think. The alteration to the feminine gender was made by an interpolator because Medea is signified. The masculine expectato should be restored, because the masculine gender is used in general statements, where a class of persons is intended, as v. 8

quae uenit indigno poena, dolenda uenit,

though by indigno Oenone means herself: iii. 43

an miseros tristis fortuna tenaciter urget,

though by miseros Briseis means herself. Examples quoted by Kühner-Stegmann II. i. 61 are rather different.

8. Alteration due to wrong attraction of gender.

ii. 55, 56

nec moueor, quod te iuui portuque locoque :
debuit haec meriti summa fuisse mei

haec PG] hoc O and many manuscripts, to conform to quod te iuui.

iii. 107

perque tuum nostrumque caput, quae iunximus una

quae PG] quod OE ω , to conform to caput.

ix. 97

quique inter laeuumque latus laeuumque lacertum
prae graue compressa fauce pendit onus.

For quique PG (i.e. Antaeus) O ω have quodque, to conform to caput.

xiii. 41

qua possum, squalore tuos imitata labores.

For qua PG⁵, which is supported by *Met.* viii. 352 qua potuit, precibus deus adnuit O ω have quo, to conform to squalore.

xiv. 11

aut illo iugulet, quem non bene tradidit, ense.

For ense rightly given by O ω , ensem is the reading of PG to conform to quem, which is wrongly accepted by Sedlmayer and Ehwald, for Ovid does not attract the antecedent into the relative clause. There is the same error in Juvenal x. 254 cum quaerit ab omni, quisquis adest, socio, where P has socius, which I adopted in my text (regarding it as an inverse attraction due to the influence of Vulgar Latin) and now abandon; and xi. 85 accedente nova, si quam dabat hostia, carne, where, with several manuscripts, P has carnem, the *m* having been subsequently erased.

xiv. 43

excussere metum uiolenti iussa parentis.

For uiolenti P all other manuscripts including O have uiolentia (uiolencia G, Palmer's note is a misprint) to agree with uerba, wrongly because Ovid always uses uiolentus not uiolens: cp. *Ibis*. 373 Aeacides uiolentus.

xx. 30

consultoque fui iuris Amore vafer.

For consulto O has consultor to agree with vafer.

9. Alteration due to attraction of number.

vii. 95

audieram uocem : nymphas ululasse putau.

For uocem OE and most manuscripts have uoces.

The singular was converted into plural to conform to nymphas, 'the voices of the nymphs.' But the singular is more poetic. In her nervous anxiety Dido exaggerates one cry into several.

x. 139

corpus, ut impulsae segetes aquilonibus, horret.

For horret O with PGV and several manuscripts has horrent, to conform to segetes.

xi. 44

artibus et tecto tulus ab hoste fuit.

For tecto OG have tectis to conform to artibus.

xviii. 91

quo magis accedo, propioraque litora fiunt,
quoque minus restat, plus libet ire mihi.

For restat O has restant, to conform to fiunt.

xix. 173

nunc male res iunctae, calor et reuerentia, pugnant.

For pugnant O with G and a few manuscripts have pugnāt, to conform to reuerentia.

10. Alteration in order to provide a more usual construction.

iii. 143

qua si destituor, repetam patresque uirumque.

So PG, while O and most manuscripts have destituor, to produce the normal conditional sentence, with future indicative in protasis and apodosis. This is probably an interpolation, for though the indicative present in protasis with future in apodosis is rare, it is found *Met.* III. 263 ipsam, si maxima Iuno rite uocor, perdam, si me gemmantia dextra sceptrā tenere decet, si sum regina Iouisque et soror et coniunx. XV. 439 si nota satis praesagia nostrae mentis habes, non tota cadet te sospite Troia. XV. 594 est hic unus, quem uos nisi pellitis urbe, rex erit. VI. 542 si tamen haec superi cernunt . . . quandocumque mihi poenas dabis.

11. Interpolations from other passages of Ovid.

v. 20

saepe citos egi per iuga longa canes.

For longa O with E and most manuscripts have summa, which is due to iv. 42 portari celeris per iuga summa canes.

vi. 51

certa fui primo, sed me mea fata trahebant.

mea O and most manuscripts: mala P and a few others, interpolated probably from *Am.* III. 9. 35 cum rapiant mala fata bonos.

viii. 72

reddita Mopsopia Taenaris urbe soror.

OP² and most manuscripts for Taenaris have Tyndaris, interpolated from v. 91 Tyndaris infestis fugitiva repositur armis.

xvii. 17

fama tamen clara est, et adhuc sine crimine uixi.

For uixi found in O and most manuscripts, several others have lusi (lusi uel uixi P), which is adopted by Sedlmayer and Ehwald, wrongly I think because lusi seems to have been introduced from *Trist.* III. 2. 5 lusi uero sine crimine, *Fast.* IV. 9 primis sine crimine lusimus annis. But lusi is inappropriate here, since Helen does not avow any frailties in her opening words; she is 'uitae sine labe' (14).

xix. 138

molle latus lateri composuisse tuo.

OGV and a few other manuscripts have conseruisse, introduced from 2. 58 lateri conseruisse latus, in place of composuisse.

VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF O TO THE DRESDEN MANUSCRIPT.

Among all the manuscripts of which collations have been published the Dresden manuscript stands out among the rest as exhibiting a close connexion with O. Though not always identical in their readings, these two manuscripts agree in the predominating number of cases, and frequently present a reading different from that of all the rest. The Dresden manuscript is described by Sedlmayer, *Prolegomena critica ad Heroides Ovidianas*, p. 21, as a thirteenth-century vellum manuscript, which was at one time in the possession of the Visconti family. A collation of it was published by Kuinoel (Loers, p. viii. and p. xiii), who assigned it to the fourteenth century, which collation is fully given by Loers, p. 633 foll. With the help of this I have compiled the following list of passages which show the affinity of these two Italian manuscripts. The reading given as the variant is that of O and the Dresden manuscript, which I call D.

- i. 1 Ulixē] Ulixēs OD.
- ii. 70 sinis] cinis OD.
- iv. 61 nunc] *om.* OD.
67 inita] uisa OD.
93 siluis Cephalus] cephalus siluis OD.
- v. 97 rudimentum] rudimentum est OD.
- vi. 27 ruptis] raptis OD.
62 simus] sumus OD.
86 abdere] addere OD.
100 se fauet GP, se facit E] se uolet OD.
103 filia fasias oete] filia phasis onete (oetae D) OD.
129 fratris potuit] potuit fratris OD.
153 subnuba] subcuba O, succuba D.
- vii. 24, 25 *om.* OD.
47 et *om.* OD.
68 Phrygia] thiria OD.
87 te tua] te mea OD.
123 coiere] cogere OD.
155 nequid desit] desit nequid OD.
- viii. 69 distinet] detinet OD.
89 ferebat] gerebat OD.
- ix. 15 pax] pars OD.
37 aprosque] apros OD.
53 defertur] refertur OD.
81 crederis] diceris OD.
97 laeuumque lacertum] dextrumque lacertum OD.
166 et patriae] patriae OD.
- x. 18 quod] quid OD.
23 ipse] ille OD.
- xi. 103 Erinyes] Eumenides OD.
115 non] nec OD.
- xii. 4 meos] suos OD.
34 pinea] picea OD.
71 noscis] nescis OD.
75 sat] satis OD.
94 findis] scindis OD.

- 104 *distinet*] *detinet* OD.
 139 *uobis*] *nobis* OD.
 xiii. 29 *ut rediit*] *utque redit* OD.
 114 *adfuso*] *effuso* OD.
 xiv. 42 *soporis*] *saporis* OD.
 57 *iacet*] *licet* OD
 xvi. 25 *perstet*] *praestet* OD.
 32 *findere*] *scindere* OD.
 166 *after this line* OD *have the interpolated couplet.*
 177 *ora* ω] *ora est* PGO, *hora est* D.
 187 *o*] *ha O, ah* D.
 200 *potando* POD, *potandas* G *and some manuscripts.*
 225 *demitto*] *dimitto* OD.
 264 *toro*] *sinu* OD.
 297 *corriget*] *corrigit* OD.
 339 *pars a me uix*] *uix a me pars* OD.
 364 *figitur*] *figitur* OD.
 xvii. 27 *luctanti*] *luctando* OD.
 71 *utque*] *atque* OD.
 149 *mala*] *mea* OD.
 208 *probris terras*] *terras probris* OD.
 xviii. 15 *felix i*] *o felix O, felix O* D.
 151 *Andromedan*] *Andromachen* OD.
 177 *propius*] *proprior* OD.
 xix. 17 *quod*] *quid* OD.
 36 *signa notamque*] *signaque nota* OD.
 181 *sic*] *sis* OD.
 194 *piata*] *placata* POD.
 xx. 24 *potest*] *potes* OD.
 74 *copia placandi sit modo*] *sit modo placandi copia* OD.
 134 *effingoque*] *astringoque* OD.
 158 *propior*] *proprior* POD.
 162 *an*] *non* OD.
 231 *e*] *et* OD.

S. G. OWEN.

To be continued.

TRIA GENERA CAUSARUM.

THE early handbooks of rhetoric compiled by Tisias and Corax and their successors seem to have been directed entirely at successful speaking in courts of law. This was the art that Strepsiades set out to learn in the Philosopher's Thinking-shop; this, Isocrates complains, was the only object of technical writers on rhetoric before his time;¹ and Aristotle, when he wrote the chapter that stands first in his *Rhetoric*, made just the same complaint: τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικὰ καὶ καλλίωνος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας οὐσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν.² The art as the Sophists practised it was by no means so limited in its application: many of them were accustomed to playing the parts of statesmen and diplomats as well as of educators; and the most notorious field for their powers of oratory was of course the lecture or ἐπίδειξις.³ But the systems of rhetoric that they devised and taught did not cover their own practice; and forensic oratory, as well as seeming the most commonly necessary kind at that time, was also, it must be said, the easiest to reduce to rule. Gorgias, it is true, professed to teach a rhetoric of more extended application, by means of which his pupils would be able to produce conviction in any public assembly;⁴ but we must conclude that this wider field was at least very imperfectly treated in all the technical systems of the time. Plato shortly describes the position thus: μάλιστα μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.⁵

Socrates in the same passage of the *Phaedrus* observes that rhetoric should cover not only the oratory of the courts and of all public assemblies, but also the art of persuasion in private relations, which Gorgias too had recognized;⁶ and this in *Soph.* 222c Plato names προσομιλητική, placing it beside δημηγορική and δικανική as parts of πιθανουργική. The whole he divides into ἰδία and δημοσία; and it is plain that προσομιλητική makes up the ἴδιον γένος, and the other two the δημόσιον; and that the latter covers the same field as that of Gorgias' πολιτικοὶ λόγοι.⁷ These enlargements of the art of rhetoric are only suggested by Plato, and that in the most general terms. But the deficiency of which Isocrates and Aristotle complain was actually remedied in their own time, and not only in their own works. At the beginning of the so-called *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which is now generally accepted as the work of Anaximenes,⁸ we find: Δύο γένη τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσι λόγων, τὸ μὲν δημηγορικόν, τὸ δὲ δικανικόν;⁹ and both these classes of public oration are fully treated in the work. After further enumerating seven εἶδη τῶν λόγων, Anaximenes goes on:

¹ *Adv. soph.* xii 19.

² 1354b 25 ff.

³ The term ἐπίδειξις, from its first meaning of any demonstration or display (*Thuc.* iii 16; vi 31; *Demosth.* 319, 9; 785, 17), comes to be used in particular of a verbal demonstration or exposition (*Thuc.* iii 42; *Plat. Phaed.* 99d; cf. *Ar. Nub.* 748); and the word and its cognates are regularly applied by Plato to the lectures of Sophists (e.g. *Hipp. Maj.* 282d), whether those general discourses intended to impress the public and attract pupils (e.g. *Euthyd.* 275a; *Gorg.* 447a ff.; a sense perhaps alluded to in *Ar. Nub.* 269) or the instructional lectures themselves (*Crat.* 384b; cf. *Soph.* 224b). In Isocrates ἐπίδειξις takes on a new sense of 'panegyric',

which I shall consider below along with Aristotle's use of ἐπιδεικτικός as a technical term.

⁴ *Plat. Gorg.* 452e.

⁵ *Phaedr.* 261b.

⁶ *Plat. Gorg.* 456b.

⁷ Cf. C. Brandstaetter: *De Notionum Πολιτικός et Σοφιστής Usu Rhetoricæ*—Leipziger Studien XV (1894) p. 139 ff.

⁸ This attribution, first made by Peter Victorius and revived by Spengel, has been commonly adopted since the appearance of P. Wendland's book *Anaximenes vom Lampisakos*, Berlin, 1905.

⁹ The manuscripts give τρία γένη, and add τὸ δ' ἐπιδεικτικόν; but Spengel in his commentary brings forward excellent reasons why this should

τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τῶν λόγων τοσαῦτα ἀριθμῶ ἐστι· χρῆσθμεθα δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐν τε ταῖς κοιναῖς δημηγορίαις καὶ ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιολογίαις καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις: so that private rhetoric is recognized also. But these ἰδία ὁμιλίας are of course not properly in place in a work dealing nominally with πολιτικοὶ λόγοι; and in fact Anaximenes gives very little attention to them.

The seven εἶδη enumerated by Anaximenes are προτρεπτικόν, ἀποτρεπτικόν, ἐγκωμιαστικόν, ψεκτικόν, κατηγορικόν, ἀπολογητικόν and ἐξεταστικόν. Of these the first two belong mainly to the δημηγορικὸν γένος, or political oratory, the last three mainly to the δικανικόν, or forensic; and this the author plainly says in several places.¹ There remain the middle two kinds, encomium and invective. Now as the δημηγορικὸν and δικανικὸν γένος are associated, in the arrangement of the work, respectively with two and three of the other five εἶδη, it might at first be thought that we should have kept in the text the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος offered by our manuscripts, to be associated with these remaining two. Anaximenes' scheme then becomes superficially very like Aristotle's: for Aristotle distinguishes the same three branches, and allots to them almost exactly the same special subjects.² But this argument would be false. It is indeed just such a line of thought that must have led to the interpolation: but if we were to accept it, we should be obliged to explain away the strong testimonies of Syrian and Quintilian, and to account for the book's never afterwards mentioning the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος at all. In either case we should have the same difficulty in fitting encomiums and invectives into that classification of speeches as political, forensic and private which Anaximenes still makes in his first chapter. They certainly need be neither 'forensic' nor 'private'; nor can we include them in 'political oratory'; for in a number of passages Anaximenes distinctly separates them from his δημηγορίαι.³ Equally we cannot, with Brandstaetter,⁴ suppose that he never intended them to form a separate branch of oratory at all, but to be entirely subordinate to the departments of political and forensic practice. The arrangement of the book, and the separate treatment given to the pair, show that Anaximenes has distinct and self-contained speeches in mind. The examples of arguments on p. 28, 15 ff., for instance, are evidently designed for set eulogies of athletics, the life of public service, and the like. It is perfectly true, as Brandstaetter says, that these may be employed as subsidiaries in the courts and assembly; but Anaximenes does not present them as in any way subsidiary. To this general argument, which ought by itself to be conclusive, I may add a particular one. The reasoning οὐκ ἄνεν τοῦ πίνειν αἱ παροιμίαι given on the same page can only be intended for a set ψόγος of wine; for we cannot imagine it to be part of a δημηγορία delivered to an assembly considering the prohibition of liquor; and were the ψόγος incidental to a κατηγορία of some particular παροιμία, it would not be a specimen of argument ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἄνεν τούτου.

The truth is that, while the seven εἶδη τῶν λόγων are enumerated as though they were subdivisions of the kinds of πολιτικοὶ λόγοι, they are actually independent divisions of rhetoric, and cover the whole field of its use, political and non-political, public and private, practical and epideictic: ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἡδὴ διηρημένων δεῖ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἐκάστω, ὅταν ἀρμότῃ, χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινῇ, συμμειγνύντα τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτῶν (p. 34, 21 ff.). It is obvious that such a classification cannot be fitted to the less extensive field of mere δημηγορίαι and δικαιολογίαι; and Anaximenes confesses as much when he says on p. 80, 8, speaking of encomium and invective, that ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν οὐκ ἀγῶνος ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξεως ἕνεκα λέγομεν. Realizing this we can

be rejected as an interpolation intended to bring the work into uniformity with Aristotle and later theory. We have the testimony of Quintilian III, 4, 9 and of Syrian II p. 11, 17 (Rabe) that in this passage only the first two kinds are mentioned. Still more cogent is the internal argument that nothing more is said of this 'epideictic' branch

anywhere in the book.

¹ E.g. pp. 27, 21 ff.; 30, 26 ff.; 65, 18 ff.; 84, 25 ff. (ed. Spengel-Hammer).

² Aristot. *Rhet.* I 3.

³ Cf. e.g. p. 27, 21-5.

⁴ P. 147 ff.

understand not only the uncertain position of encomium and invective, but also the anomalous intrusion of ἰδία ὁμιλία which we noticed before: Anaximenes has obscured the frame of his work by applying a system intended for the whole range of rhetoric to the limited field of πολιτικοὶ λόγοι. But the confusion is superficial; and if we but disregard the first sentence of the work it need not trouble us again: for it is upon the basis of the seven types of oration that the whole book is afterwards erected.

These seven types form a classification of rhetoric into the sorts practically employed; sorts not necessarily exclusive within the same speech, but principally distinct: distinguished, however, on various grounds. Προτροπή and ἀποτροπή are distinguished from κατηγορία and ἀπολογία by place and purpose: the former deliberate for the future, the latter plead upon the past. Encomium and invective, though delivered to an audience similar to that of the deliberative oration, have obviously much in common with the forensic; but are distinguished from both by the absence of any ἀγών, any question immediately at issue. The ἐξεταστικὸν γένος, whether in the courts or at large, neglects constructive argument in order to demonstrate inconsistency in something attacked—a true branch, this, of sophistic rhetoric. Except for the last, which is purely destructive, all the types fall naturally into complementary pairs, and are so considered by Anaximenes: so that we might as well distinguish in them three kinds as six.

When therefore we find that Aristotle divides rhetoric into three kinds, deliberative, judicial and epideictic, the scheme is already familiar; but whereas in Anaximenes it seems to be quite empirical, Aristotle arrives at it by an analysis, thus: (*Rhet.* I, 3) ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμὸν· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὃν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων οἷον ὁ δικάστης, ὁ δὲ [περὶ] ¹ τῆς δυνάμεως [ὁ] ² θεωρός, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν. συμβουλή δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή . . . κτλ. Anaximenes' three pairs are here three kinds: the ἐξεταστικόν, always an odd lot, is not recognized; otherwise the scheme is essentially the same in each author, and either might have derived it from the other. The relation of Anaximenes to Aristotle is disputed.³ I cannot discuss it here; but I think it will be plain that Aristotle's three types of rhetoric are not his own invention, even though it should be shown that he could not have had them from Anaximenes; even, that Anaximenes had them from him.

It has justly been objected against Aristotle that his classification of rhetoric in three kinds is anomalous; that they are not set upon the same plane, or divided by any simple criterion: for besides the difference of subject-matter by which all three are principally distinguished, two are delivered to κριταὶ and the third to θεωροί.³ Such an anomaly would be natural only if the classification was originally an empirical one, as we find it in Anaximenes; to which Aristotle, adopting it from the current rhetorical theory of the time, was characteristically seeking to give an analytical basis. It is to be observed also that he introduces the 'three kinds of rhetoric' only as a means of classifying the ἰδία προτάσεις or particular premisses from which the art must proceed: nothing more than their subject-matter is at the moment in question. In recognizing these particular premisses as legitimately belonging to the art of rhetoric Aristotle is making a grand descent from his first and

¹ Seclussit Spengel.

² Cf. H. Diels: *Abh. Berl. Ak.* 1886, iv; Wendland: *Anaximenes v. L.*, p. 30 ff.; K. Barwick: *Hermes* 57 (1922) 14 ff.; F. Solmsen:

ibid. 67, 144.

³ Cf. R. Volkmann: *Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* 2, Leipzig 1885, p. 19 ff.

most doctrinaire conception of it as a purely formal discipline:¹ it is just here that we should expect to find incorporated elements of the current rhetoric of the day, to which concession is being made.²

These considerations may explain the anomaly, but do not remove it. Logically the distinction of *θεωρός* from *κριτής* must be prior to the subdivision of *κριταί*. Volkmann is perfectly right in deploring Aristotle's arrangement of the divisions thus obtained as three uniform and parallel departments, and in pointing to it as a source of confusion afterwards. But as Aristotle clearly explains how he arrives at this arrangement, it is useless to attempt to reinterpret it in some way that will remove the anomaly. He is explicit: 'The listener must be either a witness or an arbiter, and an arbiter either of past or future. The arbiter of the future is, for instance, an ecclesiast; of the past, for instance, the dicast; the remaining kind, a witness of the art.' The unequal standing of the three divisions is perfectly plain. It would be less plain, to be sure, if the words bracketed by Spengel were read; but still, in view of the express primary distinction of *θεωρός* from *κριτής*, inevitable. That is the great merit of Spengel's correction: it makes what was always certain lucid and exact as well.

The subject-matter of epideictic rhetoric, says Aristotle, is encomium and invective. Its peculiar character, expressed in the distinction of *θεωρός* from *κριτής*, is that already noted by Anaximenes in his encomiums and invectives, the absence of any *ἀγών*. There is no vote or verdict to be given, no issue to be definitely decided one way or another; the function of the orator is not to prove a point but to make a lively presentation to his hearers. This sense of *ἐπιδεικτικός* is well illustrated by a passage from Isocrates' *Panegyricus*,³ where he defends the artistic character of his speeches: *Καίτοι τινὲς ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις, καὶ τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασιν ὥστε τοὺς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν πεποιημένους πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων σκοποῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁμοίως δέον ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς μὲν ἀσφαλῶς τοὺς δ' ἐπιδεικτικῶς.* Elsewhere in Isocrates *ἐπίδειξις*, developing this sense, has practically the meaning of panegyric.⁴ The term is not easily translatable: for 'demonstration' has false implications of logical proof; and 'display,' though very near the sense, has suggestions of virtuosity which may be misleading. Those suggestions are indeed present in the Greek term; but we wish to avoid them, for they have led ancients and moderns alike into the mistake of using such expressions as 'exornatio' or 'Prunkrede' to describe the essence of the epideictic department. If Aristotle had intended to signify by it merely ostentation, it would have been ridiculous to pretend that its subject-matter was confined to encomium and invective: it is equally ridiculous to suppose that these cannot have a serious purpose. The Lysiac *Eroticus* in Plato's *Phaedrus* is a plain piece of rhetorical virtuosity; but its form is preptetic, not encomiastic: Pericles' funeral speech in the second book of Thucydides is an encomium on Athens and the dead; shall we call it frivolous display? That interpretation of epideictic oratory as mere virtuosity, hallowed though it is by tradition, cannot be allowed to stand. The credit for pointing this out belongs to Oskar Kraus, who about thirty years ago published two papers on the subject;⁵ but he went too far, and maintained, against Aristotle and reason, a number of interpretations which discounted the distinction between *θεωρός* and *κριτής*, brought the epideictic branch into a position quite uniform with the other two, and thus sought to remove the inherent anomaly as well as the adventitious corruption

¹ Cf. F. Solmsen: *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Neue Philolog. Unters. IV) Berlin 1929, p. 196 ff. Solmsen's general contention here seems to me unassailable.

² The statement of Diogenes Laertius (III 93 f.) that Plato divided rhetoric into six types, which are the same as the first six of Anaximenes, seems, if it is worth anything, to support

the view that this was a common feature of fourth century theory. So does the appearance of the *ἑπτα γένη* in the second half of Aristotle's third book, which is known to be drawn from such sources.

³ *Or.* iv 11; cf. ps-Demosth. *Erot.* 2 (p. 1401 fn.).

⁴ *Or.* v 17; *Epist.* i 5; vi 4. 5.

⁵ Über eine altüberlieferte Missdeutung der *epi-*

rom Aristotle's scheme. This is equally false. Oratory directed to a *θεωρός* has a genuine task, but a different one from that directed to a *κριτής*. If virtue made its own just impression upon us, nothing would need praise: for praise, if we agreed with it, would always be superfluous; and if we differed, it could never replace argument. As it is, the epideictic is an essential part of oratory. The object of, say, a funeral speech is not to prove but to celebrate the virtues of the dead; nor are the audience there to learn whether he was good or not. The orator will therefore pay especial attention to his art, by which he hopes to impress his ideas upon them; and they are not arbiters of any question, but critics, even though unconsciously, of the art that he exercises. If they are impressed by it, he has attained his object. 'Critics' is too intellectual a word: not only all those who watch a show for their entertainment, but those who attend a solemn service or ceremony are *θεωροί*; spectators, it is true, of a display, but a serious one. So the absence of a controversy with a defined issue does not mean that the orator is not serious, or that his only aim is to please his hearers with artistry; only that he is seeking to impress rather than to convince, and to use, as an orator must, other weapons besides logic. In fact he will be found to argue nominally as though his contentions were or might be disputed: *ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν*, says Aristotle.¹ But these very words, far from showing, as Kraus seems to think, that there is no real difference between *θεωρός* and *κριτής*,² positively assure us that Aristotle meant to make one; for otherwise the observation would be a pointless truism.

This surely is the reasonable interpretation of Aristotle's words, and must be maintained against those who speak of epideictic rhetoric as mere virtuosity or the like. It is supported by the usual Latin translation of the term, *genus demonstrativum*, found, for example, in Cicero *de Inventione* I 7, where Aristotle is named as the authority, and, from the same source, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* I 2. But it may be objected that epideictic rhetoric, as I have characterized it, need not be restricted to encomiums and invectives, but should cover such general hortative speeches, for example, as the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates—orations addressed to *θεωροί* rather than to *κριταί*, to which he himself refers, in a passage quoted above, as *ἐπιδεικτικῶς ἔχοντες*. This is true, and a valid objection; Aristotle is to be defended only from the circumstances of his time. We are to consider that encomiums and invectives were more or less bound to be epideictic in character, and the most eminent examples of it; protreptics however, in an age not accustomed to sermons, were mostly heard in the debates of some assembly. Isocrates' great sermons were, as he so constantly tells us, a speciality of his own: and we can only say that Aristotle in his system neglected the speech which was both protreptic and delivered to *θεωροί*. This is but a result of the anomaly of which we complained at first, by which more than one criterion went to distinguish the three kinds of oratory.

The weaknesses of this classification led to divergence and confusion in the many writers who afterwards followed it. Only in one is the true Aristotelian scheme preserved, namely, in a fragment of Alexander.³ He had it perhaps from Caecilius of Calacte, one of the few ancient rhetoricians to make direct and intelligent use of Aristotle.⁴ The other authors who follow Aristotle in his classification of rhetoric—and most of them do—find no difficulty in adopting his first two classes, but show many discrepancies in their treatment of the third. Some reckon purely by subject-

deiktischen Redegattung bei Aristoteles, Halle 1905. *Neue Studien zur aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Halle 1907. Some perverse contentions, supported by a number of very injudicious arguments, caused the first paper to be damned heartily and beyond its deserts by Wendland. The second is a strident rejoinder, advocating the same views in the same manner. It is now evident that Kraus was partly right. His views are said to have

been put forward in a more temperate form by F. J. Schwaab, in an unprinted Würzburg dissertation of 1923 (see Drerup in *B.ph.W.* 1923, 745; Gohlke in *Bursians Jahresh.* 220, 321 f.).

¹ 1391 b 17.

² *Neue Studien* p. 47.

³ *Rhet. Gr.* III 1 ff. (Spengel).

⁴ See O. Angermann: *De Aristotele Rhetorum Auctore*—Diss. Leipzig 1904, p. 38 f.

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¹ *Rh*
III 109
² *Pat*
³ *Ph*
plem
⁴ *Ibid*
⁵ *Cf.*
demus—
p. 254-6

matter, and make no distinction in form between epideictic oratory on one side and forensic and deliberative on the other. Such are the *Auctor ad Herennium*, and Cicero in the *de Inventione*, *de Oratore* and *Topics*.¹ In this case the term ἐπιδεικτικός or demonstrativus has no real sense, and a better one is ἐγκωμιστικός, which Diogenes Laertius VII 42 attributes to the Stoic version of this scheme. The corresponding Latin term *laudativus* is suggested by the untechnical expressions of Cicero in the *de Oratore* and *Topics*, and found in the *Partitions* and in Quintilian.² Other authors abandon the limits of encomium and invective, and in their third branch separate from deliberative and forensic oratory all that which has no defined object, such as a vote or verdict, to obtain. In this sense Philodemus' opponent in Rhodes divided rhetoric into πανηγυρικόν, πολιτικόν and δικανικόν.³ The first of these is, says Philodemus, quite a separate thing from practical rhetoric, a τέχνη περὶ τὰς ἐπιδείξεις:⁴ and he, following as he alleges the teaching of Epicurus, is prepared to recognize it under the name of 'sophistic rhetoric' as a genuine art, a title which he denies to practical rhetoric.⁵ Philodemus seems to consider Isocrates' orations typical of such 'ceremonial' oratory;⁶ though we cannot think that Isocrates would have been pleased to hear them described as 'remote from practical application.'

It is easy to see how the character of this branch, elaborate and ornate compared with the working oratory of the courts and the assembly, comes to be mere virtuosity; and how there arises the common notion of epideictic or panegyric oratory—for the two terms are synonymous in use—that is, oratory intended only for entertainment. But authors who put this construction upon it still follow Aristotle in limiting its subject-matter to encomium and invective; and thus involve themselves in the absurdity that I have described above. Cicero, for instance, in the *Partitions* thus interprets Aristotle's very words, unacknowledged and therefore perhaps unrecognized: *aut auscultator modo est qui audit aut disceptator . . . ; ita aut ut delectetur qui audit aut ut statuat aliquid. statuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senator; sic tria haec genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exornationis; quae quia in laudationes maxime conferatur, proprium iam habet ex eo nomen.*⁷ The same mistake and the absurdity it involves we find also in *Part. Or.* 69. From Cicero it passes to Quintilian,⁸ and has been accepted by almost all modern scholars, Spengel and Cope in their commentaries, Volkmann,⁹ Wendland¹⁰ and the rest.¹¹ In one place, however, Quintilian sees the difficulties involved by this account, and there he goes to the heart of the matter. Early authors, he says at III 4 1, were content to follow Aristotle's classification. In Cicero's time it was attacked as an inadequate empirical list by him¹² and by certain Greek authorities; and more strongly by an unnamed contemporary of Quintilian's own. It was defended by others as based on the three kinds of audience, assembled *ad consilium*, *ad iudicium* and *ad delectationem*. Quintilian, perceiving this to be unsatisfactory, propounds a new method of division which restores something like the Aristotelian sense by another route (*ibid.* 6-8). He sees that the epideictic branch, as usually interpreted, quite outgrows the limits of *laus* and *vituperatio*; and that because it includes all 'panegyric oratory,' which is so often protreptic, it makes nonsense as one of three classes beside the forensic and the deliberative; but he realizes that the usual interpretation of ἐπιδεικτικός may be wrong (13-14). Nevertheless with his customary caution he prefers not to insist on correcting the faults he detects.

¹ *Rh. Her.* I 2; *de Inv.* I 7; *de Or.* I 141; III 109; cf. II 43 ff.; *Top.* 91.

² *Part. Or.* 10; Quint. III 3 14, 4 12.

³ Philod. *Rhet.* p. 45, 16 ff. of Sudhaus' *Supplementum*.

⁴ *Ibid.* 25, 3 ff.; 61, 10 ff.; cf. *enud.* I 251; 256 ff.

⁵ Cf. H. M. Hubbell: *The Rhetorica of Philodemus*—Trans. Connecticut Academy 23 (1920), p. 254-6.

⁶ *Suppl.* p. 48, 15 ff.

⁷ *Part. Or.* 10.

⁸ III 7 1; VIII 3 11.

⁹ *Rhetorik* p. 19 f.

¹⁰ *Deutsche lit. Zeit.* 1906 nr. 9.

¹¹ Kraus cites a number at the beginning of each of his papers.

¹² The reference is to Antony in *de Or.* II 43 ff.

Hermogenes neglected the Aristotelian classification. It is common enough in the late Greek rhetoricians,¹ but it would be tedious to follow the forms which it took. In general we may say that of the many authors who follow Aristotle's imperfect classification of rhetoric in three kinds few attempt to follow the subtlety of his analysis, while of those who do the most important to us, Cicero and Quintilian, misunderstand it. But it is chiefly for the interpretation of Aristotle himself that the question matters. However the third branch may be defined in other authors, the most part of them neglect it almost entirely in their treatment. Anaximenes and Aristotle do actually treat all their kinds of rhetoric. Anaximenes orders his book according to the topics and disposition of his seven kinds in turn, with a section on devices common to them all. Aristotle enumerates, as he promises, particular premisses for each of his three kinds; and when treating common topics, or in the matters of the third book, really has regard to all, and particularly to the deliberative. But in the Hellenistic age the forensic province came to outgrow the others altogether. The deliberative branch perhaps found little employment in a time without political liberty. The epideictic was uncertain in scope and purpose. The forensic remained, always sure of employment, and lending itself besides much more easily to systematization than the other two, so that in the theory it naturally bulks larger. In particular Hermagoras' doctrine of *στάσεις* or constitutions, though independent of Aristotle's classification, goes into the greatest detail in treating judicial cases, and shows that it was devised with forensic rhetoric chiefly in mind. The revival of rhetoric in the freer circumstances of late Hellenistic times might have been expected to restore the balance in favour of deliberative oratory. Indeed, there lies behind the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and the *de Inventione* an Hellenistic source that appears to have given full and proper treatment to all three kinds. But already in the former a sub-Hermagorean theory of constitutions swells the *genus iudiciale* above the rest; and the author rearranges it, alone of the three, in a way that singles it out, by inserting into the section on *inventio* an account of the parts of the speech, which should of course have been treated separately for all three kinds, but which in the end are never given for the deliberative and demonstrative at all. The *de Inventione* carries this transformation a stage farther by setting out the theory of constitutions, with all its judicial detail, at the beginning, and without respect to the division of the subject into three classes; and in later Latin authors some such arrangement is common.² So exclusively forensic a tendency, though stoutly combated by Cicero in his maturer years, was never overcome. This at first sight is surprising: the epideictic branch might indeed have been dispensed with, if only because it was so difficult to give any rules for it; and its functions were increasingly covered by the growing luxuriance of the forensic, which was quite capable of prescribing the necessary narratives, descriptions and amplifications. But the deliberative branch could ill be spared. Even with the last decay of free institutions under the Empire its field was not cut off; for the rhetorical declamations to which the schools then turned were devoted to protreptics and apotreptics as much as to anything. In truth the neglect of the *deliberativum genus* can be attributed to one thing only: the greater ease of theorizing about the judicial branch, due to its set forms and less elusive matter. This is reflected in the constant judicial trend of the theory of constitutions. Where the constitutions are not in question some effort is made to maintain the deliberative branch; but as they dominate rhetoric more and more, it sinks gradually out of sight, until at last it takes its revenge by finding a new and disruptive place within the theory of constitutions itself as the *στάσις πραγματική* of Hermogenes and his fellows.

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¹ See the index to Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge* under *συμβουλευτικός*, *δικανικός* and *πανηγυρικός*.

² See K. Barwick in *Hermes* 57 (1922) 4-7.

ΣΧΟΛΗ.

I.

'It is thought that happiness consists in leisure. That is, we accept unleisure that we may have leisure, as we make war that we may enjoy peace.'

Δοκεῖ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολέμου· μὲν ἔν' εἰρήνην ἀγώμεν.—AR. N.E. 1177b 4.

THERE are only two passages in the whole of the works of Plato and Aristotle in which the word σχολή is given central position and philosophical significance. These are (1) the celebrated interlude in the *Theaetetus* of Plato (172-177) and (2) the predominantly educational discussion of the foundations of the ideal city in Aristotle's *Politics*, Bks. VII and VIII. It will be as well to begin by summarizing briefly the doctrine of these two passages.

A. PLATO, *THEAETETUS* 172-177.

The philosopher is introduced as the man of leisure, who is free to follow the argument wherever it may lead. There is no judge or ruler constraining him. The litigant is opposed to him as slave to free man (οἰκείται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους, 172d 1). The unleisure and unfreedom of the litigant is symbolized by the water-clock, with its inexorable time-limit, and the indictment, with the compulsion to speak in strict relevance to it. A further sign of unfreedom is the personal implication: slave is in conflict with fellow-slave before their common master, and he must speak about himself, for the issue may concern his very life. Hence inevitably come shrinkage and warping of soul, only partially disguised by real skill in the art of flattering and conciliating the master. The philosopher is described in contrast, and the description is mainly negative. He does not know the way to the law court or council chamber or any other public place of assembly. He does not read or listen to the laws and decrees. Party strife and party dinners leave him cold. Nobility of birth does not impress him. He is not even aware of his own ignorance, for it is not he—only his body—that is in the city. The city is something very small to a mind that has the universe for its field. The story of Thales fits the philosopher well. He has no concern for his neighbour, only for what *man* is, and should be and do. Hence he makes a fool of himself in a law court, and only has his revenge on the litigant when the question concerns justice itself.

The contrast is summed at 175d 7. The one is ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τετραμμένος, and εὐθὺς εἰς δουλικά διακονήματα; the other is smart in such matters but unable ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον.

Theodorus says that if this view were generally accepted there would be more peace and fewer evils in the world. Socrates replies that in this world evil is inexpugnable; but there is another world, he says, from which evil is excluded and to which we must seek to escape by making ourself like the gods (ὁμοίως θεῷ), i.e. (as he explains) by a rational justice and piety. We can hope, he adds, to make some progress in the task of convincing men of this, the true meaning and justification of virtue, by the right use of the weapon of dialectic (ιδίᾳ λόγον δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι 177b 2), which is a wonderful solvent of rhetoric and exposé of pretension.

Incidentally in this last section the contrast between the two achievements is once more formulated as follows: (176c 4) ἡ μὲν τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή,

ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφαίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικάι, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάνανσοι.

B. ARISTOTLE: *POLITICS*, BKS. VII AND VIII.

The leading passage is VII xiv 9-22 (1333a 16 ff.).

Man is rational in two ways, i.e. is actively and passively rational, and there are accordingly two sides to human virtue. (This is the distinction, familiar from the *Nic. Eth.*, between διανοητική and ἠθική ἀρετή. The former is the possession of a λόγος, the latter is a discipline of passion which is essentially conformity to a λόγος — ὁρισμένη λόγῳ, as the well-known definition of ἠθική ἀρετή says.¹) The priority is of course with the actively rational principle in the sense that it is for this to determine the end to which the passively rational conforms. This higher principle is itself subdivided into practical and theoretical reason, and here there is a like priority on the side of the theoretical reason.

Life similarly is divided into unpleasure and pleasure, war and peace; and the material of action (τὰ πρακτά) into (1) τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρησιμὰ, (2) τὰ καλὰ. Between these a similar relation holds: war is for the sake of peace, unpleasure for pleasure, the necessary and useful for the noble. The lawgiver must keep everything in view, but must give priority to what is higher in the scale of good and has the status of end.

These relations must rule education. But in fact even the best governed cities fall short. They do not keep all the virtues in view, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς τὰς χρησιμὰς εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικώτερας.

The Spartan emphasis on war is an example of this. . . . 'Facts as well as arguments prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the ends of pleasure and peace' (τοῦ σχολάζειν ἕνεκεν καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης). Otherwise peace will corrupt the citizens, and it will be the fault of the legislator for not having developed by education their capacity for pleasure (οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν).

The virtues of pleasure then are needed, and must be treated as the end. The virtues developed in unpleasure contribute also to pleasure and culture (πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν); for a basis of necessities is needed to provide the opportunity for pleasure. Our city needs temperance, courage, and fortitude; for proverbially there is no pleasure for slaves and to lack these virtues is to be the slave of the aggressor. Courage and fortitude are needed for unpleasure, philosophy for pleasure, temperance and justice for both times, but even more for peace and pleasure.

There are three sources of virtue: φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος; constitution, habituation, reasoning. Which should come first? The answer is that in the order of growth body precedes soul, the irrational precedes the rational. Hence the order for the educator is, first, the body, then the irrational soul, finally the rational soul.

So far these distinctions lie entirely within the individual life, and imply that exaltation of the contemplative over the practical activity which is recommended in *N.E.* x. But in fact it is implied in the incomplete sketch of education to which this is the introduction that the higher activities are not within the reach of everyone. The education outlined is the liberal education of the gentleman, and there are frequent suggestions of the existence in the community of lower levels of life mainly occupied in activities not suitable for him.

Examples of this:

(1) VIII 2 §§ 3-6. Among the χρησιμὰ there are certain ἀναγκαῖα which must be taught. But the useful may be divided into the liberal and illiberal (ἐλεύθερα καὶ

¹ The passionate nature may be regarded 1260a 5) or as the lowest section of the λόγος either as the highest section of the λόγος (*N.E.* 1260a 5) or as the lowest section of the λόγος (ib. 1103a 1); v. Newman ad. loc.

ἀνελεύθερα), and the children must not be made vulgar (βάνανσοι). Any work, craft, or instruction is vulgar which makes the body or soul or mind of free men unfit for the exercises of virtue. Some crafts are so called because of their effect on the body, and work for wages generally is so called because it makes the mind un leisured and submissive (ἀσχολον καὶ ταπεινόν). Even in liberal acquirements there are limits: concentration on them beyond a certain point becomes illiberal, because it harms life in the ways mentioned. But motive here makes much difference: if it is self-development or the service of friends or of virtue, no illiberality is involved, but other motives may well make the very same occupation menial or slavish.

A. goes on to discuss the accepted educational subjects, viz. (1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastics, (3) music, (4) drawing. The first and fourth are recommended for their general utility, the second as making for courage. Music may be questioned, because most men regard it only as a source of pleasure. In discussing this A. reaffirms the priority of leisure over un leisured and introduces the conceptions of play or amusement (παιδιά) and recreation (ἀνάπαυσις), which are not to be confused with leisure and should rather be related to un leisured, as curative of the stress and pain implicit in its constraint. Pleasure, he explains, and happiness—which are the end—are thought to attach immediately to leisure, whereas un leisured has always an end beyond itself. There is consequently a like division in the subjects of education, viz. (1) those directed to ἡ ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολή, which are self-justifying, (2) those directed to un leisured, which are necessary and have an end outside themselves. Music has no obvious utility and was introduced πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν.

Thus some elements in education may be liberal and noble without being useful or necessary. 'To look for utility everywhere ill becomes free and exalted souls' (b 2).

(2) VIII v 5-8. Zeus does not play or sing himself. We call players and singers βάνανσοι, and playing and singing is not regarded as a man's occupation, μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

(3) In other passages of this discussion of education the notion of σχολή is not directly used, but the operation of the ideas associated with it on the negative side is apparent from the recurrence of terms such as βάνανσος, φορτικός, θητικός.

1338b 29 ff., opp. ἀναγκαῖον—καλόν.

1339a 14 ff., παιδιά καὶ ἀνάπαυσις opp. ἀρετή, διαγωγή, φρόνησις.

1340b 9, φορτικωτέρας opp. ἐλευθεριωτέρας κινήσεις.

34 ff., rejects the view that all playing and singing is βάνανσον.

1341b 6, flute rejected by Athene as contributing nothing to διάνοια.

8 ff., τεχνική (i.e. competitive) παιδεία rejected, as directed to the enjoyment of the audience and that φορτική. This is θητικωτέρα and would make them βαναύσους. For the audience which is φορτικός calls the tune.

1341b 38, distinguishes three uses of music: (1) παιδεία, (2) κάθαρσις, (3) διαγωγή, ἀνεσις, ἀνάπαυσις.

1342a 18, audience of two kinds: (1) ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, (2) φορτικός, ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκειμένος.

The political applications of these ideas are to be found in the earlier part of the discussion, i.e. before these ethical distinctions have been made.

It is frankly recognized that leisure has an economic foundation, and it is thought of as presupposing a slave or helot class. Thus in VIII 1341a 28 the Greeks are said to have become σχολαστικώτεροι by reason of increased wealth after the Persian Wars. In II 1269a 34 we read of a general agreement that a well-governed city requires τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν, which is not easy to provide: revolts

of penestae, helots, and slaves are cited as illustrating the difficulty. In the same book (1273a 23) we read of the prime necessity of securing leisure for the best (ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν), whether in or out of office: ἀδύνατον τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. It is admitted that wealth must be considered χάριν σχολῆς. The legislator should protect the ἐπιεικεῖς from poverty or at least secure leisure for his rulers.

A prominent point in the foundations of the ideal city in Bk. VII 1328b 33 ff. is the requirement that the citizens shall not live a life which is βάνανσος or ἀγοραῖος (this being prejudicial to virtue), nor be γεωργοί: for the activities both of virtue and of politics require σχολή. The dualism (1) order and defence, (2) deliberation and justice is adopted as the fundamental classification of function, and the question is raised whether these shall be allotted to different groups of citizens or not. This question is solved by distinction of groups by age. The wealth of the city, he goes on to say, should be in their hands: the citizens must be well off. For, he repeats, τὸ βάνανσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐθὲν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημοῦργόν ἐστιν. All the citizens, he argues, must be virtuous and happy, if the city is to be happy. Therefore they must be the owners of the land, which will actually be worked by slaves or barbarians or perioeci. A little further on (1329a 35) he repeats that γεωργοὶ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικόν are a necessary attribute of a city, but must not be reckoned parts of it: only the two classes before mentioned are that.

In Aristotle's city, accordingly, there are to be two agoras (1331a 30)—a free agora, as the Thessalians call it, in which there is no buying and selling, and into which the βάνανσον γεωργόν, etc., may not enter except on the summons of their rulers. The other agora is a market-place, and should be quite separate from this.

Add finally the point made in VII iv (1326a 16) that, while numbers count for something in the greatness of a city, the significant number is of those who are constituent parts of the city—not slaves, metics, or foreigners, but citizens. A city which produces many βάνανσοι but few hoplites cannot possibly be great.

Thus the doctrine of σχολή issues in a clear-cut class distinction between those who have private means and those who have not, with class differentiation in education and in political status.

II.

It seems quite clear that the Aristotelian conception of σχολή is fundamentally the same as the Platonic. Hence it is rather surprising to find the following statement in Newman's edition of the *Politics* (III 443, ad 1333a 35): 'It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of σχολή at the expense of ἀσχολία. His view of human life as comprising in its best form ἀσχολία, παιδιὰ, and σχολή is a remarkable one, and I am not aware that he owes it to anyone.'

He owes it undoubtedly to Plato. But I do not think that Plato would have claimed any special originality for his conception of σχολή. In Aristotle we have the significant reference to the proverb 'there is no leisure for slaves' (1334a 20). Further in *N.E.* x in the review of ἐνδοξα by which the doctrine of θεωρία is introduced it is said to be a common or generally accepted view that happiness consists in leisure: δοκεῖ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι. In the previous chapter παιδιὰ and ἀνάπαυσις have been excluded, and the subordination of παιδιὰ to σπουδῇ is explicitly attributed to Anacharsis.¹ Though the conception of the theoretical activity as

¹ Arist. *N.E.* 1176b 34, ἀναπαύσει γὰρ εἰκεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. Cf. Plato *Phileb.* 30c ἀνάπαυλα γὰρ τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιὰ.

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superior to the practical and as involving release from human things is plainly dictated by those ideas which the term σχολή is used in the *Theaetetus* and the *Politics* to sum up, Aristotle makes practically no further reference to the term in his account of θεωρία. The reason presumably is that he had no need to underline what was obvious: every Greek reader would see the connexion at a glance.

The inference which I draw from these facts is that σχολή was a term in current popular use, which Plato and Aristotle occasionally employed for the exposition of their ideas. Its popularity excused them from any elaborate discussion of its meaning. Where it had its origin, and why it has not left more of a track in Greek literature than it seems to have done, are questions which I cannot answer. Dr. F. Solmsen calls my attention to the passage in Euripides' *Ion* in which Ion develops the notion of σχολή in contrasting unfavourably the life offered him as a king's son at the Athenian court with his present service of the Delphic Apollo. The important lines are 633-647. He enjoys first 'what of all to men is dearest, leisure': further, he has the favour of the crowd without time-serving or fraud; he has continual novelty and change of company, every inducement to justice and piety of life: his life may be obscure and insignificant, but it is his own. We have here clearly the same order of ideas which we meet in Plato and Aristotle, and in that sense the passage is a valuable confirmation of the view taken above. It does not, however, give any definite support to the conjecture that the σχολή conception had a religious origin. (The steps also by which it came to mean 'disquisition' and 'school' are obscure, but by Plato's time it had evidently come very near to both of these uses.) In this current meaning of the word there was clearly a negative basis or undercurrent. Leisure stood for free time, absence of pressing duties and external calls. But the opposition to the φορτικόν and βάνανσον is so constant that it must belong to the popular use of the term, and this shows that the word had more positive implications. It is a condition of full freedom evidently, the other extreme to which is slavery. In between the two are intermediate grades of life, not slave certainly, but yet not free. The type of this intermediate class is the βάναντος τεχνίτης, the common craftsman, to whom Aristotle attributes ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (1260b 1), an independent or intermittent slavery. The point is that he, like the slave (who proverbially has no leisure), is active essentially in the execution of purposes not his own, but in his case the submission is for the job only and not, as in the case of the slave, for life. This exclusion of leisure, which is characteristic of the slave and is extended to the craftsman, is the exclusion of autonomous self-directing activity. It seems therefore that the current conception of σχολή was of a life of such activity. The slave is of course always at someone else's beck and call, but if leisure were a purely negative conception he could be said to enjoy it when his master was out and he was left alone in the house. Our 'leisure' is almost pure negative; and we should not choose a slave as the type of unleisure, rather a busy politician or business man, whose time is his own but all in fact pledged to this and that.

Another fundamental feature of this conception of σχολή is its close correlation with peace in opposition to war. (It may be thought that this feature is absent in the *Theaetetus*. Certainly it is not emphasized; but 172d 5 τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται and 172e 7 (with reference to the law courts) πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος; cf. also *Laws* 694e: διὰ τὸ μὴ σχολάζειν ὑπὸ πολέμων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων.) Why is war the accepted symbol of unleisure? The answer is given by the last citation from the *Theaetetus*. The primary contrast there is between the atmosphere of the law courts, with their time limits and strict rules of relevance, and the unrestricted freedom of philosophic discourse. The pressure of these external bonds is represented as reaching its extreme point, where the litigant is pleading for his very life. War evidently is the perfect type of unleisure because war is essentially a threat to life. We have here the standing Greek opposition of the ἀναγκαῖον and the

καλόν. Life is of all goods ἀναγκαϊώτατον, and the struggle for life therefore seemed to the Greek rather demoralizing than ennobling. Its assurance is a precondition of all achievement. Next among necessities and preconditions of true excellence comes a modicum of economic equipment. Hence by parity of reasoning poverty which endangers life and health is un-leisure.

Further illustration is not needed: the point is obvious. The man of leisure is one who is freed from the disagreeable necessity of securing the fundamental conditions of life, and is thus able to turn his attention to higher things. In this way the economic implications come in. The man of leisure was in short for the Greeks, as for us, a man of means. We have here what the Germans call *das Gentleman-ideal*, as it flourished in Athens. It is repugnant to a Greek gentleman to have to struggle for his life, or to take thought for the morrow.

This development is faithfully echoed by our philosophers, though more fully, as was to be expected, by Aristotle than by Plato. In Plato's account it is plainly suggested by his use of terms such as δουλίκός, φορτικός, βάναντος; and consider the following passage (135 d/e: Jowett's tr.): 'Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher—him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bedclothes, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of a man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman. . . .' In Aristotle it is written all over his account of education, as we have seen; and it is undoubtedly the basis of his attitude to manual labour. All the philosophers had to do was to give precision to those higher activities for which the man of leisure was supposed to be set free, and to transmute the social prejudice against manual labour as work unworthy of a gentleman into a reasoned demand for the exclusion of mechanics, tradesmen, etc., from citizenship. (On this last point Aristotle is of course not original: the demand had already been formulated by Plato in his last work, the *Laws* 846.)

III.

I come at last to my main question, the question what light all this throws on the composition of Aristotle's *Politics*. It is well known that during the last twenty years, owing to two brilliant books by Professor Jaeger of Berlin,¹ the question of Aristotle's development has so come to the front that no problem of Aristotelian interpretation can be properly considered apart from it. This is particularly the case in the *Politics*; for the treatise is quite obviously not unitary in character. Further, the suggestions which Jaeger made in regard to this work (suggestions which I have discussed in detail elsewhere²) were particularly illuminating. It is, I think, almost universally accepted now that of the eight books of the *Politics*, three, viz. 2. 7. 8, all based on the question What is the ideal city? are very early and belong to Aristotle's Platonic period; further, that another three, viz. 4. 5. 6, are late and a product of the Lyceum. There is no equally clear ground for dating the other two books, viz. 1. 3, but in my view the probability is that they are early in date, certainly nearer to the first group than to the second.

Now we have seen that the conception of leisure is common to Plato and Aristotle. It remains to observe that every single one of the quotations which I have made from the *Politics* in illustration of this conception is taken from one of the three books 2. 7. 8, and that in the other books, even including the discussion of slavery

¹ *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, 1914, and *Aristoteles*, 1923.

² See *Limits of Purpose*, pp. 219 ff.

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³ 518c

⁴ 530c

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in Bk. 1, the word *σχολή* hardly occurs at all. I think the only mentions of *σχολή* in these books are the following four: 1291b 26, 1293a 5, 1318b 11, 1319a 26. In this we have a striking confirmation of Jaeger's theory that 2. 7. 8 belong to Aristotle's Platonic period and were the first written part of the treatise. On the other hand, I have already pointed out that *σχολή* is something of a stranger both to the Platonic and to the Aristotelian conceptual system; so that the negative argument is not as strong as it looks. The question therefore arises whether the philosophical ideas which in these passages of the admittedly early books *σχολή* is used to convey can be shown to recede before other ideas in the admittedly later books. If this can be shown, Jaeger's theory as to the general nature of Aristotle's development on the political side will receive important corroboration, and we may be able to detach a body of doctrine in 4. 5. 6 which will assist in determining the date of the doubtful books 1. 3.

This I believe can be shown with a high degree of probability. It is necessary, as always, to start from Plato. If we ask what it was that made the term *σχολή* specially suitable for Plato's use, the answer is its underlying implication of detachment from the struggle of life. Such detachment, rising sometimes almost to rejection of life (or of what most men call life), is a constant feature of Plato's thought. It is no doubt connected, as the *Phaedo* shows, with the Orphic hope for release from 'the wheel of birth.' It is defiantly asserted in that dialogue, when Socrates, on the brink of execution, defines the philosophic life as the practising of death. Its application to the theory of knowledge, in the same period of Plato's life, is the conviction that knowledge consists not in the interpretation of the evidence of the senses, but in the recall or recollection of the experiences of another life. The *Republic* follows the same line, when the similes of the Divided Line and the Cave lead to the description of education¹ as *περιαγωγή*, a turning round or conversion, in which the back must be turned to what is at first taken for real; and again when Plato's Socrates deprecates systematic observation² of the heavenly bodies and conceives an astronomy which dispenses with the starry heavens,³ to be followed by a harmonics which refuses to waste its time over the analysis of actual musical sounds.⁴ All this, I say, and much else is simply the epistemological side of this doctrine of detachment, so beautifully summed up by Plato in his last work, the *Laws*,⁵ in the famous words τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν: 'human affairs are not worth serious attention; yet we take them seriously, unfortunately for us we cannot help it.' He goes on to say that only God deserves to be treated seriously, and that the best one can say of man is that he is God's plaything.⁶ It is implied here that all temporalities are fundamentally unreal. To call them, as Shelley does, a *stain* on the 'white radiance of eternity' is to credit them with too much power. They are epiphenomenal merely: their appearance and disappearance make no more difference to the eternal real than the reflection in a lake makes to the trees reflected.

On the political side this attitude finds its classic expression in the paradox of the philosopher king. This is said by Plato to be the most outrageous of all his paradoxes, as less likely to win support than the equality of women, the prohibition of property, or the abolition of the family. The reason is, as I have said elsewhere,⁷ that 'to put rule into the hands of a philosopher is to put rule into the hands of a man who is by profession, as it were, blind and deaf.' His prime qualification for rule is that his eyes are on the other world, and it is hard to convince men that this navigation also depends on a study of the stars, not on a study of the ship and the sea.

¹ 518d.² 529c. d.³ 530c.⁴ 530e.⁵ 803b.⁶ 803c. The whole of this passage, with its recurrent use of the opposition of war and peace,is redolent of the *σχολή* conception, though the word does not occur.⁷ *Nature and Grounds of Religious Belief*, p. 41.

The practical and psychological paradox of this comes out clearly when Plato says that the ideal ruler rules reluctantly, because he has a better use for his time than ruling.¹ The consequences in constitutional terms are obvious. The rank and file of the citizen body are allowed to take no part in politics whatever; the democratic principle is completely excluded. As the world can be known without being looked at, so a people can be governed without being consulted. Such truth as their demands would contain is to be found in larger writing elsewhere.

The middle ages, on imperfect evidence, regarded Aristotle as an empiricist, opposing him in this to Plato; and though this view is not strictly correct, it has a substratum of truth. Aristotle was the devoted pupil of Plato, and when he began writing for himself he began as a Platonist; but he was at heart an empiricist, and his development after Plato's death was in the direction of empiricism. Now there are two empiricisms—empiricism of doctrine and empiricism of method, or, we may say, there is theoretical and there is practical empiricism. These are connected and usually combined, but in very variable proportions. An empirically disposed person, who has been persuaded to adopt an anti-empirical theory of knowledge, will naturally tend to weaken in his practice before he modifies his theory, i.e. he will find himself driven in his pursuit of knowledge to detailed empirical investigations before he finds himself obliged to remodel his theory of knowledge so as to give such investigation a fuller recognition. This is, I believe, roughly what happened in Aristotle's case. It is likely and even probable that there were others in the Academy who had similar tendencies; but there is no evidence that Plato's own mind developed in later life in this direction. The fact that Aristotle's extensive observations in natural history contain a large percentage of items of Asiatic provenance suggests that he was already a practical empiricist when he went to Argos immediately after Plato's death. But the full development of these tendencies was certainly reserved for the last years of his life, when he directed a school of his own at Athens.

In politics, as in other subjects, it is natural that he should have begun on Platonic lines, and that he should have conceived the task of the political theorist as that of constructing an ideal city, following in the steps of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*. Such an ideal would provide the single point of reference which practical politics required for its orientation. But Aristotle's rejection of the transcendent Platonic form, which took place while he still regarded himself as a Platonist, had the immediate consequence that it became impossible for him to base either ethics or politics on metaphysics. The philosophic life therefore could not be for Aristotle the source of the wisdom by which cities were saved. He could only substitute his own notion of form, involving also correlative matter, and base politics on ethics. He could argue further that the city was natural, i.e. that, like any natural species, it represented for all its variety a single organizing principle, capable of precise definition and manifested variously only owing to the resistance of the matter in which it was embodied. On such lines a politics directed to the construction of an ideal city remained possible. But there are elements in this new position which make it unstable. As soon as form loses its transcendence and becomes materially embodied, the consideration is never far off that form needs its appropriate matter, and this opens the door to democracy and relativism.

At first Aristotle concentrates on the unity of the ideal, and from this point of view the problem is comparatively simple. It is only necessary to discover what human virtue or excellence is, and then to make arrangements by which whatever there is of virtue in the community shall be concentrated and armed with political power. Thus it will be brought to bear on the rising generation as an educative force, and virtue will breed virtue. It hardly needs arguing that the best govern-

¹ *Rep.* 520d-521a.

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ment is an aristocracy, a government of the best, whether these be one or few or many. Virtue in the ruler is the one proof of his right to rule, and virtue in the citizens is the one proof of his success in ruling. This is the standpoint of Bk. III, and though that same book makes some small concessions to democracy (as Plato himself did in the *Laws*), these concessions are themselves based on this same principle of virtue. The main argument is a cautious and tentative application of the principle of the summation of gifts. Possibly—so the argument may be stated—when many men come together, it is their strength, not their weakness, that is summed, and, if so, a large assembly will be wiser and generally more virtuous than anyone in it. Thus by the test of virtue itself some constitutional concessions to the principle of democracy may be justified.

None of this is ever formally withdrawn or contradicted. Aristotle turned himself eagerly to the investigation of the concrete facts of political life. He made his great collection of memoranda on the Greek constitutions of which the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* is the only survivor. He then wrote Bks. 4. 5. 6. In the elaborate introduction to these books the earlier framework is retained. These studies are offered merely as a supplement. In addition to the main question of the ideal city there are, he now sees, certain further questions which need answering. But it is evident that what is offered as a supplement has really become a substitute, and the unfinished state of Bk. VIII stands there in eloquent confirmation of the impression. Aristotle's conception of political truth has been in fact profoundly altered, and virtue is no longer the sole and sufficient test.

I must not complicate the discussion at this point by a disproportionate mass of detail. I will call attention only to three or four general tendencies apparent in these three books which give the impression that we are faced in them by a new Aristotle. First, there is the general recognition that government rests on consent—a simple point, no doubt, but a point ignored in the early discussions. Secondly, the practical choice of constitution is almost narrowed to the choice between oligarchy and democracy, and if no compromise were possible it seems that Aristotle would now have to choose democracy. Now that cities are so big, he says, no other constitution than democracy seems to be possible.¹ Thirdly, the constitution of any city seems now to be quite as much, if not more, a record of existing social and economic facts as an ideal of life, a force operating from without or above on the citizen body. 'The reason,' we read (IV 3), 'why there are many forms of government is that every city contains many elements. . . . For a constitution is an organization of offices which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess.'² This last statement, if its obvious interpretation is the right one, might be a quotation from the Communist Manifesto. Fourthly and lastly, a new criterion here appears, in a conception of balance and harmony resulting from the skilful mixture of ingredients. This is of course a characteristic Aristotelian notion, applied elsewhere both in his account of sensation in the *De Anima* and in the *Nic. Eth.* in his account of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. There it underlies his

¹ The quotation is from Bk. III, and really the discussion of the democratic principle in Bk. III contains implicitly all the points in favour of democracy which are made in 4. 5. 6; e.g. we have there the statement that 'a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies' (III 11 7: 1281b 29 θῶν γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχουσιν, πολέμων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). In this passage A. presents in parallel passages the democratic and the oligarchic case, and shows that there is some truth in each but that

neither principle alone will suffice. His concluding statement is noteworthy because it recognizes the divorce between ideals and expediency—III 13 init. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἐν μέρει τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μὲντοι ζῶντων ἀγαθὴν ἢ παιδείαν καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοῖτο.

² πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστὶ, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητά κοινήν. . . 1290a 7.

description of such virtue as a *μεσότης*; but it does not appear in any other part of the *Politics*. The new emphasis on the middle class and the new conviction of the advisability of a mixed constitution are obviously related developments.

The developments which I have briefly characterised have, it will be observed, a common character. To use a convenient term, we may call them all positivistic. They represent that mode of analysis which is congenial to scientific thought, since it exhibits the structure and behaviour of a complex as determined by its constituent parts. Aristotle's theory recognised the legitimacy of such explanation only within narrow limits. Generally in his view the matter, the components, furnish the explanation only of defect and failure: for success and perfection they are only the *conditio sine qua non*, the *οὐκ ἀνευ*. And if we look at the detail of these books we shall find it difficult to show that these limits are overstepped. Aristotle does not in fact credit the elements of which the city-community is composed with the capacity to evolve its supreme good from itself. It is always some lesser criterion, of the *ἀνυκαίων* rather than the *καλόν* order, that he applies. These are, in short, conditions of existence rather than of good living that he here establishes. Thus formal consistency is maintained. Nevertheless the emphasis and the interest have shifted; and the main concern of the political theorist is now with relativities, not with the definition of an absolute.

The obstinate loyalty with which Aristotle clung to his Platonic inheritance is as evident as the profound difference between his spirit and that of his master. Though he rejected the transcendent Form of the Platonists, he continued to the end to retain related elements of transcendence in his own theories. In his writings as they have come down to us we can distinguish three strata, as it were, or three levels of hypothesis—that of the transcendent form, that of the immanent form, and that of the matter or composition. But the first, where it survives, is largely inoperative. It does little real work, but comes in rather surprisingly towards the end, like a Platonic *μῦθος*, as a final escape into mysticism. Thus the sober realism of more than nine-tenths of the *Nicomachean Ethics* leads to the vague rhetoric of his description of the contemplative life. The Philosopher is after all crowned King, but, as Browning says, of the castle in the air. A similar position is occupied in the *Metaphysics* by the passage in Bk. A which attributes to God the status of unmoved mover of nature. In the *De Anima* similarly the soul is the form of the body through practically the whole treatise, and then suddenly, as Professor Taylor¹ says, 'in a few broken lines he tells us that there is another sense of the word 'thought' in which 'thought' actually creates the truths it understands.' Professor Taylor calls this introduction of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* 'the most startling of all the inconsistencies between the naturalistic and the "spiritualist" strains in Aristotle's philosophy.' But a similar abrupt change of front occurs in Aristotle's biology, when in the process of generation *νοῦς* is said 'to come in as an addition from without' (*θύραθεν ἐπεισεῖναι*). These are all residual transcendencies, relics of Platonism in spirit if not in the letter.

In politics the stage of full transcendence, represented by the Form of the Good and the Philosopher King, was past before Aristotle began to compose his treatise; but a certain residual transcendence marks the doctrine of *σχολή* which is the subject of discussion. The principle of immanent form inspires the conception of government as natural and as finding its test and justification in virtue. The materialist or, as Taylor says, naturalist method governs the discussions of Bks. 4. 5. 6. We are here almost, but never quite, surrendered to that 'cogent expediency' on which in Edmund Burke's view² all just government depends. The general line of development or descent is from idealism to realism, from rational to empiricism, expressed politically in an increased sense of the relativity of political truth, of the necessity of

¹ Aristotle, p. 70.

² 'All those who have affections which lead

them to the conservation of civil order would recognise, even in its cradle, the child as legiti-

concessions to democracy, of political institutions as the expression of social and economic fact, the adoption of stability and contentment instead of virtue as the test of success. Such criteria as these tendencies provide are all difficult to handle, and they will not even in the most skilful hands yield any quite definite and conclusive results. All I claim is that with their aid it is possible to discriminate with some confidence the succession of the different strata which make up the *Politics* as we have it.

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mate, which has been produced from those principles of cogent expediency to which all just governments owe their birth, and on which they

justify their continuance.'—Burke, *French Revolution*, Ed. 2, p. 243.

PORPHYRY, *DE ABSTINENTIA* I 7-12.

In the *de Abstinencia* book I chapters 7-12 Porphyry gives an account of the views of Hermarchus, the Epicurean, on abstinence from animal food. This account, which is presumably derived from Hermarchus' work on Empedocles,¹ would seem to preserve his actual words, for in chapter 9 (p. 91, 22)² the word *ἔγωγε* is used where it must refer to Hermarchus. It would be exceedingly careless of Porphyry, if he were merely summarizing or paraphrasing, to leave this word as it stands. (On the view here maintained see the Additional Note at the end.)

This article is an attempt to remove a serious difficulty from the text of these chapters. As the text stands, we have a sufficiently logical development from the beginning of chapter 7 to the end of chapter 9: the ancient law-givers established severe penalties for murder; the chief reason for men's objection to murder was that it was contrary to the interests of society; [] from that beginning some men obeyed the laws because they saw that it was to their advantage to do so, others through their fear of punishment; to increase still further the security of society, punishments were established even for accidental killings; and even for those killings which are not forbidden by law purifications are required. By such measures men were brought to their present law-abiding state.

Up to this point, then, the account is sufficiently logical. Chapter 10 begins with two sentences about the killing of animals: those who first determined what men ought to do and what they ought not to do not forbid the killing of animals, for it is essential to the interests of society that animals should be killed. Then follows a sentence which might with difficulty be forced to give a meaning in this context. And then suddenly, with the words *διαμνημονεύοντες δὲ τινες τῶν τότε χαριστᾶτων* (p. 92, 18), we find ourselves, without any explanation at all, back at the state of affairs before the existence of formulated laws at all, that is, before the events described in chapter 7 (nor is there any further reference to the killing of animals until chapter 11 (p. 93, 20) *τό τε λυμαντικὸν πᾶν κτεινόμενον*): some of the more advanced men of that time, reflecting that the reason why they refrained from murdering their fellow-men was because this was essential to the interests of society, for some time men refrained for that reason;³ as time went on, some people, not content with merely an irrational memory of what had once been essential to the interests of society, reasoned the matter out for themselves and thereupon attempted to restrain more securely those who might try to murder their fellow-men; for this purpose they set up the laws which still exist. Finally, with p. 93, 23, we return to the question of the killing of animals.

If we were to exclude from the text the passage from *οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν* chapter 10, p. 92, 16 to *διατηρούμενον* chapter 11, p. 93, 22, the development of the whole passage from 7 to 12 would be sufficiently logical. But it seems very unlikely that this passage which we wish to exclude could be a gloss. We must then consider if there is any other place in the account of the views of Hermarchus where we might insert it. The only place where we can do so, without again breaking up the logical develop-

¹ v. Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, 8 ff. Hermarchus' work on Empedocles is mentioned in *Diog. Laert.* X. 25: *Ἐπιστολικά περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους εἰκοσι καὶ δύο*.

² The pagination is that of Nauck's edition, Teubner, 1886.

³ There is a slight anacolouthon here in the Greek, due to the length of the sentence (from *διαμνημονεύοντες* p. 92, 18 to *εἰρημένων* p. 93, 7, broken up by the parenthesis *οὐ μόνον δὲ . . . παραγυγμένους*). I have retained this anacolouthon in the paraphrase.

ment, is between *ὑπολαβεῖν* and *ἀπὸ γὰρ* in chapter 7, p. 89, 29, that is, in the place indicated by [] in our summary of chapters 7-9. If we inserted the passage here, we would clearly have a satisfactory logical development. There are, moreover, various points in the language of these chapters in favour of this transposition.

(i) At the beginning of chapter 7 Porphyry says οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου ὡς περ γενεαλογίαν μακρὰν διεξιόντες φασὶν ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθεταὶ κτλ. The words spaced are surely not part of the quotation from Hermarchus. For, while this quotation might have begun: 'But we Epicureans give a pedigree (of modern laws and customs) and say, etc.,' it would surely not have begun: 'But we give a long pedigree.' The use of the word 'long' suggests that the person who wrote it considered that the 'pedigree' was *too* long. In fact the whole phrase is vaguely contemptuous and it is very unlikely that Hermarchus would have used it in speaking of his own work. It is, then, very probable that the words are Porphyry's. But, if they are, surely they imply that the 'pedigree' is given in the passage which he quotes; otherwise the mention of the 'pedigree' would be a piece of sarcasm which is both unnecessary and obscure.

But, if this 'pedigree' is given in the text, where is it, as the text stands? There would be a 'pedigree,' if a distinction could be made between the laws made by οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθεταὶ (c. 7, p. 89, 18) and τὰς ἐτι μενούσας καὶ νῦν . . . νομοθεσίας (c. 11, p. 93, 15) (though this would still leave us with the hopeless task of explaining the relevance of c. 10, p. 92, 18 ff.). But no such distinction can be made: that the laws made by οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθεταὶ and τὰς ἐτι μενούσας καὶ νῦν . . . νομοθεσίας are one and the same is made clear by c. 7, p. 90, 6 ff. ὃν ἐκάτερον φαίνεται καὶ νῦν ἐτι συμβαῖνον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμφέρον τῆς προειρημένης διατάξεως ἐτοίμως ἐπ' αὐτῆς μένουσιν κτλ. where τῆς προειρημένης διατάξεως clearly refers to the laws made by οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθεταὶ.¹

The only other place where we might think of finding this 'pedigree' is in c. 9, p. 92, 8 ff. τὸ γὰρ ἀνόητον τῆς ψυχῆς ποικίλως παιδαγωγηθὲν ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν καθεστῶσαν ἡμερότητα κτλ. Here there is a 'pedigree' from the setting-up of the laws forbidding murder to the present law-abiding state. But this is altogether too short to be a γενεαλογία μακρά,² and besides the sentence comes in rather as a parenthesis than as a fundamental part of the narrative.

If, however, we alter the text in the manner which I have suggested, we do get a 'pedigree.' We begin with an account of the reasons for objecting to murder: for a while these reasons sufficed to restrain men from murder; later on they began to forget them; finally they reasoned the matter out and decided to introduce the laws which still exist.

(ii) c. 8, p. 90, 17 ff. (οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰσηγούμενοι) τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ χρησίμου καταστήσαντες ἀλόγως αὐτοῦ πρότερον αἰσθανομένους καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλανθανομένους. This passage cannot seriously be objected to as the text stands, though it does seem strange that the first reference to the state of affairs before the introduction of laws should be made in this incidental way (ἀλόγως κτλ.). But the passage would come in much more naturally, if we had already had the description of the state of affairs before the introduction of laws, including the words ἐπιλογισμὸν δὲ ἐλάβον τινας τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλων τροφαῖς, οὐ μόνον ἀλογον μνήμην (c. 10, p. 93, 9 ff.) and παρὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἤδη τοῦ συμφέροντος . . . λαμβάνειν αἰσθῆσιν (c. 11, p. 93, 17 ff.).

(iii) c. 10, p. 92, 16 ff. οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἦν σώζεσθαι μὴ πειρωμένους ἀμύνεσθαι τοῦτο συντρεφομένους μετ' ἀλλήλων. With the text as it stands, what can τοῦτο possibly

¹ Cf. also c. 9, p. 91, 22 ff.

² γενεαλογία means, of course, the 'tracing of a pedigree' and so the mere fact that the 'pedi-

gree' extended over a long period of time does not give us a γενεαλογία μακρά.

refer to? It can only refer to οὐδέν in τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῶων εἰκότως οὐδὲν διεκώλυσαν φθεῖρειν κτλ. But surely this would be very peculiar, especially when Hermarchus could so easily have said ταῦτα. But in the emended text τοῦτο fits in very naturally. In the sentence immediately before, giving the chief reason for the objection to murder, we have the words τὴν γε πλείστην αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀνόσιον ἐπιφημισθῆναι κτλ., where τοῦτο very clearly refers to the murder of one's fellow-men. If this other sentence follows on immediately, then τοῦτο in it will mean exactly the same, and this gives a perfectly natural sense.

(iv) c. 11. p. 93, 19 ff. ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀφοβίαν συνήργει τό τε λυμαντικὸν πᾶν κτεινόμενον ἀφειδῶς καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν τούτου φθορὰν διατηρούμενον. ὅθεν εἰκότως τὸ μὲν ἀπηγορεύθη, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύθη τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐκείνο δὲ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. (In the emended text ὅθεν εἰκότως κτλ. would follow immediately after πράξεως in c. 10, p. 92, 16).

It is obvious that τὸ μὲν and τὸ δὲ here cannot refer to τό τε λυμαντικὸν πᾶν κτεινόμενον and τὸ χρήσιμον . . . διατηρούμενον. In fact there is nothing to which they can refer, unless we go back as far as the end of chapter 9 and the beginning of chapter 10: there we have the words ὧν ἔστιν καὶ τὸ μὴ κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἀκρίτως. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῶων εἰκότως οὐδὲν διεκώλυσαν φθεῖρειν . . . τὸ γὰρ συμφέρον ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπετελείτο πράξεως. In the emended text we then go on immediately ὅθεν εἰκότως τὸ μὲν ἀπηγορεύθη, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύθη τῶν εἰρημένων. Here we have a perfectly natural sequence.

The cumulative weight of all the improvements which are made in the text by the alteration which I have suggested is surely sufficient justification for making it. There is only one respect in which it might be held that the alteration is not an improvement. At the beginning of chapter 7 we have the words οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου . . . φασὶν ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται . . . ἀνόσιον ἐπεφήμισαν τὴν ἀνθρώπου σφαγὴν καὶ ζημίας οὐ τὰς τυχούσας προσῆψαν. Then follow the reasons why murder was objected to. And then, in the emended text, we go on with a description of the state of affairs *before* the law-givers set up their laws, introduced simply by the words διαμνημονεύοντες δὲ τινες τῶν τότε χαριστάτων.

There is certainly a *prima facie* objection here, but I think it is no more than *prima facie*. After προσῆψαν we go on with the reasons, not why the law-givers set up punishments for murder, but why mankind as a whole objected to murder, τάχα μὲν καὶ φυσικῆς τιнос οἰκειώσεως ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀνθρώπους . . . εἰς τὸ μὴ προχείρως φθεῖρειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῶον ὥσπερ ἕτερόν τι τῶν συγκεχωρημένων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν γε πλείστην αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀνόσιον ἐπιφημισθῆναι τὸ μὴ συμφέρον εἰς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ βίου σύστασιν ὑπολαβεῖν. οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἦν σώζεσθαι κτλ. By the time we reach this stage the attention has shifted from the punishments which the law-givers set up to the reasons why mankind in general objected to murder. This shifting of the attention is emphasized by the change from the participial construction of the τάχα . . . clause to the accusative and infinitive of the οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ . . . clause and to the indicative ἦν of the οὐ γάρ sentence.¹ The attention, then, being centred on the reasons why mankind in general objected to murder, we can quite naturally go on with the διαμνημονεύοντες . . . sentence. The words τινες τῶν τότε χαριστάτων may mean 'some of the more advanced men of that time, i.e. the time at which they reflected (διαμνημονεύοντες)', or the τότε may refer to the time of the events described in the sentences before.

¹ It is not an objection against our text that we first change from the indirect to the direct narrative with an explanatory sentence introduced by γάρ: exactly the same thing occurs, if we keep the traditional text. In either text Porphyry begins to quote Hermarchus in the

direct speech at the earliest possible moment: he could not easily begin with the οὐ μὴ . . . sentence, for this is strictly parallel to the τάχα μὲν . . . clause, which must inevitably be in indirect speech, if we are to begin with indirect speech at all.

While we are dealing with the text of these chapters of the *de Abstinencia*, we may notice a further point of detail: the MSS. reading *συντροφαῖς* in c. 10, p. 92, 22 should clearly be *συστροφαῖς*. Nauck emends to *συντροφίαις*, which involves the addition of a letter and the alteration of the accent: the other emendation only involves the alteration of one letter. The phrase *ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς*, occurring in an extract from a work by Hermarchus, can surely be taken as a reminiscence of Epicurus, K.Δ. XXXIII *ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς*.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

(On the view maintained in the first paragraph).

Pace Diels, *Philodemos ii. die Götter* III, 'part II p. 50 note 1 and Krohn, *Der Epikureer Hermarchos*, Diss. Berlin 1921 pp. 5 ff. Diels merely says that Bernay's view, that Porphyry quotes Hermarchus verbally, 'lässt sich schon durch die Auszüge aus H., die in letzten Teile der *Kύριαὶ Δόξαι* angehängt sind . . ., widerlegen.' The argument seems to be (cf. Krohn *loc. cit.*): the contents of *Sententiae* 32 and 36-40 have no parallel in the extant remains of Epicurus, but have parallels in the views of Hermarchus as given by Porphyry, therefore they and, presumably, 31 and 33-35 are excerpts from Hermarchus; but these excerpts are not reproduced verbally by Porphyry, therefore P. does not quote Hermarchus verbally. This argument presupposes, among other things, that serious doubt must be cast on anything which is not said at least twice in the extant remains of Epicurus and, on the other hand, that Hermarchus never said anything more than once. Nor does Krohn's additional argument, to show that *Sententiae* 31-40 are from the work of Hermarchus, prove anything but K.'s failure to realize the purpose of H. in the passage quoted by Porphyry.

Krohn argues, against I 7-12 being a verbal quotation from Hermarchus, that the passage contains ten words which were unusual in the 3rd century B.C. Of these words, one is used in similar senses by Epicurus and Chrysippus among others, two by Philo Mechanicus (iii/ii B.C.), another by Polybius; two of them L. and S. only quotes from here, one only from here and a scholium on Thucydides; one is an emendation (the word is found in Dion. Hal.); of the other two, one (*ἀφοσίωσις*) is used by Dion. Hal. and the other (*βλαπτικός*) by Strabo (cf. Philodem. *Piet.* 99, 100). So the linguistic argument is not very serious.

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ADDITIONAL NOTE ON PAUSES IN THE TRAGIC SENARIUS.

IN my article in *C.Q.* XXX pp. 72-9, I omitted, with quite unaccountable carelessness, to take into reckoning the varying number of senarii in the different plays. My thanks are due to Mr E. C. Yorke for drawing my attention to this omission, and for helping me to rectify the resulting errors.

The approximate total number of senarii in the three tragedians is: Aeschylus 4,300, Sophocles 7,500, Euripides 18,300. The first figure I take from Mr Yorke's article in *C.Q.* XXX p. 116. The second and third I have calculated myself. Unlike Mr Yorke, I include here (as I included them when compiling the statistics for my article) those iambic trimeters imbedded in lyrical passages which appear to me to be spoken iambic verses. Their number is not large, and their omission would not materially affect my results. (Mr Yorke tells me that his total for the trimeters in Sophocles is 7,547. C. F. Müller, *De pedibus solutis in dialogorum senariis Aeschyli, Sophoclis, Euripidis*, gives the figures, including sung trimeters, as Aeschylus 4,308, Sophocles 7,568, Euripides 17,825. J. Descroix, *Le trimètre iambique*, p. 108, impugns the accuracy of these figures.)

The following corrections must be made in my article:

P. 76. '1. The examples . . . tragedians.' Read 'This pause is nearly twice as common in Aeschylus as in Sophocles and Euripides.'

P. 76. '1½. Rarer . . . other plays.' Omit.

P. 76. '2. This stop . . . Aeschylus and Sophocles.' Read 'This stop is particularly common in the *P.V.* In general, it is much commoner in Aeschylus than in Sophocles, much commoner in Sophocles than in Euripides.'

P. 76. 4, 4½, 5. 'The combined figures . . . *Trachiniae* (44).' Read 'Taking the three pauses together, the frequency of occurrence is: *Ajax*, once in every 30 lines: *Antigone* and *Trachiniae*, once in 22: *Philoctetes*, once in 21: *Electra*, once in 19: *O.C.*, once in 13; *O.T.*, once in 11.

P. 77. Last paragraph. For 'much rarer' read 'rarer.' The figures are: Aeschylus once in every 119 lines: Sophocles once in 76: Euripides once in 79.

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ADDITIONAL NOTE ON MENANDER.

Perikeiromene 344-6 :

ἐν τῶν] ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοῦτί μοι δοκεῖ
σκοποῦν]τι, τὴν ἐμὴν τεκοῦσαν μητέρα
λάβρα προ]έσθαι θυγατέρ' αὐτῇ γενομένην.

So Sudhaus, Jensen, and Körte (1912), except that the last-named has αἰσχροῦς for λάβρα.

In my notes on this passage (*C.Q.*, 1936, p. 69) I accepted the restoration ἐν τῶν ἀδυνάτων, originally due to Wilamowitz, though with an uneasy feeling that Körte's first suggestion οὐ τῶν ἀδυνάτων¹ was better Greek. I did so because the latter did not offer any solution of the difficulties of the generally accepted reading, unless it were taken as a generalized statement ('it is possible enough that my mother exposed a daughter; such things are only too common'); and this is open to the objection that such a statement should be followed by a sentence of the type νῦν δέ or ὁμῶς δέ ('but I cannot believe that she would have exposed a son as well,' or the like). I now think, however, after a communication from Professor Körte in which he tells me he is restoring οὐ τῶν ἀδυνάτων to his text, that this is right. ἔπαθον γάρ τι οἶον οἶμαι οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ἄλλων. Because λάβρα (or αἰσχροῦς) in l. 346 added nothing to the sense, because it seemed harmless and colourless, I have accepted it every time that I have read the passage: it was in the printed text. But it is quite unnecessary; and there is in fact no great difficulty in the lines, provided they are not taken as a generalization. L. 357 shows that Moschion knew that he himself was a foundling, and had heard that, possibly, a sister had been exposed with him. His meaning in 344-6 must therefore be: 'it is not impossible that my mother [my real mother, that is; not Myrrine] exposed a daughter at the same time as she exposed me.' προ]έσθαι seems necessary; and Körte in his first publication suggested μετ' ἐμοῦ at the beginning of the line. This is somewhat too long perhaps for the gap, which requires 5 or 6 letters before προέσθαι (Körte gives 6 in his first edition); and it should mean 'with my help' rather than 'at the same time as me.' But read ἅμ' ἐμοί, and I think all the difficulties are removed. Körte saw the right meaning of the passage in 1908; but it has been badly obscured since.

Epitrepontes 353-4.

I made a mistake (p. 65) in giving Sudhaus' restoration of these lines as

ταύτην [δ' ἀφείς
ἐ]πείξεται τὴν ἐνδο]ν ἀπολείπειν.

It should be ἵσως for ἀφείς. The regular use of ἀφείς is to mean 'to give up one thing and take to another': as, e.g., Soph. *O.C.* 1536-7, ὅταν τὰ θεῖ' ἀφείς τις εἰς τὸ μαίνεσθαι τραπῇ. I had therefore attributed to Sudhaus an incorrect usage.

If further examination of the papyrus should make τὴν ναῦν the probable reading, we may restore

ἐκείνην λήψεται ταύτην ἀφείς
ἐπείξεται τὴν ναῦν ἀπολείπειν.

But I am not convinced that this is right.

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¹ In his publication of the Leipzig parchment (*Ber. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig*, 1908, pp. 145-177).

THE GREEK LETTERS OF M. JUNIUS BRUTUS.

SINCE Bentley's attack upon the Greek letters of Euripides and Phalaris, scholarship has been inclined to look with suspicion upon other similar compositions, which have for the most part lain under a cloud of doubt. This attitude of doubt was certainly to be found in the scholarship of last century, though there has been a tendency of late years to attempt to restore certain of these groups of letters to their original position as genuine productions of the writers whom they claim as their authors. Such has been the case with Plato's letters; such also is the case with those of M. Junius Brutus, the tyrannicide. Condemned last century by both Westermann¹ and Marcks,² they found in Rühl³ a clever and successful advocate, who stoutly refuted these attacks. His task was rendered less difficult, in that Marcks, who alone adduced arguments to support his thesis, had not gone deeply into his subject, and his reasoning, therefore, was superficial. But the subversion of Marcks' arguments did not of itself establish the authenticity of the letters, and the positive reasoning of Rühl was hardly less deficient than Marcks'. A fresh examination of these letters, therefore, may be pardoned, if the conclusions differ from those of Rühl.

The collection, as we have it to-day, consists of a series of seventy letters, attributed to Brutus, with conjectural answers to them from the recipients; the whole collection has an introduction by a certain King Mithridates, who addresses it to his nephew, also named Mithridates. In it he says that since his nephew has often found it difficult to imagine how the recipients would have answered Brutus' letters, he has written replies to them himself, basing his answers both upon Brutus' letters and on historians. Of these answers, therefore, we are in no doubt; they are the work of a certain Mithridates; it is with the letters of Brutus that we are concerned.

We may deal first with the external evidence in connection with these letters. Such evidence is small, but such as it is, it is interesting from the doubts it raises. They are quoted by Plutarch,⁴ yet though the text generally agrees with the text in our collection, there is one difference; Plutarch seems to have been under the impression that the third letter which he quotes was sent to the Samians; this is the natural indication of the scheme of the sentence, which runs γράφει Περγαμηνούς . . . πάλιν Σαμίους . . . καὶ ἐτέραν. The verb in the first two cases has no direct object; we are told to whom Brutus writes, and the letter is then quoted in full; in the third case not only are we not told to whom the letter is written, but we find γράφει governing ἐτέραν; the reason for this is that the recipients are the same as in the foregoing example, namely the Samians,⁵ and ἐτέραν has its proper force of 'a second letter', instead of 'another', i.e., ἄλλην. Yet in our collection⁶ this letter is addressed to the Lycians. For this there are several possible explanations; at present, however, we are concerned with noting the discrepancy. They are quoted by Photius,⁷ and Rühl⁸ considers this an argument in favour of their authenticity. Yet it is not so conclusive as Rühl would have us believe. Their mention is introduced by the words: καὶ αὖς (i.e., ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς) Βρούτος ὁ Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἐπιγράφεται κ.τ.λ.,

¹ *Commentatio de Epistolarum Scriptioribus Graecis*, Lips. 1851, Pt. IV.

² *Symbola Critica ad Epistolographos Graecos*. Diss. Bonn. 1883, pp. 23-29.

³ *Rheinisches Museum* 1915, LXX 315f.

⁴ *Brutus* ch. 2, 6 foll.

⁵ I since find this to be the view of Paukstadt in his edition of the *Life*, Gotha, 1891, though he does not attempt any discussion on the point.

⁶ Hercher *Epistolographi Graeci* No. XXV.

⁷ Hercher p. 16 No. VI.

⁸ P. 318.

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which might reasonably be taken as an argument in favour of their forged appearance to Photius; the periphrasis, together with the one he uses immediately before to indicate the letters of Phalaris, could be taken to show that Photius was not convinced of their authenticity; that though they were ascribed to these persons, they were not, to his mind, really their compositions.

The quotation from Philostratus, to which Rühl¹ refers, can be taken together with a part of Mithridates' introduction to the letters. Philostratus speaks of: *στρατηγῶν δὲ Βρούτος, ἢ ὅτε Βρούτος εἰς τὸ ἐπιστέλλειν ἐχρήτο*; Mithridates in his introduction says: *ὁ γοῦν Βρούτος μυρίας . . . διαπρεσβευσάμενος ἐπιστολάς, εἴτε ἰδίας εἴτε τινὲς τῶν εἰς ταῦτα μισθοῦ δοκιμῶν κ.τ.λ.* These two independent references to secretaries are interesting and not without importance, for they suggest difficulties of which neither Rühl nor Mithridates seemed aware. If Brutus employed secretaries for the purpose of writing to the allies and subjects, then it is clearly useless for us to attempt to discern any outstanding similarity of style between the various letters, beyond such similarities as could be discovered between the letters of two secretaries to-day.² Yet these letters were clearly deemed to bear the stamp of Brutus' individuality upon them. Plutarch refers to his *ἀποφθεγματικὴν καὶ Λακωνικὴν βραχυλογίαν*; Mithridates speaking of the letters uses the words: *ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνό με οὐ λήλθεν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πολλοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ δῆμοις γράφων εἰκότως ἐνδὸς ἐξείχετο χαρακτήρος κ.τ.λ.* And Rühl himself³ speaks as though the letters were similar in style. It is certainly not improbable that Brutus employed secretaries; yet, if he did, and that is certainly what Mithridates and Philostratus thought, then we cannot expect any particularly individual characteristics of Brutus to be discernible.

The only other piece of external evidence is to be found also in Mithridates' introduction, when he says: *ὁ γοῦν Βρούτος . . . μόνος ἐξέδωκε τὰς εὐφώρως γραφεύσας κ.τ.λ.* We hear nowhere else of Brutus having published his letters, and it is a most improbable suggestion. Some of the letters must be dated to March 42 B.C. at the earliest, and from that time until his death Brutus had more important business to occupy his time and energy. Nor is it by any means clear why Brutus should, at this time, have conceived the idea of publishing his correspondence; the end of the campaign would have been a more suitable occasion for such matters. And closely with this point goes another, the question of the order of the letters. How were the letters collected and on what principle were they grouped? If Brutus were the editor, the natural assumption would be that he kept copies of the letters, of the best of which he made an anthology. But he would have grouped them on some system⁴; as we have them, there is neither geographical nor chronological nor any other basis. And if Mithridates were mistaken, and they were not collected until after Brutus' death, then an intending compiler would have two courses open to him; he could either go through the copies of the letters, if such were kept by Brutus, or he might go to the various cities, and recover them from the archives.⁵ In either case we should expect the result to be some kind of order and arrangement, instead of the

¹ P. 318.

² For a discussion of the style of Greek letters cf. C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* pp. XLI foll.

³ P. 317-18.

⁴ Cf. Pliny I, 1 which is hardly, however, to the point for our purposes; one can hardly compare the publication of private letters with that of official letters to communities, as is the present case. If Brutus kept copies of his letters, he kept them on some system, either chronologically or geographically; if, however, they were collected after his death, then again

the case of Pliny would not affect the question. Pliny says he collected them 'non servato temporis ordine sed ut quaeque in manus venerat'. But a person collecting Brutus' letters after his death would have to go to the various communities; there would be no question of their sending a prospective editor copies of the letters, and therefore in this case, too, we should expect an arrangement according to some system.

⁵ Whether anyone could have obtained the letter to Damas, No. XXXIII, in this way, is doubtful.

chaos which meets us to-day. Externally, therefore, there is no overwhelming evidence in their favour; such evidence as we have seems to point to an uncertainty even among the ancients themselves, as though there were something apocryphal about them, as about others of the Greek letters.

Before turning to the letters themselves, since a great part of the argument depends on the trustworthiness of the historians for the period 43-42 B.C., those scholars who uphold the genuineness of the letters being compelled to find the historians inaccurate, it will be well to draw up a brief outline of the doings of Brutus and Dolabella over the period during which the letters are supposed to have been written, compiled solely from the historians and notices in Cicero's letters. For that purpose a narrative of Brutus' and Dolabella's activities based wholly on the historians and Cicero's letters, has been drawn up. We may then proceed more easily to a review of the letters.

Brutus.—Until about March 10th 43 B.C. he was engaged in winning Macedonia from C. Antonius. About this time¹ he would receive the news of Trebonius' death at Dolabella's hands, and the consequent vote of outlawry upon the latter by the Senate.² He remained inactive for some weeks after this, sending his cavalry into winter quarters at Heraclea,³ and resting his own army. His intention was to move into Asia later in the year.⁴ About the middle of May, hearing that Dolabella had sent five cohorts into the Chersonese, he determined to proceed against him, the flight of M. Antonius from Mutina and consequent removal of immediate danger to Rome being now known to him.⁵ By May 19th he reached lower Candavia.⁶ About this time or a little later he would hear of Dolabella's withdrawal into Cilicia, and thence to Syria, and this seems to have satisfied Brutus that there was no need of his immediate presence in Asia⁷; he therefore preferred to consolidate the Republic's position in Greece.⁸ In the late summer⁹ he made his expedition into Thrace, which seems to have procured him some much needed money, and also served to practise his troops. It is uncertain how long this would have taken him, but the accounts do not suggest any protracted operations. About the beginning of October¹⁰ Brutus crossed to Asia¹¹ and began collecting a fleet and coming to terms with the dynasts,¹² and, probably in January, met Cassius at Smyrna.¹³ There the reduction of Rhodes and Lycia was decided upon, Cassius undertaking that of Rhodes, Brutus that of Lycia. A problem arises at this point; we must ask whether one started before the other, and which finished first. It is impossible to be categorical on this difficult, and for our purposes, important point; and all that can be done here is to set down the evidence. The historians all narrate Cassius' reduction of Rhodes before that of Brutus' subjection of Lycia. This of itself means nothing; but the fact that they do not seem to be using the same authorities, and that Dio has before this recounted the doings of Brutus before those of Cassius, make it perhaps less likely that we have here an inverted chronological account.

¹ The news of Trebonius' death reached Rome about the end of February, cf. Rice Holmes *The Architect of the Roman Empire Vol. I*, p. 206.

² Cicero *Philippic* XI 6, 15.

³ *Ad. Fam.* XII 14, 8, *Ad. Brutum* I 6, 1.

Ad. Fam. XII 14, 1.

⁵ *Ad Brutum* I 2.

⁶ *Ad Brutum* I 6.

⁷ Brutus' movements at this time are none too clear; I am satisfied that Brutus did not cross twice into Asia, once now and once towards the end of the year, as seems the general opinion of scholars on the somewhat slender evidence of Dio XLVII 24; but as the question does not affect the Greek letters, it need not be discussed.

⁸ Livy *Epitome* CXX.

⁹ Livy *Epitome* CXXII, after Dolabella's death; both Livy and Dio XLVIII 25 are wrong in dating it after C. Antonius' death.

¹⁰ Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 27. 1 ff. says that he was about to cross to Asia, when he heard of Octavian's consulship and the Lex Pedia which followed soon after. Octavian entered on his consulship on August 19th; the news of this and the Lex Pedia would probably reach Brutus in the second half of September.

¹¹ Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 28, 3, Dio XLVII 25.

¹² Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 28, 3.

¹³ Dio XLVII 32, Appian *B.C.* IV 65, 276, Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 28, 6.

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Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 32, 4 implies that they were contemporaneous—ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον; Appian *B.C.* IV 81, 341 could reasonably be taken to imply that Rhodes fell before Brutus had completed the subjugation of Lycia.¹ Appian *B.C.* IV 82, 345 says that Brutus gave instructions to the fleet to go to Abydos and there wait until he should join Cassius and both cross together from that town. In Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 32, 4, Brutus, after fining the Lycians himself goes to Ionia; the subjection of Lycia, therefore, before the siege of Rhodes was under way, seems improbable. Lentulus, moreover, was one of Cassius' admirals²; yet we find him helping Brutus in the reduction of Myra.³ Cassius would seem, therefore, to have completed the reduction of Rhodes and left the neighbourhood by then; yet the fall of Myra came apparently soon after that of Patara.⁴ Also the phrase in Appian *B.C.* IV 82, 344 χρηματισάμενος ὁμοίως is suggestive; it presumably means 'in the same way as at Patara', where Appian has said that Brutus inflicted the same fines as Cassius did at Rhodes. We may perhaps conjecture that Lentulus was responsible for this, telling Brutus how Cassius had dealt with the Rhodians. And lastly Brutus' campaign by no means seems to have been unduly short, or Cassius' unduly protracted. Brutus, according to Dio,⁵ first fought a battle against the Lycians, invested Xanthus, which held out stubbornly, and finally received the submission of Patara; this last, admittedly, only a matter of a few days. Plutarch and Appian say nothing of a battle,⁶ but Plutarch says that Brutus demanded χρήματα καὶ στράτον and these negotiations must have taken some days. Cassius' operations were shorter than he expected;⁷ Rhodes, after her defeat at sea,⁸ found herself totally unfitted to withstand a siege and doomed to fall after a short time; whereupon she forestalled her fate and opened negotiations, which quickly resulted in her surrender. The time, therefore, between her defeat at sea and consequent blockade and surrender cannot well have been long. If then we assume that they left Smyrna for their respective duties and started about the same time on their tasks—Brutus would have slightly farther to go—there is no evidence for assuming any greater speed on the part of Brutus in the accomplishment of his part of the work. The historical evidence points, if anything, to the fall of Rhodes as prior to the subjugation of Lycia. Brutus left Lycia, probably some time in April, went to Ionia, and about June met Cassius at Sardis.

Dolabella.—The movements of Dolabella are not easy to reconstruct, depending as they do on occasional notices in Cicero's *Letters*. At the end of January, after landing in Asia, he murdered Trebonius. In the first half of February he was refused admission to Rhodes,⁹ after which he spent his time plundering Asia.¹⁰ This he continued to do for the first half of March, collecting a fleet, also, by means of his lieutenant, Lucius Figulus, from the maritime inhabitants of the South, the Rhodians, Lycians, Pamphylians and Cilicians.¹¹ About March 20th, perhaps earlier but hardly

¹ He says that Brutus imposed the same fines and punishments on the citizens of Patara οἷος καὶ Κάσσιος ἐκέρυεν ἐν Ῥόδῳ. This does not mean necessarily that Rhodes fell first, but I believe it may do here.

² Cf. Appian *B.C.* IV 72, 305.

³ Appian *B.C.* IV 82, 344.

⁴ Cf. Dio XLVII 34 end.

⁵ XLVII 34.

⁶ Though Plutarch *Brutus* 30, 4 ff. mentions fighting of a sort.

⁷ Cf. Appian *B.C.* IV 74, 313 δ Κάσσιος ἡδόμενος τῇ ταχυνεργίᾳ τῆς ἀλώσεως.

⁸ Appian *B.C.* IV 72 and 3 302-312.

⁹ *Ad Brutum* II 4, 3. I see no reason for the remark in Tyrrell and Purser's note *ad loc.* that this is obviously false, because we see from

Lentulus' letter that Rhodes admitted Dolabella Rhodes may well have refused at first, but thought better on seeing Dolabella's methods. It may have been rumour, but not necessarily so.

¹⁰ Cf. *Ad Fam.* XII 14, 1 where Lentulus speaks of a visit he paid Brutus in Macedonia; from paragraph 8 it appears that this must have been in the latter half of March; in the latter part of February, therefore, when Lentulus left Asia, Dolabella was plundering the province. Cf. also *Ad Brutum* II 3, 5; it may be to news received from Lentulus that Brutus here refers.

¹¹ Appian *B.C.* IV 60, 258. Cf. *Ad Fam.* XII 15, 5 which implies that the ships came from parts nearby.

later, Dolabella proceeded northwards, to see what he could achieve in those parts. He despatched five cohorts to the Chersonese¹—probably at the beginning of April—and then determined to try conclusions with Tillius Cimber, Governor of Bithynia, and Deiotarus, King of Galatia. The result was a battle in which Dolabella was routed,² and this persuaded him to retire south again, to enter Cilicia on May 1st³ and proceed thence to Syria. Presumably after his defeat he recalled his cohorts from the Chersonese, as we hear no more about them, and Brutus seems to have been satisfied that his immediate presence there was no longer necessary.

We may now turn to the letters themselves. They fall broadly into two groups: those which contain certain information by which we may conjecture dramatic dates for them, and those which internally are dateless, and whose dates must be conjectured by using the evidence of the historians. In the first group, however, the information contained, so far from filling out the historians' narrative is a complete contradiction of much that we find there. Rühl⁴ circumvents this difficulty by laying it down that where the information contained in the historians does not agree with that contained in the letters, the credibility of the historians must be called in question, and their story abandoned in favour of the letters; the historian must be brought into line with the letters. This comes very near to begging the question, by assuming the authenticity he set out to prove. Admittedly in a case of this kind we cannot afford to ignore any evidence; but it is a violent procedure to lay aside as untrustworthy the evidence of the historians, in order to preserve the authenticity of a series of letters. If, therefore, we can reconstruct a probable, or even possible, narrative from the historians, we should do so, and test the letters against this reconstruction.

The Pergamum series comes first in order; as they stand to-day, Nos. 1, 3, 5, seem to hang together, and Nos. 7, 9. Here we have two separate demands made upon the Pergamenes to refrain from helping Dolabella, in both cases ending with the mention of a gift of money to Brutus. In both cases the Pergamenes are spoken of as helping—or having just helped—Dolabella.⁵ Now Dolabella was in Cilicia by May 1st, and Brutus must have been aware of this by the end of May. The *terminus ante quem*, therefore, of a letter referring to help being given to Dolabella was the end of May, since after Dolabella's departure all opportunity to help him would be gone. Now in the first group we notice in No. 2 a phrase εἰς ὃν ἐπείρασμεν καιρόν; of this there is no mention in No. 1, and we must suppose something like this to have happened: Brutus writes No. 1, to which Pergamum makes an unsatisfactory reply; Brutus again writes demanding money in a specified time (the minimum being the time taken for a messenger to go to Pergamum and back to Brutus); Pergamum fails to send the money at once, but apparently it arrived later. Brutus was at Dyrrhachium until mid-May, and we shall not be far wrong in assuming a fortnight as the time for a letter to travel between Dyrrhachium and Pergamum.⁶ The *terminus post quem* for the correspondence is March 15th, when Brutus would hear of the Senatorial decree making Dolabella an enemy. The first correspondence (Nos. 1, 3, 5 + the missing one) would take about two months, i.e., it would take until about May 10th; yet the *terminus ante quem* for Nos. 7, 9 is the end of May, and we are faced with two sets of correspondence, the second following immediately on the first, though the first had ended satisfactorily. This is clearly as near an absurdity as possible.⁷ There are two possible ways of accounting for the series as it stands to-

¹ *Ad Brutum* I 2, 1.

² *Ad Brutum* I, 6, 3.

³ *Ad Fam.* XII 12, 5.

⁴ P. 324-5.

⁵ δέδωκεναι and δέδικεν in No. 1 clearly indicate this.

⁶ This includes days for deliberation at both ends.

⁷ I assume here what seems to be the case, namely that Nos. 1, 3, 5, go together, and Nos. 7, 9. Gelzer, however, in P.W.X. col. 1004, 1007, 1010, splits them up, on the assumption that they are not in chronological order. There seems little justification for this, as the series forms a perfectly understandable group, and

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day; firstly, and perhaps more simply, we can cut out No. 7 as a forgery; the rest of the correspondence would then be possible, since there would be no necessity for assuming two parallel series of correspondence. Or we could assume that only Nos. 1 and 9 belonged to the original correspondence, the last phrase in No. 9 picking up and echoing the last phrase of No. 1. Nos. 3, 5, 7 would then be later additions which served to split the correspondence into two almost identical parts.¹

No. 11, to the Rhodians, is difficult to believe, unless we ignore completely the evidence of the historians. As I have attempted to show, there is no suggestion in any of them that Brutus completed the subjugation of Lycia before Cassius had settled down to the siege of Rhodes, such evidence as there is pointing to the earlier fall of Rhodes. I see no indication in the historians of the situation pictured in this letter being chronologically possible, and it must remain a mystery why Brutus should write to Rhodes at all, since her subjugation had been decided upon, and its execution entrusted to Cassius. It was, therefore, no business of Brutus', nor was there any call for this letter. To date it after the fall of Patara and before the final surrender of Rhodes is no better; it would be a high piece of impertinence in Brutus to write to Rhodes, when Cassius' investment was complete, as though to filch from Cassius the fruits of his work.

The internal evidence of this letter is also important. In this letter, as in Nos. 25, 27, 43 also, we have an account of the fates of Xanthus and Patara, not merely different from those of our authorities, but diametrically opposed, in the case of Xanthus, to the historians' narrative. This letter and No. 43 agree in making Brutus' treatment of Xanthus harsh and unnecessarily cruel. He refused their plea for mercy, slew their youth, and drove them from the land. Our authorities,² on the other hand, give a very different picture of the affair. Brutus was gravely distressed at the misfortunes of the Xanthians, and strove to avert their fate. Appian³ says he restored them to their land soon afterwards. Neither Plutarch, Appian nor Dio seems to be using the same source at this point,⁴ yet they agree in giving a favourable—in the case of Dio a not unfavourable—picture of Brutus. This harmony is not easy to account for, if we suppose the truth to have been the very opposite. In the case of Patara, so far from Brutus' own account being true, it seems tolerably clear that Brutus inflicted a fine on them; Appian⁵ and Dio⁶ say so expressly, and Plutarch⁷ implies as much when he says he imposed a fine on the Lycians which presumably included Patara.⁸ And those who uphold the authenticity

was, we venture to say, intended to be taken in order. But Gelzer's rearrangement is by no means satisfactory; he dates No. 1 as May; now No. 7 cannot be later than the end of May; suppose No. 1 preceded No. 7, then we must assume that Brutus makes a curt demand for money on the ground that they have given Dolabella money and only afterwards explains the relations existing between himself and Dolabella. This might be the case, but it is doubtful when the two letters must have followed closely on one another. To put No. 7 before No. 1 is more difficult; if Brutus wanted money from Pergamum, and was aware of the help given by that city to Dolabella, he would surely have included the request in the same letter. Even more difficult is Gelzer's dating of No. 9 as June end (col. 1007) and Nos. 3, 5 as towards the end of the year—September-October (1010). If a town had given Brutus 200 talents and passed decrees in his favour, it is too improbable to be possible that within less than six months he

should not only demand further money of the same city, but be curtly insistent on it and grumble at the smallness of the sum.

¹ Historically I find the phrase *τῇ δὲ Ἰταλίας στρατὸν ἐπισκοπούμενον* difficult; Gelzer (col. 1007) assumes this to be legions though it seems rather an unnecessary periphrasis, if it is. The natural assumption would be that Brutus was reviewing an army sent him from Italy, and of such an army our historical sources are silent.

² Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 30, 6 foll; Appian *B.C.* IV 80, 335 foll. Dio makes no comment.

³ Appian *B.C.* IV 82, 345.

⁴ If either Plutarch or Appian were using Asinius Pollio, we should expect the truth, since he would have no reason for being favourably disposed towards Brutus.

⁵ Appian *B.C.* IV 81, 341.

⁶ Dio XLVII 34.

⁷ *Brutus* ch. 32, 4.

⁸ Rühl asserts that Plutarch was aware of Brutus' harsh treatment of the Xanthians, but

of all the letters, must surely find it difficult to believe that, whereas most of the collection are demands for money, yet Brutus could lightly remit taxation and make a gift of 50 talents to a city.

No. 21, to the Lycians, is not easy to accept. Here Brutus orders the Lycians to send all their engines of war to Cassius, who is besieging Rhodes. But what does Brutus mean by *ἐπὶ Καῦνον*? Neither the Lycians nor Cassius were at this time storming Caunus; the natural place to which to send siege engines would be Rhodes or Loryma,¹ where Cassius' fleet was; if it means 'at Caunus', it still leaves unexplained why the Lycians should keep their siege engines at Caunus in Caria.² And the last sentence is obscure; were the Lycians not yet subdued? If not, then it was idle to ask help of them; if so, then No. 25 must precede this one, and we are faced with the same difficulty of chronology as in No. 11; for Xanthus and Patara must have fallen at the very outset of the reduction of Rhodes, if not before. Yet could Brutus have written No. 23 to persons not yet his allies and followed it up with No. 25?³

In the Cyzican correspondence there are one or two difficult points. It is by no means clear why the duty of conveying arms from Bithynia should be imposed on Cyzicus (No. 35); and why there should be no mention of these arms in the Bithynian correspondence. Neither is *ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις* easily crystallized into any particular person or persons. More obscure is the *πόλεμος* of No. 39; Gelzer⁴ assumes by implication that it is the Lycian war, but what fruits could Cyzicus hope to gain from the subjugation of Lycia, such as Brutus denies them in the last sentence? The Thracian war would be little better as an explanation.⁵ No. 45, to Myra, likewise has a reference to a *πόλεμος*; but since, according to Appian,⁶ Myra was the last town to capitulate, the *πόλεμος* is not easily identified; and the same may be said of No. 29, which, presumably, was written after No. 13, and therefore after the campaign in Lycia had been completed.

The Tralles correspondence is in some ways like that of Pergamum, since it too can be dated by Dolabella's presence. The *terminus post quem* for No. 51 is March 15th. The news of Dolabella's encampment would take ten days to a fortnight to reach Brutus at Dyrrhachium. Now No. 55 implies that Brutus' first letter, No. 51, has reached Tralles, and some days at least have elapsed before his next news was despatched from Tralles. This is clear from the first sentence; in No. 51 Brutus had demanded: *εἴργετε αὐτὸν τῆς σφετέρης*; in No. 55 he has heard that Menodorus *καὶ πρότερον ὑμᾶς μὴ εἴργειν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ στρατοπεδούνοντα καὶ νῦν*. At least a week to ten days seems to be implied as the distance between *πρότερον* and *καὶ νῦν*. If we assume ten days as the time for the letter to arrive at Tralles, and ten days before the Tralleans replied, together with the ten days which the news would take to reach Brutus in the first

failed to mention it, because it did not give an impression of Brutus, in harmony with his own portrayal. This is unfair to Plutarch; in ch. XLVI of the *Brutus*, he tells us that Brutus gave Sparta and Thessalonica to his soldiers for plunder; it is perfectly legitimate to ask, on Rühl's hypothesis, why this, too, was not suppressed. But suppose Rühl right, quid sequitur? Surely the narration of those events did serve to bring out the favourable side of Brutus' character, and one of these we must certainly call the gift to Patara of 50 talents and remission of tribute. The *argumentum ex silentio* is here of force.

¹ Appian *B.C.* IV 72, 305.

² In the time of Hierocles it seems to have

become part of Lycia; but we cannot safely conjecture a date for the letter from this fact.

³ One solution would be to make it part of the Caunian correspondence, which would make it a more feasible threat; especially since Caunus was part of the Rhodian mainland, which is here given its chance of being spared the fate of Rhodes. But there seems no justification for this.

⁴ Col. 100.

⁵ We may rule out the campaign of Philippi; this would entail their refusing help after receiving the gift of Proconnesus but a short time before; and I agree with Marcks (p. 25) that such a supposition is too improbable.

⁶ Appian *B.C.* IV 82, 344.

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place, we have a period of thirty days during which Dolabella was encamped at Tralles.¹ On the assumption that Brutus wrote about March 15th Dolabella must have been encamped since March 1st-5th, i.e., he was there the whole of March.² The complete silence of our authorities, and the definite notices in Cicero's letters of movements of Dolabella in the north, which must have begun about March 20th at the latest, seem to preclude any possibility of such a long sojourn at Tralles.³

The Bithynian group is also highly improbable. *τοσαύτας δὲ καὶ Δολαβέλλῃ πυνθά- νομαι ὑμᾶς παρασχέσθαι* is a statement almost impossible to credit. All the time during which Dolabella was in a position to collect aid from Bithynia, i.e., January to early April, Tillius Cimber was governor of that province, which he did not leave till Dolabella was about to enter Syria,⁴ and since Dolabella's first action on reaching Asia had been to murder Trebonius, it is not likely that Cimber would have shown any friendliness towards him.⁵ We also learn⁶ that Cimber collected an imposing fleet from Bithynia, and it is improbable that they either could or would supply Dolabella with 150 transport vessels.⁷

There is, besides those which contain certain historical information, a group consisting of most of the remaining ones. This group is distinguished by two characteristics; firstly, they are internally dateless; and secondly, they all say very much the same thing. Such are the Caunian letters (Nos. 19, 31), the Coan (No. 29), Damas (No. 33), Smyrna (No. 41), Myra (No. 45), Miletus (Nos. 47, 49), Bithynia (No. 59), and Samos (No. 69). They all caution the recipients to show greater alacrity and enthusiasm in preparing Brutus' requirements. They read more like rhetorical exercises on a given theme, than letters from a Roman general. There is in some cases a striving after point; in No. 45 (cf. also No. 29) Brutus shows how lateness in sending help is equivalent to not sending at all; in No. 59, perhaps the cleverest, Brutus points out that spending the money is far more wearing than giving it. Miletus (Nos. 47, 49) suffers as we should expect, at the hands of anyone composing a letter at her expense; proverbially the effeminate of antiquity, she is accused of lack of arms and men. Damas⁸ may, as Gelzer suggests, be a dynast; but he may equally well be a fictitious character. All that can be said of these letters is that, even if genuine, they add nothing to our knowledge and that they read more like sophistical exercises.

It remains to say something of the possible origin of these letters. Westermann⁹ was of the opinion that the three quoted by Plutarch were genuine, and were derived

¹ This leaves out of account No. 53, which might, just conceivably, be presumed to have been written on the receipt of further news from Tralles, but before Brutus' first letter reached them. This is not the natural explanation, for *καὶ πρόσθεν ὑμῖν ἐπέστευλα* seems to imply that Brutus' first letter could have reached them, and that they had not obeyed his orders contained therein. If his first letter could not have reached them, it was idle to refer to it. If it does imply that his first letter had reached them, then Dolabella's camping days at Tralles must be lengthened by some days. But I prefer to ignore it, as an imitation of No. 51. The calculations also leave out of account an almost certain three days to a week of encampment before the messenger set off to Brutus in the first place. It is most unlikely that the day Dolabella arrived someone set off to Brutus.

² It would more likely be second half of March and first half of April.

³ The correspondence, with the omission of Nos. 53 and 55, might be possible. No. 57 could have suggested No. 55 by the mention of Menodorus, just as No. 51 perhaps suggested No. 53.

⁴ Dio XLVII 31, 1.

⁵ In *Ad Brutum* I 7, 3 we hear that Cimber defeated Dolabella.

⁶ *Ad Fam.* VII 13, 3.

⁷ Appian *B.C.* IV 60, 258 makes no mention of Bithynian ships. In No. 67 there seems no support for Brutus' statement of the sources of his naval supplies, though he may in fact have derived help from those quarters.

⁸ The only Damas of whom we know anything in this period is a Declamator mentioned several times by Seneca, and twice by Strabo; but he can hardly be referred to here.

⁹ *Commentatio de Epistolarum Scriptoribus Graecis*, Pt. IV, p. 3 foll.

by Plutarch from some intermediary source;¹ that at a later date someone forged a collection of Greek letters of Brutus, including the three quoted by Plutarch, to give an appearance of genuineness to his own efforts. Marcks (p. 26 foll.) denied the authenticity of all equally, because he saw no stylistic superiority in the three quoted by Plutarch over the rest of the collection. He was of the opinion that they were Stoic forgeries of the first century A.D., when Brutus became an object of praise and respect on the part of the more advanced Stoics to whom the Empire and the Emperor were hateful. Cichorius,² who attempts to identify the writer of the introduction and answers to the letters, makes two statements, neither of which have the logical necessity with which they are made. He says firstly that, if those attributed to Brutus are a forgery, they must have been made at the latest in the first century A.D., since they are quoted by Plutarch. He then continues by saying that the Mithridates in question must be looked for among the eastern dynasts of the first century A.D., setting as the *terminus ante quem* the time when Plutarch composed the *Life of Brutus*.

To Westermann's theory there are the following objections. It was at least equally possible for the forger to have gone to the source which Plutarch used as to Plutarch; in which case we have no *terminus ante quem* for the collection, nor any means of judging how many of the collection are authentic, since the source may have contained others than those quoted by Plutarch. It is, furthermore, reasonable to maintain that their presence in a history or biography implies a collection to which the author had access. Against Marcks' theory it may be objected that the collection does not seem to be the creation of hero worshippers, as Marcks himself felt (pp. 24-5). And had there been no nucleus around which to build, it is difficult to understand why they should all be connected with his campaign in Asia, nor why stoical ideals failed to find a more lucid expression. Against Cichorius' first statement we may point out that it is unnecessary to assume either the authenticity or the forged character of the collection *in toto*: a forger may well have built upon a genuine foundation. Nor is there any reason why Mithridates should be the name of a dynast who lived before Plutarch wrote the *Life of Brutus*. The beginning of Mithridates' introduction makes it quite clear that both uncle and nephew had access to a collection of these letters; to this collection whatever it was, clearly Plutarch, too, could have had access. It is unnecessary, therefore, to assume that Mithridates must have made this collection before Plutarch wrote, since Plutarch could well have been acquainted with the letters from elsewhere, and Mithridates have composed the answers after Plutarch's death.

It is impossible to say what source Plutarch was using in Chapter 2³ of the *Brutus*; all that can be said is that it appears to be well-informed on Brutus' early life, and therefore to be the work of some acquaintance of Brutus. If, then, the letters quoted by Plutarch are copied from this source, they will have the stamp of authority. But we shall probably be nearer the truth in following Rühl,⁴ who believes that Plutarch went directly to the letters and made the choice himself.⁵ In either case there is sufficient justification for the assumption of a collection, of some sort, of Brutus' letters. We know that the writing of Greek letters was carried on fairly extensively during the first century A.D.⁶; it was the practice in the schools for sophists to set their pupils to write Greek letters,⁷ and in all probability they them-

¹ He tentatively suggests Bibulus as the source.

² *Römische Studien*, p. 434 foll.

³ Cf. Wichmann *De Plutarchi in vitis Bruti et Antoni fontibus*, Diss. Bonn. 1874, p. 3.

⁴ P. 325.

⁵ We may notice that the last part of the chapter, dealing with the letters, seems to be

rather loosely attached to what has gone before, which may suggest that it is not from the same source as the preceding part; though this is anything but conclusive.

⁶ Cf. Marcks op. cit.

⁷ Cf. Westermann op. cit. Pt. I, pp. 10-11. Dziatzko in P.W. s.v. Briefe, col. 841.

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selves wrote models for the pupils. Brutus had a certain interest for the early Empire, for the Stoics especially, and it would be altogether natural for one or more of the sophists to set his pupils to write letters modelled on genuine Brutan ones, i.e., the collection, such as it was, which then existed. It is not improbable that we have incorporated in the collection two examples of themes given by the sophist, upon which his pupils were to write: Nos. 33 and 69. However that may be, some sophist collected together the more outstanding of his own and his classes' efforts, and published them, hoping to win as great or as little credence for them as other Greek letters won. When the publication was made, we cannot say, but probably it was sometime in the late first or early second century.¹ Mithridates may be in fact an Eastern dynast; he may equally well be a sophist using a pen name. There seems no ground for denying his existence or for doubting the words of his introduction. On the assumption that our collection appeared in the early second century, since Mithridates speaks as though both he and his nephew had long been acquainted with it, and certainly gives no indication of its having been but lately published, we shall probably be not far wrong suggesting for his earliest date the latter part of the second century.² More than that it seems impossible to say with any probability. But that we have not a complete collection of genuine Brutan letters there seems little doubt.

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¹ Plutarch *Brutus* ch. 53, 7, refers to a letter — *ἐπερ ἀπὸ τῶν ῥητορῶν ἐστίν*. The letter in question was probably written in Latin, as were Brutus' others to friends, and therefore there would be no question of its authenticity. The explanation would seem to be this: by this time there were some Greek letters which were known not to be genuine, though they may not have been collected and published yet. Plutarch, for this chapter, was using a source which quoted Nicolaus, Valerius Maximus and the letter, and he was not aware in which language the letter was written. As a Greek himself he may have thought of the letter as being in Greek. He therefore entered the proviso about the genuineness merely to show that in his opinion the two historians may have been right. All that we can

infer from this statement is that forged letters of Brutus were known to exist; we may not assume that this or any of the other letters quoted by Plutarch belong to a larger collection of Greek letters.

² This is clearly only one of many tenable hypotheses; it might be held that Mithridates was the Sophist responsible for the original publication of the letters, who included the introduction and answers to create the impression of their having been for long in circulation. It may also be argued that additional letters with answers have been interpolated into an originally smaller collection. What is set forth above is put forward merely as a possible, and, to the writer, likely account of their origin.

ARISTOTLE AND THE KOINE—NOTES ON THE PREPOSITIONS.

VERY little has been written on the language of Aristotle in general, apart from the two dissertations of R. Eucken,¹ though there are several discussions of linguistic peculiarities in disputed works and some articles on special points. But though the existing Aristotelian corpus has on the whole little value as literature, it has some interest as illustrating the development of the Greek language, and its value in this respect is increased by its non-literary character.²

The deviations from Attic usage of Xenophon (Gildersleeve's 'naughty boy of Attic syntax') have received careful attention, and his position as in some respects a forerunner of the Koine is well recognized; in the same connection the importance of Aeneas Tacticus has been clearly brought out by Hunter in his Introduction to the *Poliorcetica*. It might be expected from the circumstances of his life and the period at which he wrote that the language of Aristotle would also differ in many respects from Attic, and foreshadow developments more clearly seen in the Koine writers. That this is in fact true is, of course, known, and has been stated elsewhere³; but apart from scattered remarks in commentaries the general fact does not seem to have been examined or illustrated in any detail. I have here confined myself to giving some notes on certain prepositions and adverbs with special reference to the relation of Aristotle to later writers. I have included some references to the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* since, though not by Aristotle, it almost certainly belongs to the second half of the Fourth Century⁴ and illustrates the usage of that period.

As regards prepositions proper two general tendencies have been noticed—(1) Syncretism in the use of prepositions and the cases governed by them; and in particular a tendency for the accusative to encroach on the sphere of the genitive and dative, until in modern Greek out of eighteen classical prepositions only seven remain, and all prepositions govern the accusative,⁵ except for a few fixed formulae

¹ *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* (on particles) and *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles* (on prepositions) Berlin, 1868; E.'s work deals with all the prepositions and is valuable, though in some respects incomplete and open to criticism.

² This would not apply to the lost dialogues, which were apparently of a more literary nature, and in the surviving fragments of which there are e.g. no instances of the later uses of prepositions illustrated below; similarly the more careful attention to style and diction in the *Ath. Pol.* is shown by Kaibel, *Stil und Text der Ath. Pol.*, esp. pp. 81 ff. and 102 ff.; see also pp. 37 ff. where K. gives instances of deliberate 'atticizing' from the *Ath. Pol.*, and remarks 'die Politeia aber will attisch sein und ist es auch, nicht des Stoffes oder der Athener wegen sondern weil sie ein Litteraturbuch ist'; cf. Diels'

review in *Gött. Gel. Anzeig.* 1894, pp. 293-307. Even in other works of A. there may be some conscious effort to conform to Attic standards.

³ E.g. Thumb, *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, p. 205; Wilamowitz, *Geschichte der griech. Sprache*, p. 48; Kaibel, *op. cit.* p. 37.

⁴ See Powell and Barber, *New Chapters in Greek Literature*, Series II, pp. 114-116, where about 340 B.C. is suggested as a likely date.

⁵ See Jannaris, *Hist. Gr. Grammar* §§ 1491-3 Radermacher, *Neutestamentliche Grammatik*, pp. 107-112, 115; Blass-Debrunner, *Neutest. Gramm.* (ed. 6) § 203; Moulton, *Proleg. to N.T. Grammar*, pp. 106, 7; Robertson, *Hist. Grammar of the N.T.*, p. 451(d); Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax* II, pp. 207-8; Thumb, *Handbook of Modern Greek Vernacular* (English trans. of ed. 2) § 158.

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due to the influence of the literary language, e.g. ἀπὸ καρδιάς, μετὰ χαρᾶς, καταγῆς.¹ (2) A tendency to greater frequency in the use of prepositions with cases instead of cases alone.² It is now generally held that prepositions were originally used adverbially and their use with cases is a later development. This development can be seen in Attic prose as compared with Homeric Greek, and is carried still further in the Koine, partly in the extended use of periphrastic phrases, e.g. ἡ κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον πόρεια (Polybius) 'the course of the sun,' and partly in various other uses of prepositions, e.g. καθαρὸς ἀπὸ, the common instrumental use of ἐν c. dat. in place of dat. alone, and the use of παρά, ὑπέρ, and ἀπὸ after comparatives, in place of a simple gen. or ἤ.

The position of Aristotle as in some respects a forerunner of the Koine can be illustrated as regards these two tendencies by comparing his use of certain prepositions with that of the classical period, and especially the prose of the Attic Orators, on the one side, and on the other side with that of the New Testament, Polybius and Diodorus, post-classical inscriptions and papyri.³ The prepositions considered below are:—ὑπὸ, ὑπέρ, διὰ, πρός, περί, and κατὰ.

ὑπὸ.—ὑπὸ c. acc. is used from Homer onwards to express motion under in three senses, (a) to a point under (going along a flat surface) e.g. Il. II 286 ὑπ' Ἴλιον ἦλθεν, (b) descending beneath e.g. Aesch. P. 839 ἀπειμι ὑπὸ τὸν ζῶφον, (c) (rarely in Attic prose) extending under, e.g. Hdt. V 10 τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν ἄρκτον, Plato, Tim. 77c ὀχέτους κρυφαίους ὑπὸ τὴν ξύμφυσιν τοῦ δέρματος δύο φλέβας ἔτεμον νωτιαίας. Under this heading may be included the few instances in Attic of the phrase 'all men under heaven or the sun': Dem. XVIII 270 τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον ἀνθρώπων, and similarly Aeschines II 41, Plato, Tim. 23D, Ep. VII 326c.⁴ Thuc. II 17 (extension at the foot of) seems to be the only other example of (c) in Attic,⁵ except Isocr. IV 108 ὑποκειμένης τῆς Εὐβοίας ὑπὸ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, where the exact force of ὑπὸ is not certain.⁶ In Hdt. this use is more common; fifteen examples in all are referred to by Helbing (p. 112).

ὑπὸ c. acc. is also occasionally used metaphorically to express subjection, control, dependence. So Hdt. VII 108 ἦν ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ δασμοφόρος, Thuc. VI 86, 4 ὑπ' αὐτοὺς

¹ Thumb, *op. cit.* §§ 161, 162, 164.

² Rademacher, *op. cit.* pp. 108, 116; Blass-Debrunner, *op. cit.* § 185; Krebs, *Die Präpp. bei Polybius*, pp. 144 ff.

³ It is to be regretted that there is no book dealing with Greek prepositions on the scale of Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses* or Denniston's *Greek Particles*. In the absence of any such work (apart from the valuable but naturally not exhaustive sections in Kühner-Gerth) I have mainly consulted and given some references (by author's name only) to the following special dissertations: Helbing, *Die Präpp. bei Herodot und andern Historikern*; Sobolewski, *De Praep. usu Aristophaneo*; Lutz, *Die Präpp. bei den attischen Rednern*; Lina, *De praep. usu Platonico quaest. selectae*; Eucken, *Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles*; Hagfors, *De praep. in Arist. Pol. et Ath. Pol. usu*; Regard, *Contrib. à l'étude des prépp. dans le N.T.*; Johannessohn, *Der Gebrauch der Präpp. in der Septuaginta*; Krebs, *Die Präpp. bei Polybius*; Rosberg, *De praep. Graec. in chartis Aegyptiis Ptol. aetat. usu*; Kuhrung, *De praep. Graec. in chartis Aegyptiis quaest. selectae*.

⁴ Cf. a rare use of sub c. acc. quicquid sub Noton et Borean hominum sumus, Luc. VII 364.

⁵ Also in a few references in the tragedians to gods of the underworld, e.g. Aesch. *Eum.* 952 ἀθανάτοις τοῖς θ' ὑπὸ γαίαν, Eur. *Hec.* 144, *Alc.* 899.

⁶ In K.-G. (I 525) this passage is included under a category 'Annäherung,' with Soph. *El.* 720 κείνος δ' ὑπ' αὐτὴν ἐσχάτην στήλην ἔχων 'unmittelbar unter der Saule hin.' Here motion is implied, but not in Isocr. (examples of prep. c. acc. after κείσθαι in pregnant sense, as pass. of τίθημι, do not offer a close parallel to the present passage). In sense (a) above the idea of coming near to, as well as under something higher is present; so perhaps here 'nearness' alone may be expressed; in so far as the idea of extension is present this use is also akin to (c) above. Possibly the sense 'under' (already present in the verb) may be due to the idea that Euboea lies close to and under the control of Athens; cf. a few lines later κρατοῦντες αὐτῆς (Euboea) μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν. Examples of ὑπὸ c. acc. denoting subjection in classical writers are given below; cf. an inscription of the Christian era from Selymbria (A.E.M. VIII, 1884, p. 212 no. 29) where ὑπὸ Ναξοῶν means 'in the territorium of.'

εἶναι (cf. VI 86, 1 ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις γενέσθαι); Dem. VI 34 εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ χεῖρα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφίεναι belongs to the same category. But in Thuc., Dem. and Plato the dat. is far more frequent in this sense, and in Hdt. there are twenty examples of the dat. compared with one of the acc. (Helbing, p. 113). Lastly Plato, *Laws* 670a ὑπ' ὀρχησιν καὶ ψδῆν is an instance of ὑπὸ c. acc. to denote accompaniment, instead of the usual dat. or gen.¹

Thus in Attic the use of ὑπὸ c. acc. to express position under, in the local and metaphorical senses, is very limited.² In Homer and Hdt. it is used with rather more freedom.³

In Aristotle both motion and position under are normally expressed by ὑπὸ c. acc. ὑπὸ c. gen. to express position is not used except very rarely in the phrase ὑπὸ γῆς. ὑπὸ c. dat. is also very rare, only five examples from genuine works being cited by Bonitz. Examples of ὑπὸ c. acc. in Aristotle are as follows: In local sense, e.g. in physiological descriptions, *P.A.* 664a 13 ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐ αὐχὴν, *H.A.* 493a 19 τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ἤτρον, *ibid* 491a 33 ὑπὸ τὸ βρέγμα ὃ ἐγκέφαλος, and in a general local sense, *Meteor.* 368a 14 οἱ ψόφοι οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν γινόμενοι. In metaphorical senses, (a) of subjection, *H.A.* 488a 10 τῶν ἀγελαιῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ὑφ' ἡγεμόνα ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ἀναρχα; so often of things, *E.N.* 1094a 10, 12, 13, ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπικρὴν ἢ χαλινοποικὴ; (b) in logical terminology, of subordination of species to genus, *E.N.* 1096a 32, τὰ ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, *Categ.* 1b 21 τὰ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται. Many other examples of all these uses are given in Bonitz s.v. ὑπό, where he devotes a page to giving only a selection of the examples of ὑπό c. acc.

In Xenophon the acc. with ὑπό is found occasionally in the local sense 'at the foot of' e.g. *Anab.* VII 4, 5 ταῖς ὑπὸ τὸ ὄρος κόμαις and in the sense of subjection to it occurs three times in the *Cyropaedia*. In the post-classical period the acc. becomes common in all senses, in the N.T., Hellenistic writers, papyri and post-classical inscriptions. According to Jannaris (*Hist. Gr. Grammar* § 1689) in the post-classical period the difference between rest and motion is lost sight of in the use of ὑπό.⁴ So in the N.T. *Mark* IV 32 (local sense) ὑπὸ τὴν σκιάν αὐτοῦ κατασκηνοῦν, *Gal.* III 25 (subjection) οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν ἐσμεν. For Polybius and Diodorus see Krebs, p. 50; e.g. with τάττεσθαι ὑπό the acc. is used forty-one times in Polyb., the dat. once only. For papyri see Rosenberg, pp. 59-60, and for the common phrase οἱ ὑπό τινα—Kuhring, pp. 16 ff. So also in inscriptions, e.g. of place, ὑπὸ τὸν ὀπλίταν (Delphi 117 B.C.),⁵ and of accompaniment, ἀπέδοτο πάντα τὰ ἔργα ὑπὸ κήρυκα (Olbia 230 B.C.).⁶

Though exact statistics for Aristotle are not available, a comparison of the following figures⁷ with what has been said above on the usage of Aristotle gives

¹ In Xen. *Symf.* VI 4 the MS reading is ὑπὸ τὸν αὐλὸν διαλέγματος, and it seems unnecessary to accept (with MERCHANT in the O.T.) Cobet's correction τοῦ αὐλοῦ.

² In *Phaedrus* 268a 'Ἐῶμεν δὲ τὰ γε σμικρὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον ἴωμεν, motion (metaphorical) is implied, 'holding up to the light.' Cf. Eur. *Hec.* 1154 ὑπ' αὐγὰς τοῖσδε λείσσομαι πέπλους.

³ In *Il.* III 371-2 ἀγχε δὲ μιν πολύκεστοι ἱμάς ἀπαλὴν ὑπὸ δερῆν, δὲ οἱ ὑπ' ἀνθερώνομος ὀχεὺς τέτατο τρυφαλεῖσι, there seems to be no real distinction between acc. and gen. with ὑπό. In Hdt. cf. VI 137 χώρην τὴν ὑπὸ τὸν 'Τμησὺν ἐόθσαν and, in the same chapter, κατοικοῦμένους τοὺς Πελασγοὺς ὑπὸ τῷ 'Τμησῷ. In VII 114 τῷ ὑπὸ γῆν λεγομένῳ εἶναι θεῷ the acc. is used to denote position under, though the idea of extension is hardly present. It is a familiar fact that some instances of the characteristic usages of post-classical

Greek can frequently be found in earlier Greek, and that poetic and Ionic characteristics sometimes disappear in literary Attic prose and appear again in the Koine. The use of ὑπό c. acc. offers some slight confirmation of this; cf. the use of πρὶν ἢ in Ionic and again in Aristotle and the Koine. But on the whole the point is perhaps better illustrated by vocabulary than by syntax.

⁴ Cf. Blass-Debrunner § 232 'das alte lokale ὑπὸ τινος und ὑπὸ τινι ist in ὑπό τι aufgegangen.'

⁵ Dittenberger, *Sylloge* II 826E₃₀.

⁶ *Ibid.* I 495130. Contrast Dem. LI 22 ὑπὸ κήρυκος πωλοῦν.

⁷ From Lutz, Lina and Krebs. The frequency of the gen. throughout is of course mainly due to its use to denote the agent; in Polyb. it is only used in a local sense in the phrase ὑπὸ γῆς (Krebs, p. 47).

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¹ Cf. Mos
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some indication of his position in regard to the general increase in the use of the acc. with *ὑπό* in the post-classical period.

		Attic Orators.	Plato.	Polybius.
Gen.	...	1294	1040	672
Dat.	...	63	29	11
Acc.	...	26	33	280

ὑπό c. gen. in the local sense is not found in the N.T. and LXX, and the dat. is not used at all with *ὑπό* (Johannessohn, pp. 174, 179); in Ptolemaic papyri the gen. is hardly ever used with *ὑπό* in a local sense, and the dat. very rarely (Rossberg, p. 59). In the Atticists, as might be expected, the use of the dat. with *ὑπό* is carefully restored; the gen. is limited to a few special phrases (Schmid, *Atticismus* IV, pp. 624-5, 609).

ὑπέρ c. acc. is used in Homer (a) of motion or extent over a space, e.g. *ὑπὲρ ἅλα κίδναται ἥως* II. XXIII 227, not a common use; (b) of motion passing over an object, e.g. *ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἐβήσετο* Od. VII 135; (c) metaphorically, in excess of, in violation of, e.g. *ὑπὲρ Μοῖραν, ὑπὲρ ὅρκια*.¹ (b) and (c) are found in Hdt. and Attic, and there are a few examples with the sense 'beyond' (without motion), (1) of place, Hdt. II 10 τῶν γὰρ ὁρέων τῶν εἰρημένων τῶν ὑπὲρ Μέμφιν πόλιν² κειμένων, Plato *Crit.* 108E τοῖς ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλείας στήλας ἔξω κατοικοῦσι, (2) of time, Thuc. I 41 τὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον, Plato, *Tim.* 23C ἦν ὑπὲρ τὴν μεγίστην φθορὰν ὕδασιν ἢ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὐσα πόλις. But the acc. is not used in prose³ to express motion or extent over a space, or position over, and even in Homer the gen. is frequent in these senses.⁴ The acc. with *ὑπέρ* is in general rare in the Attic Orators compared with the gen. (the proportion according to Lutz is 1:60.8) and is almost always used in the metaphorical sense of 'beyond' or 'more than' (with numbers). There is also an example in Xen. of position beyond, *Anab.* I 1. 9 οἰκεῖν ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάσποντον.

In Aristotle the metaphorical sense of beyond is fairly common; in the local sense of position beyond there are a number of examples in the *De Mundo* and *De Mirab. Auscult.*, but Bonitz gives none from genuine works. There are also several examples of the acc. to denote position or extension above: *De Cael.* 279a 20 οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμίας μεταβολῇ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φορὰν, *ibid.* 308a 26 ἐν εἶναι μόνον τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἡμισφαίριον, *ibid.* 285b 15 τῶν δὲ πόλων ὁ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς φαινόμενος τὸ κάτω μέρος ἐστίν, *ibid.* 289a 33 πλησιάζοντός τε αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἡλίου) καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ὄντος γίγνεται ἡ θερμότης [ἡμῶν E M], *H.A.* 493a 20 τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ἡτρον, τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ὑποχόνδριον, *ibid.* 495a 9 ὑπὲρ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον [τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου A^cC²], *Meteor.* 340b 24 τὸ μὲν περὶ τὴν γῆν οἶον ὕγρον καὶ θερμὸν εἶναι . . . τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτο θερμὸν ἦδη καὶ ξηρόν, *ibid.* 375b 28 τὸ ὑπὲρ γῆν γιγνόμενον. Since in all other passages where the phrase occurs the best MSS have *ὑπὲρ γῆς*, in some cases with a variant *ὑπὲρ γῆν* (e.g. *Meteor.* 378a 13 τοῖς τόποις τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς γῆς [γῆν F] and *P.A.* 653a 6), Eucken here conjectures *ὑπὲρ γῆς*. In some of the other passages quoted a *v.l.* giving the gen. was mentioned, and the gen. with *ὑπὲρ* in local sense is certainly more common in A. than the acc. (Bonitz refers to fifteen passages *et alia*); but there still remain at any rate five passages (not including *Meteor.* 375b 28) where there is no MS variation. It is not likely that the use of the acc. is throughout due to corruption of the text, but rather that at the time when these works were written less care was being taken

¹ Cf. Monro, *H.G.* § 218; Kühner-Gerth II 1, p. 488.

² Stein and Bekker emend to Μέμφιος πόλεως, the gen. being the normal usage, and perhaps with special reference to II 12 ὅρος τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὲρ Μέμφιος ἔχον.

³ Pind., *Pyth.* II. 80 has ἀβᾶπτιστός εἰμι φελλός, ὡς ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ἄλμας.

⁴ Cf. with Od. VII 135 (above) τὸν δ' ὑπὲρ οὐδοῦ βάπτα Od. XVII 575; no real distinction can have been felt.

to observe distinctions in the use of different cases with *ὑπέρ*, as with *ὑπό*. Cf. Polybius, where the acc. is normal but there are six examples of the gen.¹

In the N.T. *ὑπέρ c. acc.* is rare, and only used in the metaphorical sense.² It is found occasionally in Ptolemaic papyri in the local sense of 'above,' e.g. *Hib. Pap.* I 38v τῶν συρίων ὑπὲρ τὴν σκηνῇ[ν] οὐσῶν 'The Syrian cloths being above the cabin' (252-1 B.C.). Further examples are given in Rossberg (p. 41). So also in some dialect inscriptions as early as c. 300 B.C. e.g. from Ialysos θέμειν δὲ τὰς στάλας μίαν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσόδου . . . μίαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἰστιάτοριον.³ In Polybius, as stated above, *ὑπέρ c. acc.* for 'above' in the local sense is normal. In Diodorus there seems to be a reaction in favour of the gen., which is more common than the acc.⁴ So also in Philostratus (Schmid, *Atticismus* IV pp. 466-7). The use of the gen. with *ὑπέρ* probably became a mark of atticizing. In an inscription of the Christian era⁵ the gen. is used with *ὑπέρ* in the sense 'more than,' Γαϊανῇ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλιτος γλυκντάτῃ (cf. *Psalms* XIX 11 γλυκντέρα ὑπὲρ μέλι). This may be due to some uncertainty about the construction (the Greek of the inscription is irregular in some other respects), or to a desire to be literary and avoid the acc. with *ὑπέρ* as being a characteristically vulgar use.

Confusion of *ὑπέρ* and *περί*.—The first clear instance⁶ of *ὑπέρ c. gen.* in the sense 'concerning,' i.e. *περί c. gen.*, appears to be Hdt. IV 8; otherwise it is not found till the Fourth Century. For Plato Ast gives three examples, but in *Menex.* 238a *ὑπέρ* may well be taken to mean 'on behalf of'; to the remaining two should be added *Rep.* 367a 6. In the later Orators *ὑπέρ* in this sense occurs fairly frequently⁷; e.g. for Dem. Lutz (p. 95) refers to about forty-five instances where *ὑπέρ* is used in practically the same sense as *περί*; and in seventeen of these the 'Nebenbegriffe des Interesses' is either not present or definitely excluded by the context (as in XIX 129 ὑπὲρ δ' ὧν . . .).⁸

In genuine works of Aristotle examples are rare in comparison with the bulk of A.'s writings; there are five instances in the *Topics*, five in the *Nic. Ethics* and six in the *Categories*; these last six, however, all occur close together at a place (11b 8 ff.) where begins what on other grounds is considered to be a later addition, the Post-predicaments. The prevailing use of *ὑπέρ c. gen.* for the sense 'concerning' in the *Magna Moralia* is part of the linguistic evidence for the later date of that work. Where there are only a few instances of what is mainly a later usage, there is no doubt some possibility of corruption. On the other hand we might expect there to be some period when a usage such as *ὑπέρ c. gen.* = 'concerning' was beginning to appear; and as its occurrence before Aristotle is clearly established, and in the examples referred to there is no MS variation, there seems to be no sufficient reason for doubting the occasional appearance of this usage in genuine works of A.

In the post-classical period this use of *ὑπέρ* becomes more general. In the N.T. it is not very common and is confined to the writings of Paul (Blass-Debrunner, § 231); it is more common in the LXX (Johannessohn, p. 218), in papyri⁹ and in

¹ Krebs, p. 40.

² Blass-Debrunner § 230.

³ Collitz-Bechtel, 4110.

⁴ Krebs, pp. 40, 42.

⁵ J.H.S. XXII, p. 369, No. 143A.

⁶ Homer, *Il.* VI 524 ὑπὲρ σθένος ἀλόχε' ἀκούω is doubtful, since some idea of interest may be involved; so Monro (*H.G.* 189) 'on your account.'

⁷ Kühner-Gerth (I § 435e), and still more L. and S., seem to underestimate the extent of this use of *ὑπέρ* in the Orators. On the other hand of the passages cited by L. and S., in Hdt. II 123 Hude (with better MSS) reads ὑπό, and in

Soph. *O.T.* 1444 the meaning is 'on behalf of.' There is also a certain amount of MS variation between *ὑπέρ* and *περί*; cf. Wyse on Isaeus III 55. 8.

⁸ This use of *ὑπέρ* is also fairly common in some of the Atticists (Schmid, III 290, IV 466, 630); it was not perhaps regarded as un-Attic, though it does not occur in Attic inscriptions till after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans, 222).

⁹ E.g. in business letters with the sense 'with reference to'; see Robertson, *The use of ὑπέρ in business documents in the Papyri*. Expositor Ser. VIII 19, 1920, 321-7.

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pp. 221-2)
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Dem. XV
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301a 18 ο
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Physics 219
καὶ ἡ φορὰ δ
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(quoted by
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Syntaktische I

Hellenistic writers, e.g. Polybius, in whom avoidance of hiatus often determines the choice between *ὑπέρ* and *περί* to denote 'concerning' (Krebs, pp. 24, 26). There is also frequent MS variation between *ὑπέρ* and *περί* (B.-D. §§ 229, 231; Johann., pp. 221-2). The increasing frequency of interchange between *ὑπέρ* and *περί*¹ is not surprising, owing to their affinity in meaning, and probably also to their partial homophony. In this connection it is interesting to notice that a composite form *ὑπερί* is found in Christian inscriptions of Asia Minor and elsewhere, e.g. *ὑπερί εὐχῆς* (Ineh, vi A.D.).²

διά. The distinction in meaning between the gen. and acc. with *διά* is compared in Kühner-Gerth (I, p. 485 Anmerk.) with that between *per* and *propter*; '*διά* c. gen. bezeichnet die Wirksamkeit einer Sache oder Person unmittelbarer und starker, *διά* c. acc. mittelbarer und entfernter'. In some cases the general sense of a passage would not be affected whether gen. or acc. were used, but it seems true to say that there is a different shade of meaning, a difference in point of view.³ For example in Dem. XVIII 33 *μισθοῦται τὸν κατὰπτυστον τουτονί . . . τοιαῦτα πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀπαγγέλλαι δι' ὧν ἅπαντ' ἀπόλετο* and 35 *τίνας οὖν ἦσαν οἱ παρὰ τούτου λόγοι τότε ῥηθέντες, καὶ δι' οὓς ἅπαντ' ἀπόλετο*; *δι'* ὧν looks at the matter from the point of view of purpose, *δι' οὓς* of result. There is however in the *Timaeus* 57c an example of *διά* c. gen. used in the causal sense, *ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα διὰ τοιούτων αἰτιῶν γέγονε*.⁴

Eucken (p. 39) refers to Aristotle's use of *διά* c. acc. where in Attic the gen. would be expected, and quotes four examples from *Meteor.*, *De Caelo*, *Physics* and *Politics*. But in *Meteor.* 366b 5 *τὸ γὰρ θέρος καὶ ὁ χειμὼν, τὸ μὲν διὰ τὸν πάγον τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἄλιαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀκινήσιαν* the force of the prep. may well be causal. Again in *De Caelo* 301a 18 *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδύνατο συστήσασθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ κεχωρισμένων μὲν κατασκευάων σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλοτήτα* 'by the power of Love' (Oxford Trans.), A. is referring to the cosmogony of Empedocles, and the sense may be 'representing the combination of separate bodies as the result of the action of Love.' Similarly in *Physics* 219b 29 *καὶ γνώριμον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ ἡ φορὰ διὰ τὸ φερόμενον*, the acc. is apparently used to denote that the existence of τὸ κινούμενον is the efficient cause of the knowability of ἡ κίνησις, whereas in 219b 18 (quoted by Eucken as parallel) *τὸ φερόμενον φ' τὴν κίνησιν γνωρίζομεν, τὸ φερόμενον* is regarded as the instrument by means of which we know. Compare also (with Bonitz) *De An.* 404a 23 *εἰκόσκει πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ταύτην δὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς*, where the context certainly suggests an instrumental force for *διά* c. acc., though it is possible to suppose that the soul is regarded first as the efficient cause, then as the instrument. In *Pol.* 1263b 36 *ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἶρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν*, followed by *καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπουδαίαν . . .*, acc. and gen. seem to be used without distinction, and in both instances the force of the prep. should probably be taken as instrumental. Further examples are *P.A.* 696a 22

¹ In the classical period *περί* c. gen. is of course used in certain contexts in much the same sense as *ὑπέρ*, e.g. in *μάχεσθαι περί*; in later Greek *περί* is more widely used in this sense (often with a v.l. *ὑπέρ*), e.g. in the N.T. *Matt.* xxvi. 28 *τὸ αἷμά μου . . . τὸ περί πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον* [D *ὑπέρ*]; cf B.-D. § 229 n. 1.

² See H. Grégoire, *Recueil des inscriptions grecques chrétiennes d'Asie Mineure*, Fasc. 1, p. 4, No. 2; cf. Nos. 15, 40, and E. Nachmanson, *Syntaktische Inschriftenstudien*, *Erano* IX, p. 74.

The existence of this form does not seem to be noticed in any grammar or lexicon. Both *ὑπέρ* *εὐχῆς* and *περί* *εὐχῆς* are common at the beginning of *ex voto* inscriptions.

³ At any rate in prose; in Aeschylus, *Ag.* 448, 1453 *διὰ* c. gen. may have a causal sense.

⁴ The cause seems to be thought of as an instrument; cf. Aristotle, *De Part. An.* 641b 16 *τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς αἰτίας . . . καὶ εἶναι διὰ τῆς αἰτίας*.

δοσα μὴ κωλύεται διὰ τὸ πλάτος, and *Ath. Pol.* c. 34 ἡ ἐξαπατηθέντος τοῦ δήμου διὰ τοὺς παροργισάντας, where the force of διὰ *c. acc.* seems to be at any rate not primarily causal, but in the former passage denotes the instrument, in the latter the agent, the acc. being used in both where the gen. might have been expected.¹ A further instance of confusion is *Pol.* 1305a 37 αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους instead of the usual gen., as in 1314a 29 εἰς τρόπον δι' οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία. The causal sense is appropriate to the context, but seems precluded by the meaning of τρόπος. The choice of expression is probably influenced by the preceding words τῶν μὲν δημοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται . . . διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, and is due to a confusion between 'for two reasons' and 'in two ways'.

It is perhaps true that in none of these passages (except the last) the ordinary causal sense of διὰ *c. acc.* is impossible; but in some of them this sense appears a little forced, and in others the meaning approximates closely to the instrumental, so that on the whole it may be concluded that the distinction between gen. and acc. is wearing thin and is occasionally disregarded.

Conversely διὰ *c. gen.* is found where the sense 'owing to', 'by reason of' is to be expected.² Examples are *Phys.* 208b 29 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος παρὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ, διὰ τούτων ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, and 209b 29 διὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐ μόνον τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ ἐστιν ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. In each case διὰ τούτων sums up a series of arguments, and should perhaps in both be regarded as equivalent to *has ob causas*. In the former passage the sense 'by means of' is possible; 'one might form these conceptions by means of, by passing through these arguments', but this explanation hardly fits the second, and certainly not *Pol.* 1316b 14 πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ὧν γίνονται αἱ μεταβολαὶ or 1258a 9 δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πορίζειν πειρῶνται, since we cannot pass through a cause, because *ex hypothesi* we start from it.³ Further examples are *Top.* 100a 25 τεθέντων τινῶν ἑτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων, and *Soph. Elench.* 164b 27 ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἑτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων [διὰ τῶν κειμένων om. A C]; cf. *Rhet.* 1356b 15 τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἑτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν and similarly *An. Prior.* 24b 18. So also *Poet.* 1449b 37 οὗς ἀνάγκη ποιοῦς τινὰ εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν δianoian, διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι φάμεν ποιάς τινὰς, 'owing to these qualities'; the sentence continues πέφυκεν αἰτία δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, δianoian καὶ ἦθος. Again if we compare *Poet.* 1447a 20 πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας) . . . with 1451a 23 ὁ δ' Ὀμηρος . . . καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκοιεν καλῶς ἰδεῖν διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν, it is possible, though rather forced, to suppose that A. is making a distinction between doing something by means of τέχνη and knowing something as a result of τέχνη; at any rate a further comparison with *Rhet.* 1354a 7 οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείαν leaves the impression that A. does not distinguish in meaning between διὰ συνηθείας and διὰ συνηθείαν.

It is clear then that the distinction between the force of gen. and acc. with διὰ is becoming blurred in Aristotle, a tendency carried further in later writers, e.g. Polybius,⁴ and in keeping with the general process by which the fine distinctions of the classical period eventually become lost in the uniformity of modern Greek.

¹ In the classical period διὰ *c. gen.* was sometimes used in practically the same sense as an instrumental dative; this use becomes more common in Aristotle (Eucken p. 18), and still more common in the post-classical period; cf. Humbert, *La Disparition du Datif en Grec*, pp. 119-124.

² Cf. [Xen.] *Cynag.* 13. 13 βελτίους γίνονται καὶ σοφώτεροι, δι' οὗ διδάσκωμεν 'they become better and wiser, and we will give the reason'. Authorship and date are, however, disputed (Christ-

Schmidt, I, p. 516.)

³ With this causal use of διὰ *c. gen.* cf. the use of *per* in such expressions as *per timorem*, with pronouns, e.g. *per hoc ne . . . caperentur* (Livy) and, in later Latin, more freely with nouns, e.g. *Amm.* 14. 7. 5 *per multas causas*; see Stolz-Schmalz, *Lat.-Grammatik*⁵, p. 521, and cf. Glotta IV, pp. 278-9.

⁴ Krebs, p. 68. The Atticists are careful to observe the distinction (Schmid, *Atticismus* IV 627).

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¹ Cf. *Pr*
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A further point worth noting is that *διά c. gen.* is twice used in the *Poetics*, and perhaps in the *Politics*, in a sense otherwise confined to later Greek, though it is a natural development of the ordinary instrumental use. L. and S. (s.v. *διά* A III 2) refer to the use of *διά c. gen.* to denote the material out of which a thing is made, e.g. Diod. 17. 115 *κατεσκευάσεν εἰδωλα δι' ἐλέφαντος καὶ χρυσοῦ*, and refer to passages in Plutarch and Dion. Hal.; see also Kühner-Gerth I 434(d).¹

The passages in Aristotle are *Poetics* 1451b 13 *συνστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων . . .* 'having constructed the plot out of probable incidents . . .'; *ibid.* 1462a 16 *καὶ ἐτι οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν . . .*, *δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται* 'music, which is an ingredient in the pleasure of the drama'; *Pol.* 1341b 23 *τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν* 'consists of melody and rhythm'; Victorius, however, explains '*musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros*'; cf. (with Newman) 1324a 15 *ὁ βίος ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως* 'the life spent in being a citizen.'

The tendency for the genitive and dative with prepositions to decrease as compared with the accusative is illustrated by the virtual disappearance of the gen. with *πρός* in certain authors. Compare the following figures² of cases used with *πρός*:

		Attic Orators.	Plato.	New Testament.	Polybius.
Gen.	132	117	I	3
Dat.	296	229	6	210
Acc.	2286	1946	v. numerous	3253

So also in Aristotle for the gen. Bonitz gives only three examples from genuine works (*Pol.* 1262a 11, *Probl.* 870a 7, 962b 25) and one from the *De Mundo*. The dat. is still common (as in Polybius), but here too the encroachment of the acc. is illustrated by a few examples of *πρός c. acc.* to denote position near, a use which does not occur in Attic except after verbs implying motion, e.g. *καθίσθαι πρὸς*.³ Examples in Aristotle are *Pol.* 1330a 15 *τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς χώρας τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατίας ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν* (cf. Plato, *Laws* 745c *τὸ πρὸς τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἐσχατοῖς*). *H.A.* 504b 31 *ἔχουσι πτερύγια . . . ὄντα πρὸς τὰ βράχια*. So also in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1440b 39 *οἱ πρὸς αὐτόν* is equivalent to *τοὺς πλησίον* in 1441a 1.

Examples in later Greek are numerous. So in the N.T., e.g. *Luke* IX 41 *ἔως πότε ἔσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*; *John* I 1 *ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*. For examples of *παρεῖναι πρὸς c. acc.* in Polybius see Krebs, pp. 118-9. In later Greek *εἶναι πρὸς τι* is used for 'to be engaged in something', e.g. Plutarch *Nic. c.* 5 *εἶναι πρὸς δημοσίαις χρεῖαις*, but in Aristotle the dat. is still the only case so used.

In Plato *Phaedo* 69a *ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς . . . φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι* *πρὸς c. acc.* is used in the sense 'in exchange for', like *ἀντί c. gen.* This use, an extension of the meaning 'with reference to' 'compared with', does not occur elsewhere before Aristotle. For Aristotle (not cited by L. and S. in this connection) Bonitz quotes *Pol.* 1257a 27 *οἶνον πρὸς σίτον δίδοντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες* and *P.A.* 682b 6 *ὅσα δ' ἐλάττονας ἔχει πόδας πτηνὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑλλειψιν τὴν τῶν ποδῶν*. Add *Pol.* 1257a 26 *αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὸ καταλλάττονται*, and *E.N.* 1117b 20 *τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται*. So also in Theophrastus *Hist. Plant.* ix vi 4 *πωλεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀκρατον δις πρὸς ἀργύριον*, and Menander *ap. Diogen. Paroem. Prov.* I 100 *τὸ πρὸς ἄλας ὠνηθέν' ὅθεν καὶ Μένανδρος 'Θράξ εὐγενὴς εἰ πρὸς ἄλας ἡγορασμένος'*.

Reference has been made to the frequent use of prepositional periphrases, esp.

¹ Cf. Propertius IV 3. 20 *et struxit querulas rauce per ossa tubas*. This use is particularly common in technical works on medicine and cookery, to denote the ingredients of prescriptions etc.; numerous examples are given in the

Thesaurus of Stephanus s.v. *διά*.

² From Lutz, Lina, Regard and Krebs.

³ So also in such phrases in the Orators as *δικη πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον* 'motion to' is apparently implied.

with *κατά* and *περί*, as characteristic of the Koine.¹ Various forms of such periphrases are also found from Herodotus onwards. Phrases of the type *τὰ περί (κατά) τι* are fairly common in Hdt., occasionally almost equivalent to the simple noun, e.g. I 186 *τὰ περί τὴν γέφυραν ἐκεκόσμητο*, and are often used in Thuc. in the formula for summing up; there are also a few instances in the Historians and Orators where the prepositional phrase replaces a genitive, e.g. Hdt. I 67 *κατὰ τὸν κατὰ Κροῖσον χρόνον*, Thuc. VI 16 *ἐν τῷ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ*, Dem. II 27 *τὰ καθ' ὑμᾶς ἐλλείμματα*, XIX 76 *τοῦ περὶ Φωκίας ὀλέθρου* (in four other passages in the same speech the gen. alone is used, with and without the article, e.g. 60 *τοῦ τῶν Φ. ὀλέθρου*). In Plato these periphrases, equivalent to a genitive or an adjective, become more frequent, esp. with *περί*.² It is necessary here to distinguish between the subjective and objective genitive, since where the latter is replaced by e.g. *περί c. acc.* the use of the prep. is more natural, and is often closely akin to its use with certain verbs and adjectives, e.g. *σπουδάζειν περί*; so *Ep.* VII 325A *ἡ περί τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ ἐπιθυμία*, and *Phaedo* 82C *τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν* may be explained as 'desires (of the soul) concerning the body' (but cf. 66C *τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι*). In an early dialogue, *Phaedrus* 279A, there is an example of *περί c. acc.* for a purely subjective genitive, *κατὰ τοὺς περί Λυσίαν λόγους* 'the arguments of Lysias', and in *Polit.* 310D *ὡς δ' αὐτως τὸ περί τὴν ἀνδρείαν γένος δρᾶ* the prepositional phrase is equivalent to *ἀνδρείον γένος*. In some of the latest works, e.g. *Laws*³ and *Ep.* VII, instances of periphrasis are more common and include some of the more extreme form, e.g. *Laws* 668B 10, 775B 4.

In many instances some particular reason may be given for the use of a periphrasis,⁴ but it appears that in the Fourth Century such phrases were coming to be used, generally with some stylistic justification, as variants for a simple case. In the more severe style of the Orators the use of this idiom is restricted, but the slight added fullness of expression is in keeping with the amplifying tendency of Plato's style.

A tendency to use these periphrastic expressions, and in general an increase in the use of prepositions instead of simple cases, is noticeable in Aristotle. Phrases of the form *τὰ περί (κατά) τι* are more widely used in A. than in previous writers, (Eucken, p. 67), and in some instances hardly add anything to the meaning of the simple noun, e.g., *Rhet.* 1361A 10 *δοῖς τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα*, *Pol.* 1270B 36 *ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ περί τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς*. The use of *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα* needs no illustration. There are also many passages where *περί* or *κατά c. acc.* are equivalent to a simple genitive or an adjective. So *Pol.* 1282B 19 *τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις* 'philosophical distinctions', and *Top.* 101A 27, 34 *τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας*, where the phrase represents an adjective. For the objective gen. compare the common phrase *μεταβολὴ πολιτείας* with *Pol.* 1302A 17 *αἱ μ. περί τὰς πολιτείας*, H.A. 537B 19 *γενέσθαι μ.*

¹ See G. Rudberg, *Ad usum circumscribentem praef. Graecarum annotationes*, *Eranos* XIX, pp. 173 ff., where the use of *περί* and *κατά* in periphrasis in post-classical Greek is very fully illustrated and a number of examples from Plato are given, but no distinction is made between easier and more extreme forms of periphrasis. For similar uses of *ἀπὸ*, *ἐκ* and *παρά* see K.-G. I, p. 336, Anmerk. 8.

² *περί c. gen.* is rarely so used. England (on *Laws* 685C 2) makes the distinction that *περί c. gen.* represents an objective, *περί c. acc.* (generally) a possessive gen., but there are so many exceptions to this that the distinction does not seem worth making.

³ England (in the Index to his edition s.v. *περί*) refers to sixteen examples of *περί c. acc.* so

used and nine of *περί c. gen.*, but some of these, esp. those of the gen., may be otherwise explained.

⁴ E.g. in *τοὺς περί Λυσίαν λόγους*, possibly (as was suggested by Mr. J. D. Denniston) the *λόγοι* are personified as a sort of *cortège* of L.; the personification of *λόγος* is of course characteristic of Plato, e.g. *ἀλαζόνες λόγοι* *Phaedo* 92D, *Rep.* 560C, and for a strong instance see *Rep.* 503A. So possibly *Laws* 775B 4 *τῶν περί τὰς Μούσας νόμων*, where euphony may have some influence; in *Laws* 668B 10 *τὰ περί αὐτὴν (τὴν μουσικὴν) ποιήματα* 'its productions' there seems to be no special reason, except perhaps considerations of rhythm or avoidance of hiatus; cf. Wyse on *Isaeus* I 36. 1.

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¹ Here, thought of ψυχὴν (ἀγ. τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) *περί c. acc.* text and 1315B 22 δ. νίς) with 1 Κῦψελος ἐν γὰρ ἐν Λακ. ps.-Ar. M τὴν Ἰταλίαν usual gen.

² Here denote pl faculty; ἡδοναί. πε express a tween noun used (or without al 5 ἡ κατὰ τ ἐνέργειαν φ make a dis is in the ex

περὶ τὸ σῶμα, and *E.N.* 1149a 25 ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ with 1149b 19 τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἀκρασίας. Compare also *Pol.* 1264b 29 περὶ τε γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας with 1262b 35 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, where the fuller form of expression may have been thought appropriate to the conclusion of a section, though this would not apply to an exactly parallel variation of construction with κοινότης in *Pol.* 1274b 10 and 1266a 34. In several passages a prepositional phrase is found depending on 'goods' or 'pleasures' where a gen. (or an adj.) might equally well be used; so *Rhet.* 1391a 32 τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ, *E.N.* 1098b 13 τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀγαθῶν,¹ 1176a 2 αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἡδοναί.² For instances of periphrasis equivalent to a subjective gen. compare *Pol.* 1329a 25 δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων with α 18 τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτους, and *Rhet.* 1366a 12 τὰ ἥθη τῶν πολιτειῶν with 1391b 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἡθῶν; in the last ex. an awkward series of gen. endings is avoided, as also in *Pol.* 1326b 34 τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰπορίας (cf. 1293a 3 προσόδων εἰπορίας). The same variation of construction is found with ἀρχή, e.g. compare *An. Post.* 71b 23 αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκείαι τοῦ δεκνυμένου and 76a 17 τὰς ἐκάστου ἀρχὰς ἰδίας with *An. Prior.* 53a 3 τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, *Top.* 101a 37 τῶν περὶ ἐκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν, 101a 38 τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθείσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν,³ with words for 'kingship,' e.g. in *Pol.* 1313a 24 ἡ περὶ Μολοττοῦ βασιλεία is followed in the next line by ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, and in 1315b 30 ἡ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν (τυραννίς) is followed in the next sentence by ἡ περὶ Ἰέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα,⁴ and with κάλλος, *Pol.* 1338b 1 τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους (cf. *ibid.* 1254b 39 *et al.*).

Further examples could be quoted from Aristotle.⁵ These periphrastic expressions seem to be more widely used in works of more general interest and rather more literary flavour, esp. the *Politics* and to a rather less extent the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in many instances their use is presumably due to considerations of style. It is probable, however, that the idiom was coming to be used independently of such considerations. In several of the examples from Aristotle there seems to be no special justification for it on stylistic grounds, and it is worth noting that in the *Ath. Pol.*, which of all the extant works of A. shows most indications of attention to the existing principles of artistic composition, there are practically no instances of purely periphrastic expressions.⁶ Further the frequent occurrence of these expres-

¹ Here, however, the relationship may be thought of as local; cf. *Rhet.* 1360b 25 τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν (ἀγαθὰ) καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, *E.E.* 1218b 33 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγαθὰ. In the geographical sense *περὶ ε. acc.* is often used by A. in the same context and the same sense as *ἐν ε. dat.*; cf. *Pol.* 1315b 22 δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόρινθον ἡ τῶν Κ. (τυραννίς) with 1310b 26 φεῖδων μὲν περὶ Ἄργος . . . καὶ Κύπλου ἐν Κορίνθῳ, and again, *ibid.* 1341a 33 καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ . . . καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας; but in *ps.-Ar. Mirab. Auscult.* 838a 5 ἐν τῇ Κόμῃ τῇ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν the acc. with *περὶ* replaces the usual gen.

² Here also *ἐν* (or *ἐπὶ ε. gen.*) might be used to denote pleasure residing in the exercise of a faculty; cf. 1175b 30 αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς (ταῖς ἐνεργείαις) ἡδοναί. *περὶ* and *κατὰ* are in fact used in A. to express a very wide range of relationships between nouns, and in many cases either could be used (or replaced by a gen. or another prep.) without alteration of meaning; cf. *E.N.* 1175b 5 ἡ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθελει, where it would be possible to make a distinction in translation, but the variety is in the expression, not the thought.

³ Cf. *Phys.* 189b 32 τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἰδία and *De An.* 421b 19 τὸ . . . μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, instead of the usual gen. with *ἴδιος*, and on this pleonastic use of *ἐπὶ* see Vahlen, *Philologische Schriften*, I 334-6.

⁴ Cf. *Xen. Hell.* V 4. 2 τὴν περὶ Φίλιππον τυραννίδα, possibly influenced by τὰ περὶ Ἀρχίαν 'the conduct of A.', in the previous line.

⁵ I have not attempted in all cases to distinguish between easier and more extreme forms of periphrasis; they all in varying degrees illustrate the same tendency. The total number of examples would not be great in comparison with the bulk of A.'s works, but Rudberg (*op. cit.*, p. 177) is mistaken in stating that this usage is rare in A.; he quotes only four exx. from genuine works of a prepositional phrase equivalent to a gen., and adds that there are several passages where such phrases are equivalent to an adjective. (Similarly from the Orators R. cites only *Dem.* II 27, apparently regarding it as a unique example).

⁶ Except XVIII 1 τοὺς περὶ Ἀνακρέοντα . . . (see below on the phrase οἱ περὶ τινα). XXVIII 1 βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν 'things went well

sions in Ptolemaic papyri¹ shows that in that period (and probably earlier) the usage was a popular one. Some examples are also found in the Atticists (Schmid, I 399, III 284), but are apparently not common.

In addition to these periphrastic expressions the freer use of prepositions in post-classical Greek is illustrated by the use of *περί c. acc.* instead of the dat. with *συμβαίνειν* and *γίγνεσθαι*, e.g. Polyb. I 22, 1 τὸ γεγονὸς σύμπτωμα *περὶ τὸν Γναίον*.² So also in Aristotle, in some of the examples of *συμβαίνειν* *περί* referred to by Bonitz the sense 'in connection with' shades off into the sense 'to'; e.g. *Pol.* 1281a 36 τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθῃ *περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν*, *Gen. An.* 729b 23 μέγιστον δὲ σημεῖον τὸ συμβαίνειν *περὶ τὰς ὀρνίθας*, and (in the technical sense) *De An.* 402a 8 θεωρῆσαι καὶ γινῶναι τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἰθ' ὅσα συμβέβηκε *περὶ αὐτήν*, cf. 402b 18 πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις. In *Pol.* 1327b 7 τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην *περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον* οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως, Newman takes the sense to be 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connection with the mass of trireme-oarsmen'; *περί* thus almost comes to mean 'on account of'. The normal meaning, however, of *πολυανθρωπία* is 'large population', and in 1326a 18 ff. *πολύανθρωπος* is used to denote large population as distinguished from a large citizen body. Perhaps the phrase *γιγνομένην . . . ὄχλον* is equivalent to a genitive, 'the large numbers of the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος need not affect the cities proper (i.e. the citizen bodies)'; cf. *De Caelo* 284a 33 ἡ *περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γιγνομένη τοῦ σώματος ἀνεσις* 'the bodily relaxation of sleep', and Plato, *Ep.* VII 327a τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ *περὶ Διονύσιον γιγνομένου*.

A special instance of periphrasis is the post-classical use of the phrase *οἱ περὶ τινα*. The use of *οἱ περὶ τινα* to denote a person and his associates is well known, e.g. Thuc. VIII 63 *οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον πρέσβεις*. L. and S. add 'later *οἱ περὶ τινα* periphrastically for the person himself',³ and quote examples from Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* c. 20 (though in fact the context here implies more than one person), *Tim.* c. 13 and an inscription from Tarsus (II/III A.D.). Kühner-Gerth (I § 403d) has 'Erst bei den griechischen Grammatikern bedeutet *οἱ περὶ τινα* eine Person allein'. As might be expected from his general tendency to employ periphrastic expressions, there are a number of examples of this usage in Polybius,⁴ a good instance being XV 35, 6 where Scipio, asked who were the greatest statesmen of past times, replied τοὺς *περὶ Ἀγαθοκλείας καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας*.⁵

There are, however, several passages in Aristotle where *οἱ περὶ τινα* appears to mean no more than the person himself.⁶ These are *Pol.* 1305b 24 ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς κἂν πᾶν ὀλίγοι ᾧσιν οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν *οἱ περὶ Χαρίκλεια ἰσχυροὶ* τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις *οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον* τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Here the reference appears to be to Charicles and Phrynichus only. *Ath. Pol.* XVIII 1 τοὺς *περὶ Ἀνακρέοντα καὶ Σιμωνίδην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς* οὗτος ἦν ὁ μεταπεμπόμενος 'Anacreon and Simonides and the other poets'. More doubtful passages are *Pol.* 1312b 9 where, after describing one of the two ways by which a despotism may be overthrown, namely attack from without, A. continues ἕνα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὅταν *οἱ μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν*, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν *περὶ Γέλωνα* καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν *περὶ Διονύσιον*. In the

enough with the state' is not purely periphrastic; so in the other three examples, which are instances of the common formula for summing up, e.g. III 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν [*περὶ*] τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον.

¹ Kuhring, pp. 12-15; Rossberg, pp. 11 ff., 34 ff.

² Further examples are given in Krebs, p. 104.

³ Robertson (*Historical Grammar of N.T.*, p. 620) compares the vernacular 'you all' for a single person, in the Southern States of America.

⁴ See Schweighäuser's Index s.v. *περί*, and Krebs, pp. 5 and 113.

⁵ *οἱ περὶ τινα* is also used to denote two friends or lovers, e.g. *οἱ π. Ἀταλάντην*, 'A. and Melanio'. Other examples are given in Kühner, *loc. cit.*

⁶ The more familiar use is of course also found in Arist., and in *Pol.* 1314b 23 μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι ὑβρίζοντα . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴδ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν *περὶ αὐτόν*, the man himself is clearly contrasted with *οἱ περὶ αὐτόν*.

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¹ See I
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next sentence the former despotism is referred to as ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος, and in the next we have Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας . . . ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη. τῶν περὶ Γ. might refer to G. and his successors (similarly τῶν περὶ Δ. to D. and his predecessors), or to G.'s faction, Aristotle speaking of the στάσις now as being between factions, now between individuals. It is possible, however, in view of the subsequent use of proper names alone, that by τῶν περὶ Γ. Arist. meant no more than Gelo himself. At any rate the hardening process into the stereotyped periphrasis of Polybius has clearly begun. *Met. 342b 35* παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖσι καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἱπποκράτην τὸν Χίων καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ Αἰσχύλον ἀπεφώνοντο, πλὴν γε τὴν κόμην οὐκ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φασιν ἔχειν ἀλλὰ πλανώμενον διὰ τὸν τόπον ἐνίοτε λαμβάνειν ἀνακλωμένης τῆς ἡμετέρας ὀψews . . . Here again the reference is perhaps to Hippocrates and Aeschylus alone; cf. *ibid.* 343a 27 εἰ διὰ τὴν ἀνάκλασιν τὴν κόμην ἴσχυουσιν, καθάπερ φησὶν Αἰσχύλος καὶ Ἱπποκράτης. *De Caelo* 305a 34 πότερον ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει καὶ Δημόκριτος ἢ ὡς οἱ εἰς τὰ ἐπίπεδα διαλύοντες . . . οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον λανθάνουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτούς . . . *De Gen. et Corr.* 314a 24 ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι . . . οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἀπλᾶ . . . In these two passages the meaning is generally taken to be e.g. 'Empedocles and his disciples', but in the former the parallel use of proper names alone, and in the latter the following references ὁ μὲν and οἱ δὲ seem to indicate no very clear distinction in thought between οἱ περὶ τινα and the person himself.

In general it may be said of these passages in Aristotle that they are either actual instances of what is generally regarded as a later usage, or at any rate mark a transition stage between such instances as Thuc. VIII 63 (quoted above), where definite persons are referred to, and later instances where the reference is unquestionably to a single person only.

There is a similar passage in Xenophon, *Mem.* III v. 10 ἄρα λέγετε τὴν τῶν θεῶν κρίσιν, ἣν οἱ περὶ Κέκροπα δι' ἀρετὴν ἐκρίναν; Marchant translates 'the judgment which Cecrops delivered in his court'; perhaps the phrase οἱ περὶ Κ. is used with reference to the council of elders or princes normally consulted by a βασιλεὺς in judicial matters, as e.g. in *Il.* XVIII 503 ff.; but in comparison with I i. 18 τοῖς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον, where particular colleagues are referred to, this passage clearly comes very near to the later use of οἱ περὶ τινα. Again in the N.T. *John* XI 19 the better authenticated reading is καὶ πολλοὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐληλύθεισαν πρὸς τὴν Μάρθαν καὶ Μαρίαν, but there is a v.l. πρὸς τὰς περὶ Μ. καὶ Μ. which is adopted by some editors and perhaps receives some support from the above passages in Aristotle.

A third general tendency is towards an increase in the use of improper prepositions (i.e. adverbs and nouns used as prepositions) and of combinations of prepositions with adverbs.¹ This tendency is illustrated by Aristotle's use of ἐπάνω, ὑπεράνω, ὑποκάτω, ἔως, μέχρι.

ἐπάνω appears first in a few passages in Hdt., e.g. as adverb III 54, and as prep. I 179; it is also found in tmesis in I 93 ἐπὶ τοῦ σήματος ἄνω. In later classical writers the only examples are Aristoph. *Lys.* 773, *Birds* 1126; pseudo-Dem. *Epitaphios* § 7 (of time) πατέρες καὶ τοῦτων ἐπάνω; Plato, five times, four as adverb and once as prep. ἐπάνωθεν occurs in Thuc. II 99 as adverb, and in Plato, *Tim.* 45a as prep. ἐπάνωθε [ἐπάνω L] is used by Eur. in *Alc.* 463 (lyric). ἐπάνω and kindred forms are thus rare in the classical period, extremely rare in Attic, and, from the silence of Meisterhans do not occur in Attic inscriptions.

¹ See Blass-Debrunner §§ 203, 215, 216; Radermacher, pp. 26, 55; Moulton, *Prolegomena to N.T.*, p. 159; Wackernagel, *op. cit.*, II, p. 158; Robertson, *Hist. Gr. of N.T.*, pp. 636-7; Jan-

naris §§ 1491-2; Hatzidakis, *Einleitung in der neugriech. Grammatik*, p. 213; Thumb, *Handb.*, § 158; Schmid, *Atticismus* IV, 625.

In Aristotle *ἐπάνω* is more frequent, especially as a technical term in logic, Bonitz gives in all twenty examples from genuine works, one as prep. of place. *H.A.* 526a 25 *ἐπάνω τῶν μεγάλων ὀδόντων*, three as prep. in logical terminology, *Top.* 122a 14, 34, 36, and sixteen as adverb, three of place, one of time, and the rest as a logical term. To these add *H.A.* 496a 30 *ἐπάνω δ' εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας*. There are thus in all fifteen examples as a logical term and six in other senses.

In post-classical period *ἐπάνω* becomes common both as adverb and preposition. It is frequent in the N.T. and LXX and sometimes in the local sense is almost equivalent to *ἐπὶ*, e.g. *Matt.* V, 14 πόλις ἐπάνω ὄρους κειμένη. It is also very frequent in Hellenistic writers, e.g. Polybius and Diodorus (Krebs, p. 16). For the tendency for *ἐπὶ* to be replaced in popular speech by *ἐπάνω* (mod. Gr. *ἀπάνω εἰς*) see Jannaris § 1491, Thumb, *Handbook* § 171, 5.

ὑπεράνω appears first in Aristotle, in one passage only, *H.A.* 513b 32 where *ὑπεράνω τούτων μορίων* is the reading of all the MSS. It occurs also in the pseud.-Arist. *De Plantis* 823a 40.

After Aristotle it becomes fairly common. In the N.T. there are three examples as prep. *c. gen.*, two local (*Heb.* IX, 5, *Eph.* IV, 10) and one of rank (*Eph.* I, 21); in the LXX there are examples of the metaphorical sense, e.g. *Deuterom.* XXVI, 19 εἶναι ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν ἔθνων. So also in later writers, e.g. (metaphorical) Polyb. 12. 24. 1 τῶν ὑπεράνω πλεονασμῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν 'nimia copia,' and (geographical) Diod. 2. 5. 4 κείται ὑπεράνω τῆς Εὐδαίμονος ('Αραβίας). For papyri and inscriptions cf. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch* II 645, and Dittenberger, *Syll.* II 591. For replacement of *ὑπέρ* by *ὑπεράνω* (mod. Gr. *παράνω ἀπό*) see Jannaris § 1491.

ὑποκάτω is first found in Plato, twice as a prep. *c. gen. viz.* *Phaedo.* 112D ὑποκάτω τῆς ἐκροῆς and *Symph.* 222E δεῦρο ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ κατακλίνου (222E εἰν οὖν ὑπὸ σοὶ κατακλινῇ seems to show that the meaning is equivalent to that of *ὑπὸ*), and once as an adverb, *Laws* 844c. *ὑποκάτωθεν* is used in the same sense in *Laws* 761b. *ὑποκάτω* is not found in the Attic Orators, except Hyperides,¹ *Euksem.* 40 ὑποκάτω παραγράφειν τι, or in Attic inscriptions.

For Aristotle Bonitz gives twenty examples from genuine works, adding *et al.* In local sense, as an adverb, *De Caelo* 288a 16 ἐν τοῖς ὑποκάτω (οὐρανοῖς) 'in the lower spheres', *Met.* 1074a 4, *H.A.* 526a 13, 497a 26, 612b 12, 615b 28; as a preposition, *Meteor.* 377a 4 ὑποκάτω τοῦ ὀρίζοντος, *H.A.* 509b 33, 514a 29, 526a 26 *et al.* In many instances *ὑπὸ c. acc.* is used on the same page in the same sense. In logical terminology as an adverb, opposed to *ἐπάνω*, *Top.* 143a 21, 25, 27 τὸ ὑποκάτω γένος, and *Top.* 122a 9, 14, 15, 142b 11, 14. For *ὑποκάτωθεν* Bonitz quotes *P.A.* 773a 22; add *H.A.* 493b 13, where the better MSS have *ὑποκάτωθεν* [*ὑποκάτω* P D].

After Aristotle *ὑποκάτω* occurs ten times in the N.T. and about ninety times in the LXX (Johannesson, p. 183, n. 1). Krebs (p. 17) gives several examples from Polybius and Diodorus. For *ὑποκάτω* (mod. Gr. *ἀποκάτω ἀπό*) in later Greek see Jannaris § 1491.

ἕως (εἰως, εἰος) appears in Homer as a conjunction, and this remains its only use throughout the classical period; the few exceptions are probably corrupt. These are *Hdt.* II 103 where *ἕως οὗ* is the reading of P, an inferior MS, and the rest have *ἐς οὗ*, which is common in *Hdt.*²; *Thuc.* III 108 where ἡ μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἕως ὅψε has good

¹ On the language of Hyperides see U. Pohle, *Die Sprache des Redners Hyperides in ihren Beziehungen zur Koine*, and D. Gromska, *De Sermonis Hyperidici*.

² See Stein on *Hdt.* I 67, and cf. *Indogerm. Forsch.* XXXI, p. 448 ff. *ἕως οὗ* is found in an inscription from Olbia, 230 B.C. τοῦ μέρους ἕως οὗ ὁ ἥρωις ὁ Σωσίας (*Ditt.* I 496), in the N.T. acc. to

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MS authority and is explained by Lobeck (on Phrynichus, p. 47) as *παρέτεινε ἕως ὅψε* καὶ ὅψε ἐτελείετα, but Classen, Stuart Jones and others are probably right in reading *ἔς ὅψε*, the reading of C (*ἕως ἐς FG*), owing to the doubtful use of *ἕως* and the frequency of the phrase *τελευτᾶν ἐς* in Thuc. and elsewhere. There is also an example of *ἕως* with an articular infinitive in a law quoted by Aeschines *ἕως τοῦ ἀποτίσαι* I 16, and in a *κατάλογος* in Dem. *De Cor.* 262 we have *ἕως τριῶν πλοίων*, but for lateness of *κατάλογοι* etc. in Dem. see the dissertation by R. Koch, *Observationes Grammaticae in Decreta etc. in Dem. Orationibus*. According to Meisterhans (p. 217) *ἕως* as a preposition is not found in Attic inscriptions.

In Aristotle *ἕως* as a preposition occurs eight times in genuine works and once in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*; e.g. *Top.* 109b 16 *ἕως τῶν ἀτόμων* (syn. *μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων* b 21) *P.A.* 668b 2 *ἕως τοῦ γενέσθαι*, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1424a 37 *ἕως ἡβης*, and *P.A.* 643a 22 *H.A.* 630b 27, *E.N.* 1173a 27, 1159a 4, *Met.* 1050b 5. Bonitz also quotes several examples from the *De Mundo*, *De Plantis* and other spurious works. The only example of *ἕως* with another preposition in genuine works appears to be *P.A.* 650a 17 *ἕως εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν*. Bonitz quotes two examples of *ἕως εἰς* from *De Plantis* and *De Mirab. Auscult.*

In post-classical Greek *ἕως* is common as a preposition *c. gen.* and with other prepositions and adverbs of time and place. In the N.T. and LXX *ἕως c. gen.* occurs frequently, e.g. *Luke X.* 15 *ἕως οὐρανοῦ*, *Matt.* XXVII. 45 *ἕως ὥρας ἐνάτης* and many other passages. So also Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* 3. 12. 7 *λοβοῦς ἐσχιζόμενους ἕως τοῦ ἰνός*, Polyb. 1. 18. 2 *οὐκ ἀντεξήσαν πλὴν ἕως ἀκροβολίσμου*, and many other passages; for inscriptions cf. Ditt. I 588 *ἕως θαλάσσης* (Miletus, 196 B.C.) and *ibid.* III 972 *ἕως τῆς ἐσχάτης δοκιμασίας* (Lebadea, 175-2 B.C.).¹

μέχρι is used throughout the classical period as a prep. *c. gen.*, and is also used with adverbs in Thuc., Dem. and Plato. But instances of *μέχρι* with a prep. are not found, except Plato, *Tim.* 25b *μέχρι πρὸς Αἴγυπτον* and *Crit.* 118a *μέχρι πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν*. In *Rep.* 586a καὶ *μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται*, *μέχρι* goes with *πάλιν* 'as far as back again.'

In Aristotle *μέχρι* with prepositions is fairly common. Bonitz gives for *μέχρι* *πρὸς De Caelo* 297a 9, *Meteor.* 355a 6, *Met.* 1028b 26, four exx. from *H.A.*, two from *P.A.*, and *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1440b 30; *μέχρι εἰς H.A.* 527a 33, 541b 10; *μέχρι ἐπὶ H.A.* 545b 3 *μέχρι ἐπὶ τριετής* [*ἐπὶ om. P D. τριετίας P D et fort. C*], 546a 7 *μέχρι ἐπὶ τριετής* [*τριετοῦς P D*]; *μέχρι ὑπὸ H.A.* 504a 1, *De An. Incess.* 710b 28; *μέχρι περὶ Meteor.* 367b 33. In all sixteen examples.

The combination of *μέχρι* (and *ἄχρι*) with prepositions does not seem to have become common after Aristotle. There are a few examples in Xenophon, and also in Polybius and Diodorus, in both of whom, however, *ἕως* is much more often so used (Krebs, pp. 19, 20). There are also a few examples of *μέχρι* with prepositions in the Atticists (Schmid, I 397).

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some MSS (Blass-Debrunner § 383), and the LXX (*Kings* II 23. 10). In later Greek it becomes more common, and survives into mod. Greek in the contracted forms *ὡσού* or *ὡσου* (*ὥσο*), and (for *ἕως ὅτου*) *ὡστου* (Jannaris § 1785,

Thumb § 275).

¹ Blass-Debrunner § 216; Johannessohn, pp. 304-5; Krebs, p. 19. I wish to thank Mr. J. D. Denniston and Prof. A. Cameron for advice and criticism on several points.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

Classical Philology. XXX. 4. October, 1935.

C. W. Mendel, *Catullan Echoes in the Odes of Horace*: notes about a hundred possible reminiscences: of these more than half come from lxiv, which H. must have known well: he has several borrowings from lxiii, a few from lxi and lxii and from xi, li and iv: most of the borrowings are in *Od.* 3. 27, 1. 14, 1. 4 and 1. 32. Aubrey Diller, *Scrutiny and Appeal in Athenian Citizenship*: argues against Gomme (*C.P.* 29. 123) that the decree of Demophilus in 346/5 was an unprecedented measure and that its terms were not perpetuated by law: a single decree both provided for an immediate general scrutiny and inaugurated the system of particular scrutinies, in which the verdict was contested by appeal. N. W. de Witt, *Parresiasitic Poems of Horace*: examines *Od.* ii and *Ep.* i in the light of Philodemus's discussion of *παρηγορία* as a paedeutical method: suggests that *Od.* iv. 12, a parrhesiasitic address to Virgil, was transferred from bk. ii by H. himself to take the place of the propempticon (i. 3), when it was moved from bk. iv in view of V.'s popularity. M. J. Finkelstein, *Ἐμπορος, Ναύκληρος and Κάπηλος, a (sic) Prolegomena to the Study of Athenian Trade*: detailed discussion of the connotation of the terms in 5th and 4th cent. F. Granger, *The Emendation of Vitruvius*: replies to Beeson's criticisms (*C.P.* 29. 4) of his Loeb edition of V. C. H. Beeson, *The Manuscript Problem of Vitruvius*: takes up his challenge, with special reference to the value of Gudianus. G. W. Elderkin, *Dolon's Disguise in the Rhesus* (208-15): the last word of the passage, *δόλος*, is a pun: the first, *λυκείον*, is equally pointed, suggesting D.'s protector, Apollo *Δύκαος* (cf. 224). A. D. Winspear on Plato, *Rep.* 450b 3: in *χρυσόχοισόντας* Thrasyarchus neatly throws back at Socrates his words in 336d. W. H. Alexander on Seneca *Apoc.* 7. 1: *ubi mures ferrum rodunt* is not a literary reminiscence but a twist of a popular phrase—'where the mice are so tough that they chew iron.' C. H. Oldfather on Strabo 16. 4. 10: revives Wesseling's *προσβεβηκότων* for *προ-* and adds exx. of the special use of the verb.

XXXI. 1. January, 1936.

A. Neumann, *Das Augusteisch-Hadrianische Armeereglement und Vegetius*: concludes that V. did not use the military handbook of Augustus, modified by later emperors, but used his *Constitutiones*. J. A. O. Larsen, *Perioeci in Crete*: epigraphic evidence points to the existence of subject-communities with limited citizen-rights and local self-government under the control of the large cities. E. T. Sage and Adeline J. Wegner, *Administrative Commissions and the Official Career, 218-167 B.C.*: from examination of the lists of members of commissions which can be constructed from Livy concludes that provision was made both for securing continuity and experience and for training young aspirants to a political career. L. Pearson, *Propaganda in the Archidamian War*: attempts to elicit from Thuc. evidence of the use of defamatory propaganda and of the development of counter-measures: his most striking instances are the Alcmaeonid curse (1. 126), a cry perhaps borrowed by Sparta from Athenian local politics, and the story of the massacre of the Corcyraean oligarchs (4. 47-8), to which he finds a reply in the 'Athenian' and 'Argive' accounts of Cleomenes' conduct at Argos (Hdt. 6. 78-80). R. J. Getty, *The Date of Composition of the Argonautica of Valerius Flaccus*: restates and amplifies the arguments drawn from i. 1-22 by W. Meerum Tervogt in 1898: the invocation is to the dead Vespasian, *delubra* is his temple begun by Titus: the poem was begun about 80 A.D. and V. F. died about 92/3. P. W. Harsh, *Possible Greek Background for the Word Rex as used by Plautus*:

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argues against Fraenkel that the parasite's *rex* is no proof of Plautine originality and may be a translation of Greek uses of βασιλεύς, σατράπης, τύραννος. G. W. Elderkin, *Xanthias and Herakles*: the ἄκανθα of *Frogs* 657 is in Xanthias' back, not in his foot (he is ξανθεύς): his reference to the Diomeian festival (649) gains in point if the rites of Herakles transferred there from Melite included mystic flagellation. Agnes Kirsopp Lake, *Lapis Capitolinus*: suggests that the stone ascribed to the cult of Terminus was a pre-Etruscan aniconic representation of Jupiter and that the hole in the roof above it was originally made to illuminate it when it was enclosed in the cella. J. P. Cooke on Ovid, *Met.* 15. 651-2 accepts 652 as genuine and supports Schrevelius' interpretation: *telluris umbra* is the shadow cast by the earth, well-known by O.'s time as the cause of night. Eva M. Sanford, *Were the Hymns of Propertius Sung?*: the argument from length loses some force in view of August., *Retract.* 1. 18, where a congregation is expected to sing a psalm of 228 verses.

XXXI. 2. April, 1936.

H. W. Prescott, *Silent Roles in Roman Comedy* (I): examines the evidence for silent supernumeraries and discusses the use made of them. J. F. Mountford, *The Music of Pindar's Golden Lyric*: a detailed examination of Kircher's fragment, setting out the facts and the arguments for and against its genuineness. E. E. Burgiss, *The Terminology of Witchcraft*: a list (with references) of Latin terms used of witches and wizards and their activities. O. W. Reinmuth, *Two Prefectural Edicts concerning the Publicani*: text of Pap. Princeton A.M. 8931 (fragments of two 2nd cent. edicts dealing with 'racketeering' by τελῶναι) with notes on readings and a very full commentary. W. K. Smith, *The Date of the Ars Poetica*: the poem was written after the appearance of *Odes* i-iii in 23 B.C. and submitted to Augustus before he left for the East in 22: in view of representations by Aug. it was laid aside and published, with a new dedication to L. Piso, some time after 13. M. Hadas, *The Tradition of a Feeble Jason*: the Hellenistic tradition finds an artistic parallel in a 5th cent. Athenian crater: it may perhaps be traced in the Ναυπάκτια and Pindar's picture may be a protest. A. Shewan, *The Bow of Odysseus*: replies to H. J. Rose's criticisms in *C.P.* 29. 343.

Hermathena. XLIX. (1935.)

W. H. Porter, *The Antecedents of the Spartan Revolution of 243 B.C.*, argues that the decline of Sparta was not due to fall in wages and rise in prices or to the introduction of a money economy, or to a slow shrinkage in the number of 'lots,' but (1) to the effects of the earthquake of 464 (Ziehen, *Hermes*, 68), and (2) the loss of Messenia after 371 B.C. A. Souter, *Varia Latina*, a lexicological study of a number of post-classical words and uses. E. H. Alton, *Temptamina Propertiana*, proposes emendations on Prop. i 16, 42: ii 6, 12: ii 7, 2: ii 28, 11: iii 7, 25: iii 7, 60: iv 7, 35-38: iv 9, 24: iv 9, 35. W. A. Goligher, *Articles for an Attic Law Lexicon*, has notes on ἀγαμίον γραφή: ἀγεωργίου δίκη: ἀγραφίου γραφή: ἀγράφου μετάλλων γραφή: ἀδικίου γραφή: ἀεικείας δίκη. R. M. Gwynn, *Two Notes*, proposes in St. Paul, Rom. xii 16, μὴ τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονούντες ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς συναπαγόμενοι, to emend the last word to συναγαγόμενοι. The vb. occurs in Polybius and the middle voice denotes reciprocity. In Wisdom of Solomon xvii 13, τὸν αὐτὸν ὕπνον κοιμώμενοι, G. would read τὸν ἄπνον ὕπνον. W. B. Stanford, *Varia*, argues (1) that ἀλωπεκία, baldness on the head, connects with ἀλώπηξ in its meaning bat, cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xxix 26. (2) That Βηνή, a town in Crete, Benna in Thrace, Benacus, Alabanda, Bandusia, bananica, a variety of vine (Pliny, *N.H.* 14, 37), are connected with Old Irish bend-benn, Mod. ben, Welsh bann, 'high.' Cf. Hesych. βανοῖς· ὄρη στρογγύλα: (3) suggests that Hesych. ἀβήρει· ᾗδει should be emended to ἀβήδει or ἀβείδει (i.e. ἀβείδει); cf. the Cretan ἀβέλιον=ἡλιον: (4) on Theocr. vi 15-18 argues that the

point of the comparison of Galatea to the thistledown lies in the tendency of thistledown to evade the clutch of the hand as well as to attach itself to one's clothes, no matter how one tries to avoid it. H. W. Parke, *Pausanias' Description of the Temple of Delphi*, argues from occurrence of *θεδραίο* 8' αὖ twice in a single chapter (x, 29, 2 and 4), though nowhere else in the work, that Paus. had not himself seen the objects in question. P. brings evidence to show that the temple was never open except after sacrifice to those consulting the oracle. M. Esposito, *Latin Learning and Literature in Medieval Ireland*—iv, argues that the *Vita Prima* (or *Vita Tertia*) *Brigidae* is a composition either of Ultan or of Aileran, and therefore the earliest hagiographical monument compiled in Ireland (c. 650) that has come down to us in its original form and in sound MS. tradition. He gives a description of the MSS. of the *Vita*. F. R. M. Hitchcock, *On Tac. Ann.* xv 44, 'indicio eorum multitudo (Christianorum) haud proinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis convicti sunt,' after an examination of all passages in Tac. where (a) *odium* w. gen. and (b) *humanum* genus occur, concludes that Tac. here refers to the *odium* felt by the *humanum* genus against the Christians.

Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung. XI. 6. 1935.

H. Preisker, *Jesus und das Urchristentum*. Emphasizes the dynamic features which distinguish the earliest Christianity from Judaism and Hellenistic mystery-cults.

XII. 1. 1936.

H. Rüdiger, *Horaz als Römer*. Lucid rehandling of a familiar theme.

XII. 2. 1936.

K. Olzscha, *Die Sprache der Etrusker, Probleme und neue Wege der Deutung*. Renewed examination of the Agram roll, in combination with other evidence, has made it possible to translate considerable consecutive passages, which follow the known arrangement of formal prayers, and thus to establish the existence in the language both of an Indogermanic stratum and of a stratum resembling Basque and some Caucasian speeches. H. Oppermann, *Die Bevölkerungspolitik des Augustus*. Deals chiefly with the efforts made by Augustus to preserve and utilize the traditional predominance of the Italian upper classes.

Philologus. XC (N.F. XLIV) 3. 1935.

K. Barwick, *Horaz Carm. I, 2 und Vergil*. (1) The omens of ll. 1-20 are those of 44 B.C. The Ode is a prayer to Augustus not to resign control. (2) H. had in mind Verg. G. I. 463 sqq. (3) The Civil War (*scelus* 29) was brought on by Rome's moral degeneration (cf. I. 24, III. 24). F. Klingner, *Horazevklärungen*. (1) Sat I. 6. Relations between H. and Maecenas are grounded in their similar moral outlook. (2) Detects a unity in C. II. 6 unobserved by the editors. (3) Analyses C. I. 17. K. Latte, *Eine Ode des Horaz* (II. 16). Discusses H.'s word-painting and sequence of thought. J. Stroux, *Valerius Flaccus und Horaz*. (1) Some verbal reminiscences of H. in V. F. (2) Compares the preliminaries to the voyage in V. F. and Ap. Rhod. V. F. conforms to taste of Augustan epic writers, esp. in motivation. (3) Compares speeches of Teucer (C. I. 7) and Jason (V. F. I. 241 sqq.) (4) Discusses H.'s debt to the Greek lyric poets in Epode 13. G. Jachmann, *Calabrae Pierides*. C. IV. 8 15-19 are interpolated by someone who thought mention of Scipio required by *Calabrae Pierides* (cf. Ov. A.A. III. 409-10). Discusses other interpolations in middle of a line. R. Helm, *Reden in den Oden des Horaz*. H. inserts long speeches in epic or dithyrambic manner (esp. cf. Bacchylides) without endangering lyrical unity. U. Knoche, *Horazens satirische Gesprächsführung*. Shows how transitions of thought in S. I. 4 and elsewhere are often made from a single word. MISZELLE: G. Carlsson, *Horaz C.I. 31, 17. Paratis = iis quae in promptu sunt*.

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